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Abstract
The thesis examines the nature and extent of protection available to
"whistleblowers", employees who disclose to outside bodies wrongdoing or
malpractice at work. It begins with a consideration of the philosophical basis for
providing protection for such employees. The legal rights of the whistleblowing
employee in English law are then considered. In chapter three case law on the duty
of confidence is examined and conclusions drawn on its application to employees
dismissed for blowing the whistle, with particular reference to whether disclosure
of information involves a breach of the employment contract. The general law on
unfair dismissal is examined in chapter four to determine the extent to which an
employee can claim that a dismissal for raising a concern is unfair. Protection for
whistleblowing on specific issues such as race or sex discrimination, and health and
safety issues is considered in chapter five.
International standards governing the protection of the right to freedom of
expression, in particular Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
are examined in chapter six. Chapter seven comprises a comparative study of the
protection available to employees who blow the whistle in the USA, where
protection exists for whistleblowers both at a constitutional level and in specific
legislation.
A case study is included in chapter eight in which the position of employees in the
National Health Service is examined in detail, with regard to their contractual
position and the practical difficulties faced by those who wish to raise concerns
about matters at work.
A fundamental distinction drawn throughout the thesis is between two types of
whistleblowing: "watchdog" whistleblowing, referring the raising of concerns about
immediate threats to health and safety or of serious financial loss; and "protest"
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whistleblowing, referring to the participation of employees in debate on matters that
are in the public interest, using specialist informztion gained from their
employment. The recognition of these two forms of whistleblowing aids the
analysis of the limitations of the legal protection as well as proving useful in the
determining the scope of proposed reform.
The argument is made that the protection currently available is inadequate and the
thesis ends with proposals for legal reform.
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One
Introduction
The term "whistleblower" is usually used to refer to the person who raises
the alarm in public about a wrong being committed in private. Many
employees are well placed to act as whistleblowers; they have unique access
to information in the workplace and are often the first to know if anything
is seriously wrong in the organisation in which they work. Employees
therefore have the potential to act as an early warning system, to alert
management or the public where serious risks arise.
However, this potential often goes unrealised; concerns are not voiced, or
else are voiced too late. This can have disastrous consequences. Employees
reported concerns about the potential safety risks of sailing with the bow
doors open on roll on roll off ferries prior to the capsize of the ferry The
Herald of Free Enterprise on March 6th 1987, in which one hundred and
ninety three people died'. A few months before the train collision that
killed thirty five people and injured five hundred, a supervisor noticed
faulty wiring in the Clapham Junction Relay Room, but did not report it2.
One hundred and sixty seven people were killed in the explosion on the
Piper Alpha oil platform; employees had had concerns about safety but had
not raised them at the time3.
'Court Inquiry, Department of Transport, Ct No. 8074, 1987 HMSO
2lnvestigation into the Clapham Junction Railway Accident, November 1989, }IMSO Cm
3The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, November 1990, HMSO Cm 1310
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Employees not only have the potential to raise concerns about safety
matters, but may also be aware of financial malpractice, the disclosure of
which could prevent financial loss to many. Employees had doubts about
the probity of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)
before the disclosure of the £2 billion fraud that left many businesses in
ruin. The internal auditor who, in 1990, expressed concerns was
subsequently made redundant4.
In each of these cases employees were in a position to prevent disaster or
financial scandal, but did not do so, either for fear of rocking the boat and
appearing disloyal, or because they feared reprisal. The ensuing disasters
have led to public concern about the lack of protection available to
employees who raise concerns about safety or wrongdoing at work,
although thus far, no general protection has been introduced to cover such
employees5. Similar concerns led to the introduction of specific protection
in the USA for employees who blow the whistle. For example, Michigan's
Whistleblower Protection Act was introduced in direct response to an
incident in the 1970's in which employees were threatened with reprisal if
they volunteered information to an inquiry into the shipping of poisonous
chemical fire retardant to state feed-grain cooperatives, which had serious
effects on the health of those who ate contaminated food.
Concern about the lack of similar protection for employees in the UK has
also been generated by several high profile cases of whistleblowing at work
involving employees within the National Health Service. In February 1990,
Helen Zeitlin, a consultant haematologist with the Bromsgrove and Redditch
4lnquiiy into the Supervision of The Bank of Credit and Commerce International, 2
October, 1992, HMSO, 198
5Following the Piper Alpha disaster, the Offshore Safety (Protection Against
Victimisation) Act 1992 was introduced. This was repealed by TURERA 1993 and replaced
by s 57A EPCA 1978 (now s 100 ERA), which provides general protection against
victimisation for raising health and safety concerns at work. This is discussed in detail in
Chapter five.
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health authority was dismissed for mentioning nursing shortages at a public
meeting. Although she was ultimately successful in gaining reinstatement
after an appeal to the Secretary of State for Health, she no longer works in
her original job, and her case acted as a focus for concern about the
difficulties faced by staff who speak out about standards at work. According
to Zeitlin, before leaving her job, she had been persistently intimidated and
undermined by NHS managers, who had, among other things, raised
questions about her mental health6.
Other cases followed. Graham Pink was dismissed for gross misconduct
after publishing in The Guardian a series of letters he had written to
hospital managers, his Member of Parliament, the Chief Executive of the
NHS, the Secretary of State for Health and the Prime Minister. In these he
raised concerns about staffing levels on the geriatrics ward on which he
worked7. He also spoke to the local press about his concerns 8. Again, Pink
was ultimately successful in his claim for unfair dismissal, but no longer
works in his original job. His case became a cause celebre amongst nurses,
but also led to increased fears on the part of nursing staff about the risks
involved in voicing concerns. Many nursing staff have heard of his
dismissal, fewer know of his success at the industrial tribunal.
Other examples of employees dismissed after blowing the whistle include
Chris Chapman, a scientist at the Leeds General Infirmary, who was the
only one out of a staff of two hundred to be made redundant in a work
reorganisation. He had just exposed financial corruption and scientific fraud
in his department. After much publicity and intervention by his Member of
Parliament, he was reinstated, subject to an agreement not to speak about
6As confirmed in conversation with Helen Zeitlin. See also the Independent 10 September
1993. See also Lennane, "Whistleblowing": a health issue (1993) 307 BMJ 667
7The Guardian, 11 April 1990.
8Stockport Express Advertiser, July 25 1990
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the case in public9. Social worker, Sue Machin won her claim of unfair
dismissal after she was dismissed for gross misconduct. Prior to the incident
that gave rise to the dismissal, she had made allegations of cruelty at the
Ashworth Special Hospital where she worked, as part of the inquily into
patient treatment at the hospital by Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC. She claims
that the dismissal was a direct result of the evidence she gave at the
inquiry'0.
These are some of the more famous examples of reprisal taken for blowing
the whistle, but they are by no means isolated examples. In its news letter,
The Whistle, the organisation Freedom to Care" documents many
examples of employees dismissed or disciplined for raising concerns; a
social worker dismissed for criticising standards of care in the children's
home in which he worked, a college lecturer dismissed for writing to an
exam board with concerns about academic standards, a psychiatrist
suspended and threatened with dismissal after making complaints about his
employer' 2 . The charity Public Concern at Work (see below), in its annual
report gives details of a selection of cases it dealt with in its first year
including that of a credit controller, concerned about his employer's
involvement in a million pound fraud who had been threatened with an
injunction unless he undertook not to disclose any details, and employees
who resigned over concerns about the state of repair of brakes on a ride at
a pleasure park. In its publications on whistleblowing in defence
9As confirmed in conversation with Chris Chapman.
'°As confirmed in conversation with Sue Machin. See also, the Independent 3 June 1995.
For report on Ashworth Special Hospital, see Report of the Committee of Inquiry into
Complaints about Ashworth Special Hospital, August 1992, HMSO Cm 2028-1.
"A self help and lobbying group for workers in health and social services.
' 2The Whistle, Volume II, No. 6., Winter 1994, Freedom to Care.
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procurement, the police and local government' 3 , many more cases are
documented.
The publicity and resulting concern about the risks faced by employees who
raise concerns about work-related issues have had a number of practical
consequences. Both the Royal College of Nursing and the Manufacturing
Science Finance Union set up confidential telephone "hot-lines" used by
nursing and other health care professionals to report concerns' 4 . Several
self help and lobby groups have been set up, giving support to those who
blow the whistle and lobbying for legal protection to be provided for
employees'5.
In addition, October 1993 saw the launch of Public Concern At Work, a
charity set up to help employees raise and employers address concerns
about malpractice at work. The charity provides various services to help
employees with serious concerns about wrongs that may threaten the public
interest. It provides a legal advice and assistance service for employees who
may face dismissal or discipline for raising concerns. It also advises
employees on how best to raise concerns internally, sometimes acting as a
neutral channel through which this can be done. In addition, it provides
training and consultancy to employers on how to deal with concerns raised
'3 Speaking up by sector: The Police (1993) Public Concern at Work, London. Speaking
up by sector 2: Local Government, blowing the whistle on fraud and corruption (1994) Public
Concern at Work, London. Speaking up by sector 3: Blowing the whistle on defence
procurement (1995) Public Concern at Work, London.
'4See The Royal College of Nursing, Report on Whistleblow Scheme (1992) and Freedom
of Speech in the NHS, A Guide for Negotiators, MSF, July 1993
' 5For example Freedom to Care for those working in the health and social services, and
the Council for Academic freedom and Academic Standards, in the further and higher
education sector.
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by employees, undertakes research and seeks to influence public debate on
accountability and corporate and public governance'6.
Public Concern at Work has also been involved in various attempts to
introduce legislation to provide employment protection for whistleblowers.
In the autumn of 1995, together with the Campaign for Freedom of
Information, it produced a Whistleblower Protection Bill as a ten minute
rule Bill, sponsored by Tony Wright MP. The response to consultation on
this Bill led, in the spring and summer of 1996, to a second attempt to
introduce legislation. The Public Interest Disclosure Bill, Don Touhig MP's
private member's bill, provided for a remedy for employees dismissed for
raising certain matters of public concern. The classes of information
covered were limited to offences or breaches of statutory requirements,
improper or unauthorised use of public or other funds, miscarriages of
justice and dangers to the health and safety of any individual or to the
environment. As a general rule, protection was only to be provided if
disclosures were made internally at first, and only applied to employees.
Even though the protection offered was restricted after consideration in
committee'7, the Bill did not make it through the parliamentary process.
Despite the failure to introduce general protection for employees who report
wrongs, some recent legislation has imposed a duty on employees to report
concerns. Section 48 of the Pensions Act 1995 imposes a duty on auditors
and actuaries to report cases to the Occupational Pensions Regulatory
Authority where they have reason to believe that any duty imposed by law
is not being complied with, and where that failure will prevent the
'6To this end the charity was involved in giving evidence to the Nolan Committee on
Standards in Public Life. Its proposed code for an internal reporting mechanism to be adopted
by public services was taken up by the Nolan Committee. (Second Report of the Committee
on Standards in Public Life, 1996, E[MSO Cm 3270 I - II.)
' 7For example, as originally drafted, the list of protected matters that could be raised was
only illustrative, and included abuse of authority and maladministration as well as those
already listed.
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Authority from carrying out its functions. Failure to make a report can lead
to the auditor being disqualified by the Authority. The Pensions Act states
that compliance with this duty will not constitute a contravention of any
other duty owed by the auditor, so that it cannot amount to a breach of
confidence or breach of contract on the part of the auditor. Auditors in
other financial sectors are under a similar duty to report concerns to their
respective regulators'8.
However, no specific employment protection is provided by the Pensions
Act and other similar regulations. The parliamentary debate on the Public
Interest Disclosure Bill' 9 indicates the ongoing concern of the legislators
about the costs to businesses in providing employment protection. Although
the recently introduced Section 100 Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA
1996)20 provides employment protection for safety representatives who
have adverse action taken against them for raising health and safety
concerns at work, it is notable that this section was introduced to ensure
compliance with European law2'. It appears that insufficient weight is
given by UK legislators to the potential cost of ignoring the valid concerns
of employees.
As the examples given above show, there is ample evidence that employees
who raise concerns at work often suffer reprisal. As a result, it is quite
common for employees to resign before raising a concern. Alternatively,
rather than lose their jobs, they may chose to stay quiet. Given the public
'8For example, Auditors (Insurance Companies Act 1982) Regulations 1994 SI 1994/449;
Auditors (Financial Services Act 1986) Rules 1994 SI 1994/526; Accountants (Banking Act
1987) Regulations 1994 SI 1994/ 524; Building Societies (Auditors) Order 1994 SI 1994/ 525.
' 9H.C. Deb., 1st March 1996 cols. 1108 - 1175
20Previously s 57A EP(C)A 1978, and introduced by the Trade Union Reform and
Employment Rights Act 1993.
21 EC Framework Directive 89/39 1
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interest in encouraging the disclosure of certain matters, particularly where
health and safety are involved, this gives cause for serious concern.
1 Definitions of whistleblowing
Before considering the employment protection currently available for
employees who blow the whistle, the definition of whistleblowing needs
further refinement, as a distinction can be drawn between two types of
whistleblowing which affects the level of protection that is needed.
The two types of whistleblowing can be illustrated by contrasting the cases
of Helen Zeitlin and Graham Pink with those of the employees at Clapham
Junction, BCCI and on the Piper Alpha oil platform. In the latter cases, the
employees had knowledge of illegal conduct, or specific safety risks. They
had the chance act as watchdogs, alerting the public or their fellow
employees to the existence of danger or wrongdoing that placed them at
significant risk of financial loss, serious injuly or death. Helen Zeitlin and
Graham Pink, on the other hand, were not so much alerting the public to
specific and imminent dangers, as using their positions as employees to
protest about developments in the NES.
In effect, there are two different types of conduct that are being termed
"whistleblowing". The first can be referred to as "watchdog
whistleblowing", and refers to the case where the employee discloses a
current and avoidable danger to health and safety, or serious financial
malpractice. In contrast, "protest whistleblowing" can be used to denote the
case where an employee uses her experience at work to participate in debate
on issues of public importance, often using her position inside an
organisation to shed new light on issues already being debated in public.
Both types of whistleblowing can be said to serve the public interest,
18
although the public interest in favour of watchdog whistleblowing is
stronger, given its ability to avert imminent disaster.
The different types of whistleblowing raise slightly different issues, and
arguably deserve different levels of protection. Yet the distinction between
the two is not always clear cut. For example, in raising his concern about
under staffing on his hospital ward, Graham Pink could be said to have
been protesting about standards of care within the NITS. Or he could be said
to have been acting as a watchdog to alert the public to the risks to safety
involved in under staffing. Similarly, the BCCI internal auditor's actions in
raising concerns could be seen as those of a watchdog, reporting the risk of
serious financial loss, or as those of a protester, objecting to financial
irregularities.
However, the distinction between the two remains valid, and can be useful
when considering questions such as the extent to which the public interest
served by the whistleblower's disclosure outweighs the duty of loyalty owed
by the employee to her employer. Even though the concepts involve a
degree of overlap, they will be used throughout the following chapters to
draw a generalised distinction between the two types of conduct.
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2 Overview of the thesis
The chapters that follow will consider the extent to which employees are
protected when disclosing matters of public concern at work. The focus is
on employees in both public and private sector employment22.
Chapter two considers the philosophical basis for providing protection for
employees who speak out at work. Particular attention is given to the
justifications for protecting protest whistleblowing, which is viewed as an
aspect of freedom of speech. The writings of Milton, Mill and Meiklejohn
are used to assert that protest whistleblowing merits strong legal protection,
there being a presumption in favour of protecting freedom of speech which
should only be overridden where there are strong interests in restrictions.
Chapter three looks at the legal position of the employee beginning with the
question of whether blowing the whistle involves a breach of the contract
of employment. Case law on the duty of confidence and the interpretation
of the concept of the public interest are examined in detail. The factors that
influence the determination of the public interest in any particular case are
identified and applied to the example of the whistleblower.
Chapter four examines the protection against unfair dismissal contained in
the Employment Rights Act 1996 to determine the extent to which an
employee can claim that a dismissal for blowing the whistle is unfair. In
It does not consider the special position of civil servants under the Official Secrets Acts.
For discussion of the implications of public interest disclosure for civil servants see Cripps,
The Legal Implications of Disclosure in the Public Interest, 2nd Edition (1994) Sweet and
Maxwell, London, Chapter 3. Other matters of relevance but not included in the thesis are
discussed by Cripps, including the public interest as a defence to defamation arising out of
disclosures of information (Chapter 6) and the public interest as a defence to proceedings
instituted in an attempt to discover the identity of employees who disclosure information
(Chapter 8).
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particular the operation of the test of fairness contained in s 98(4) ERA
1996 is considered and applied to the example of a dismissal for raising
public interest concerns at work.
Protection for whistleblowing on specific issues is examined in chapter five.
The victimisation provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, Race
Relations Act 1976 and Disability Discrimination Act 1995 are considered,
together with the protection against dismissal or action short of dismissal
for raising health and safety issues and for partaking in trade union
activities24.
Chapter six looks at the protection for whistleblowers under the European
Convention on Human Rights. Article 10 ECHR provides for the right to
freedom of speech. The extent to which this affords protection for
employees who exercise their freedom of speech in the workplace is
considered.
Chapter seven contains a comparative study of the protection of
whistleblowers in the USA. Specific legislation is in force in the USA to
protect employees against reprisal for blowing the whistle at work. In
addition, employees enjoy a constitutional rights to freedom of speech and
can claim damages for the tort of "wrongful discharge" if dismissed in
breach of public policy. An examination of the operation of these varied
forms of employment protection demonstrates that, despite the seeming
wealth of protection in comparison with that available in the UK. the US
employee is not fully protected against reprisals for whistleblowing. The
shortcomings of the protection in the US provide useful lessons when
considering reform proposals for the UK.
ss 44 and 100 ERA 1996
24ss 152 and 146 TULR(C)A 1992
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Chapter eight consists of a case study on whistleblowing in the NHS. First,
the need to protect the freedom of speech of NHS staff is justified, using
the arguments examined in chapter two. Next, the terms of employment of
staff in the NETS are examined, together with the UKCC Code of
Professional Conduct for nursing staff, and the government's Guidance for
Staff on Relations with the Public and the Media. The practical problems
faced by staff in the NHS when considering raising concerns are then
assessed. Informal interviews with NHS managers, nursing staff and nursing
staff representatives were conducted in order to inform the discussion in this
chapter. The case study is not based on any statistical analysis and makes
no claim to be an exact sociological study; instead, interviews with selected
individuals are used to show the conflict between the various sources of
obligation on NETS staff.
The final chapter considers various proposals for improvement in the
protection available to employees who blow the whistle. One option
discussed is increasing the use of internal reporting mechanisms within the
workplace. In addition the creation of a new automatically unfair reason for
dismissal is suggested, and its scope examined.
22
Two
Whistleblowing and Freedom of
Speech
The examples provided by the disasters at Zeebrugge, Clapham Junction,
and on the Piper Alpha oil platform provide a sobering justification for
protecting those who wish to raise concerns about health and safety at work.
Had the individuals involved felt safe to raise their concerns, lives might
have been saved. Similarly, financial fraud and mismanagement might cause
fewer losses if employees feel safe to report concerns.
In such cases, where there is a concern about an immediate health and
safety risk, or the risk of serious financial malpractice, it is easy to justify
protecting the individual who speaks out. The information, if acted on, can
help avert danger or disaster; the individual with access to the information
should therefore be encouraged to come forward with the information so
that those in a position to do so can take appropriate action. Without the
information no action can be taken. Despite the fact that there may be
competing interests present, such as an interest in commercial
confidentiality, or in employee trust and confidence, this is unlikely to
outweigh the public interest in allowing the information to be disclosed, in
such circumstances.
Although not always accepted in the courts 1, these arguments provide
strong justification for protecting the speech of the watchdog whistleblower.
Perhaps more difficult to justify is protection for the protester, where the
immediate public interest served by the speech is less obvious, and where
'See Chapter Three on Confidentiality and the Public Interest.
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the interests in speaking may more readily be outweighed by the interests
of an employer in confidence, loyalty and privacy. This section therefore
concentrates on the justification for protecting the protest whistleblower.
This justification applies equally to watchdog whistleblowers, but is not so
necessary to the case for protection because of the existence of strong
pragmatic arguments in favour of watchdog speech.
In order to see why the speech of the protester needs protection alongside
that of the watchdog, protest about matters at work needs to be seen as an
aspect of the right to freedom of speech. According to this view, the public
interest is served by protest, and there should be a presumption in favour
of protecting the speaker, unless there are very strong reasons to the
contrary2. This argument is based on the view that the right to free speech
is a fundamental right which will usually "trump" other rights, such as the
right of an employer to privacy and confidence. It is worth considering
these arguments in some detail to see whether they shed any light on the
position that courts should take when weighing competing interests to
confidence and to free speech.
1 Why should free speech be protected?3
There are three broad arguments in favour of the protection of free speech
as a fundamental right. First, freedom of speech can be seen as an aspect
of personal autonomy, without which an individual cannot be totally
fulfilled. According to this view, the right to free speech should be upheld
2The need to protect individual freedom of speech, with only strictly limited exceptions,
is recognised by the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10. The way in which
the rights enshrined in the Convention might by used by whistleblowers is considered in
Chapter Six.
3The arguments in this section are based on Barendt, Freedom of Speech (1985) Oxford,
and Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiiy (1982) Cambridge.
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as it serves the personal interests of the speaker. Secondly, freedom of
speech has been said to lead to the discovery of the truth by allowing
eveiyone to contribute to debate. Here, free speech serves the interests of
the audience rather than the speaker. The final reason for protecting free
speech also serves the interests of the audience but would protect one type
of speech above others; the argument is that freedom of political speech is
necessary to enable citizens to understand political arguments so as to be
able fully to participate in the democratic system.
If any of the three approaches are sustainable, then it will be possible to
argue that free speech should be protected, not on the basis of the content
of the speech, (such as the fact that it reveals fraud or misconduct), but
because the right to speak itself deserves protection. Although, if used to
argue for the protection of all types of speech, each of the theories has its
limitations, they can provide a basis from which to argue for a high level
of protection for some types of speech, particularly political speech4.
1.1 Free Speech as an Aspect of Individual Autonomy
The first argument supporting special protection for freedom of speech is
that it is the ability to hold opinions and beliefs, and to communicate them,
that makes us fully human. In order to be able to develop one's ideas on
moral or political issues, one needs to have access to a wide range of views
and opinions. Thus, the right to speak, write, and discuss freely is
fundamental to individual development and autonomy and the protection of
the right to communicate is essential in a civilised society.
However, such an approach does have limitations as a philosophical
justification for granting freedom of speech special protection. On a general
41t is not intended to consider general free speech theory in depth. Although the theories
used here to justify protection for political speech can be used to argue for protection of other
types of speech, these arguments will not be considered.
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level, when one compares the right to free speech with other rights equally
beneficial to human development, such as rights to education or housing it
is not clear why free speech should enjoy particular protection, other than
for the negative reason that it is easier to prevent encroachments on a right
to speech, than to require the positive action necessary to ensure that a
right, for example, to education is available to all.
More particularly, the argument essentially seems to be that freedom of
speech is one aspect of the right to human dignity. If this is so, then again
it is unclear how the right to free speech should fare in competition with
other aspects of human dignity such as a right to privacy, or an interest in
enjoying the confidence of one's friends or colleagues. This is especially so
when the speech involves disclosure of facts or information, as opposed to
opinion, where it may be difficult to see the speech as an aspect of self
expression. Thus, to the extent that freedom of speech is an individual right,
it is not clear why that right should prevail over any other.
On the other hand, it has been argued that free speech supports the human
dignity of the audience as well as the speaker 5. Scanlon suggests that it is
only by hearing the ideas and opinions of others that one can develop one's
own beliefs. This idea is developed to argue for special protection for
political speech (see below), but even at a general level, such a view gives
a stronger reason to uphold the right of one person to speak against the
right of another to confidence. Once the interests of the audience are taken
into account one person's right to confidence is no longer weighed against
another's right to speak, but against the rights of many. Viewed in this way,
however, the argument for free speech prevailing over other rights is more
utilitarian, concerned with upholding free speech as the way to satisfy the
5Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression' in The Philosophy of Law, ed. R. M.
Dworkin (Oxford, 1977)
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interests of the greatest number, rather than anything inherent in the right
to speech itself.
1.2 Free Speech Leads to Truth.
The argument that freedom of speech will lead to the discovery of truth can
be traced most famously to Milton in Areopagitica 6, his speech in defence
of the freedom to publish without state censorship. He argues that without
the freedom to debate new ideas there is no health in intellectual or moral
life, and that truth, when contrasted with error will always win:
"Let (truth) and falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the
worse, in a free and open encounter? Her confuting is the best and
surest suppressing."
Thus the argument is that if full and open debate is allowed, then the truth
will emerge.
This argument was developed by Mill in On Liberty7. Mill argues that
freedom of speech is essential if the truth on any matter is to be discovered.
An opinion that is silenced may in fact be true, and by silencing it, one will
have prevented the truth from being discovered. Even if the silenced
opinion turns out to be an error overall, it may contain an element of truth
that will be lost in the silencing of the whole. Furthermore, even if the
opinion is totally in error, the truth will be strengthened by the debate. In
fact, he goes as far as to say that truth is enfeebled if not fully and
regularly debated:
"If the opinion is right, [people] are deprived of the opportunity of
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as
6Areopagitica (1644) in Areopagitica and other prose works (1927) Dent and Sons,
London.
7J. S. Mill, On Liberty in On Liberty and Other Writings, Edited by Stefan Collini,
Cambridge University Press (1989)
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great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth, produced by its collision with error."8
Thus, free speech should be given greater protection than other rights
because it is only through free speech that we can arrive at the truth about
a situation. In the case of the watchdog whistleblower the necessity of
reaching the truth is obvious, and this can also be the case for the protester.
For example, the free speech of a whistleblower in the NRS is necessary
if we are to reach correct conclusions on whether recent reforms are
working, and in order best to determine how the service should be run.
The argument has been taken up by various judges in the USA when
looking at the scope of their First Amendment rights. They use the
terminology of the market: "[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas... [T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market". 9 Although this
approach has led to extensive protection for many types of speech, it shares
the limitations of Mill's argument from truth.
First, it makes the presumption that there is a.n objective truth that can be
known, which is not always the case. In some cases, factual information can
be said to be true without the need for wide public debate. Elsewhere, the
"truth" is more elusive. For example, in the context of protest
whistleblowing in the NIHS, we may know how many staff there are on a
ward, but still not know whether it is understaffed, that issue being more
complex and in the end, relative. The argument from truth is thus limited
as a justification for protecting the protester.
8Mill, op cit. p 20
9Abrams v United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes and Brandeis, dissenting).
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Secondly, whilst suppression of views may prevent the emergence of truth,
the causal link between wide and public debate and the emergence of truth
is not established. Historical experience shows that society does not
necessarily recognise the truth when presented with it. The only way round
this is to redefine truth, from an objective concept to a relative one in
which the "truth" is that which is generally accepted by society. However,
if this is done, the strength of the argument is lost as it is no longer clear
why "truth" must emerge only from public debate and not from any other
source recognised by society, such as myth or tradition. Truth effectively
becomes a relative concept and there is no reason for granting it special
protection. In arguing that freedom of speech should be afforded special
protection, Mill also assumes that the discovery of truth is the highest of
human goals although this is not necessarily so; the maintenance of dignity,
privacy and confidence may rank along side.
Finally, Mill presumes that the only reason for suppressing speech is that
it is false, although there are many occasions where information that is true
is not necessarily best debated in public for reasons of confidence,
commercial sensitivity, privacy etc. In fact, whilst this is a limitation of
Mill's argument for upholding the right to free speech on any issue, it does
explain the development of the final reason for upholding free speech for
particular categories of speech; for it not always the fear of falsity that leads
to the suppression of speech, but a fear of the consequences of the truth
being universally known and discussed.
1.3 Free Speech Upholds Democracy
The argument that free speech upholds democracy is mainly associated with
the work of Alexander Meiklejohn'°. He argues that free speech is a
'°see Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its relation to Self Government, (1972) Kennikat Press,
New York.
29
necessary part of self government; a democratic system requires that the
electorate is sufficiently informed to participate. The public thus need all
relevant information before them when playing their part in the democratic
process and for this reason, freedom of speech must be maintained. The
interests served by speech in this model are those of the audience not the
speaker. "What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that
everything worth saying shall be said"." Here the emphasis returns to a
certain extent to the content of speech; not all speech is worthy of special
protection, but political speech is.
Again the theory has limitations although it is probably the strongest
argument in favour of protection for public sector employees who protest
about matters at work. The first criticism is that the theory is based on the
idea that the electorate is sovereign: government's role is to serve the
people thus people need information in order to be able to judge whether
the government has done what they want it to do. However, if the electorate
is sovereign, there is no theoretical reason why it should not vote for a
government which does not uphold free speech; nor is there a reason why
a majority of the electorate may not vote for the suppression of the speech
of a minority. These arguments can only be overcome by refining the
argument with insights gained from the Mill's arguments from truth
considered above.
Schauer argues that it is in conjunction with the argument from truth that
the argument from democracy gets its strength as a rationale for giving
special protection to political speech. Since governments have enormous
power, they have the potential to make errors of a greater size and import
than most decision makers. Since the issues surrounding the decisions in
uMeiklejohn, op cit p. 25
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which they are involved are rarely clear cut, it is vital that they are debated
and discussed widely so that the possibility of error is minimised12.
This argument will not apply to all information; for example, neither purely
commercial information, nor that relating to the private lives of public
figures are politically relevant. The communication of such information thus
deserves no special protection. However, in many cases, information can
lead to better, more informed political debate and participation in the
political process. Thus, information about how a government policy is
working, how government funding policies will affect parts of the public
sector or about how a public utility is being run may all be necessary to
enable the electorate to participate knowledgably in the political process.
Equally, governments may be keen to restrict access to exactly this type of
information.
The refined argument from democracy is further strengthened by
considering the reasons for suppression of speech, as free speech is often
suppressed not because it is false, but from a fear of what the truth, in
public hands, may lead to. The argument takes into account the tendency
of governments to restrict information that is harmful to them. As Schauer
puts it; "Freedom to criticise the government is a check on the survival
instincts of self-perpetuating governmental organisations." 13 Thus free
speech is not merely necessary because the electorate needs certain
information: it is also necessary to act as a check on governments' tendency
to be "economical with the truth" when it is in their interests to be so.
2 By virtue of the power we grant to government, the effects of its fallibility are
magnified by the importance of the decisions it makes. The special concern for freedom to
discuss public issues and freedom to criticise governmental officials is a form of the argument
from truth, because the necessity for rational thinking and the possibility or error in
governmental policy are both large and serious. There is little certainty in questions of
governmental policy, and the consequences are particularly serious when the chosen policies
turn out to have been mistaken." Schauer, op cit. p 46
' 3 Schauer, op cit. p. 43
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Scanlon points out that governments are notoriously partisan and unreliable
where political issues are concerned' 4. He argues from this that political
speech is distinctively important and deserves particular protection to
prevent governments from determining
when speech should be allowed.
1.4 Protest as Political Speech
The key to recognising the political nature of much protest speech is to
recognise the public aspect of many otherwise private employment
relationships. Where the employer is part of the public sector and funded
from public money, this is easy to see. Those who contribute to the funding
of such bodies via taxation have a legitimate interest in their work.
Obviously, if there is illegal or improper conduct in this sector, it is right
that the public should be informed. Moreover, the public sector is concerned
with the provision of essential services, for example health care and
education. Again, whether as contributors to the funding, or users of the
service, or both, members of the public have a legitimate interest in
knowing that these services are run as well as possible.
Such interests also arise in many areas of the private sector. The most
obvious are the industries that were recently part of the public sector. The
services they provide, such as the provision of gas and electricity are
essential ones, occupying a monopoly position in the market. Given the
dependence of most people on these services, there is a legitimate public
interest in their operation, despite the fact that they are privately owned.
The same can be said for many private companies that operate in areas once
dominated by the public sector, and now in the private sector as a result of
the government's drive towards the contracting out of essential services.
' 4Scanlon, Freedom ofExpression and Categories ofExpression (1979) 40 U. Pittsb. L.R.
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These employers include agencies that provide care staff used by social
services and hospitals, companies that provide street cleaning services for
local councils, catering companies operating in schools, colleges and
hospitals, and companies providing public transport. These private
employers are largely funded by public money and therefore should be
subject to the same public scrutiny as the public sector.
To a limited extent, the same argument can be applied to the traditional
private sector. In some circumstances, the public will have a legitimate
interest in the dealings of the company, for example where public health or
safety are at stake, or where the company is involved in illegal conduct.
However the situations where public scrutiny is appropriate are less
common.
Thus, despite the private nature of the employment relationship, matters of
concern to employees may often also be matters of public concern. At
times, those concerns have political implications. The political nature of
much protest whistleblowing is clearest in respect of those who work in the
public sector. In recent years, most parts of the public sector have been
subject to significant organisational change. An internal market has been
introduced to the NHS; school budgets are locally managed and some have
opted out of local authority control entirely; many local services are
contracted out of local authority control following compulsory competitive
tendering; and government agencies have been, and continue to be,
privatised.
These changes are far reaching, and have, in many cases, been carried out
against the wishes of many of those working in the different services. At
the same time, the changes form a key part of government policy in these
sectors, and it is important for the government that they are seen to be a
success. Taking the NTiS as an example, the introduction of the internal
market, and the setting up of trust hospitals were major changes introduced
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without the support of many who worked within the service. Even before
the changes. the public perception of the state of the NHS was known to be
a matter of vital political importance 15. This is especially the case.
following the changes to its structure as any shortcomings in the service are
likely to be seen to be the result of the changes and therefore the
responsibility of the government that introduced them.
This argument can be applied in any part of the public sector which has
been subject to the changes outlined. It is of party political importance that
the changes are viewed as a success by the voting public. Given the
electoral importance of public opinion on these issues, it is clearly right that
such opinion should be well informed. In the NHS the government has
requested that good news stories be published about the work of the
service' 6, and many trusts now have public relations departments.
However, in order to ensure that the public will be able to obtain sufficient
information to participate fully in the electoral process, the rights of others,
such as those who work within the service, to put their views across to the
public need also to be ensured.
The same argument can be applied to the recently privatised sector; again,
the question of whether the change is beneficial is politically sensitive, and
should be the subject of fully informed debate. Similarly, industries funded
mainly from the public purse, such as the defence industry should be
subject to similar scrutiny and debate. A problem arises when considering
the traditional private sector. Most of the time these industries and
companies operate to serve the private interests of shareholders and
' 5Recognised by Mr John Maples, then Conservative Party deputy chairman, in a memo
leaked to the Financial Times in 1994, setting out tactics for avoiding a Conservative defeat
at the next election. On the NHS he says "The best result for the next 12 months would be
zero media coverage". Financial Times 21 November 1994, p 10.
' 6Recognised in Maples's memo, above.
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consumers. However, there may be times when their operations can come
in for public scrutiny, for example if they pursue environmentally
unfriendly policies, or even if they pay very low wages. These are issues
that have political significance, and public debate is legitimate. It is
arguable that employees of these companies should be allowed to participate
in that debate, especially if the employers for which they work mislead the
public as to their policies on such issues. Whether they should be protected
from adverse action for initiating a such a debate is more questionable. To
argue for such protection would probably be to weaken the stronger
arguments for protection of speech on issues that are more clearly political.
1.5 Protection for Political Speech
The recognition that political speech is particularly susceptible to
interference from government provides strong grounds for protecting it. In
addition, the recognition of audience interests in hearing speech as well as
the speaker's interest in speaking, can provide additional reasons for
protecting speech even where the subject matter is not overtly political.
From the arguments from truth and autonomy it can be argued that,
regardless of content, there should be a presumption in favour of free
speech which should only be rebutted by evidence that another important
interest, such a confidence or privacy, is likely to be injured by the speech.
Thus the protection of speech still ultimately depends on its content, but a
presumption in favour of allowing free speech can benefit those who speak
out at work. Although interests in commercial confidence or privacy are
still accepted and recognised, any such interest in restraining information
will need to be especially strong if it is to outweigh the presumption in
favour of speech. In addition, where the subject matter can be regarded as
political, courts should be very wary of restraining speech.
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2 Recognition of the interests in free speech in substantive law
Given the philosophical justifications for giving the widest protection to free
speech, it is worth considering the extent to which these concerns are
reflected in the substantive law.
2.1 The European Convention on Human Rights and the argument
from democracy'7
Article 10 ECHR, subject to some restrictions, provides the right to freedom
of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas. It covers a wide range of types of speech including
artistic expression. To this extent, the right can be seen as upholding an
aspect of individual autonomy, both in the right to express oneself, and in
the right to receive information. However, the case law on the Convention
makes clear that political speech will be given special protection.
The Convention has as one of its main aims the maintenance of effective
political democracy in order to protect the "fundamental freedoms which are
the foundation of justice and peace in the world' 8 ". It is recognised that
freedom of speech'9 has a vital role in achieving this aint "freedom of
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a 'democratic
society'], one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the
' 7See Chapter Six, Protection Available under Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.
' 8Preamble to ECHR
'9Freedom of speech is protected under Article 10 of the Convention although the
protection is not absolute. Article 10(2) recognises that freedom of expression carries with it
duties and responsibilities, and that in some cases freedom of expression must be limited.
However, the circumstances in which such limitations may occur are restricted. See separate
section on ECHR.
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development of every man. "2° The particular importance of political speech
is also recognised: "freedom of political debate is at the very core of the
concept of a democratic society which prevails throughout the
convention"21.
The view of a democratic society reflected in the Convention is one of
"pluralism and tolerance" 22, recognising that there may be more than one
view of the truth. The argument from truth in its strict Millian sense holds
little sway within the Convention, instead, it is the lack of any objective
truth that gives rise to the need for the discussion and debate seen as vital
for the upholding of a pluralist democracy. The main rationale for providing
protection for free speech can therefore be seen to be a form of the
argument from democracy.
In tenns of the level of protection necessary, the Court and Commission
have, in some cases, recognised that protection needs to cover any activity
which, if not prohibited, might deter speech. In Lingens it was accepted
that the threat of legal proceedings could inhibit participation in public
debate, and in Van Der HeUden v the Netherlands24 the Commission
accepted that termination of employment restricted and penalised freedom
of speech25 . However, in other cases, the Court appears to take the line
that the Convention does not provide employment protection and
20Handyside v UK (1981) 1 E}IRR 737
2tLingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407
"Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which
there is no 'democratic society'." Handyside, above, para 49.
23ibid
1 1002/84 (1985) decision of 8th March
25The case was declared inadmissible as the measure was necessary in a democratic
society; his political activity was on behalf of party that was hostile to presence of foreign
workers and was clearly incompatible with his job.
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interference with the right to free speech by way of dismissal is not
sufficient to warrant the protection of the Convention26.
Despite these limitations, it is clear that the importance of free speech to the
democratic process is reflected in the Convention. Although Article 10
protects freedom of expression in more general terms, the special relevance
of political speech to the aims of the convention mean that the Court will
be particularly careful before finding that interference with the right comes
within the restrictions contained in Article 10(2).
2.2 Freedom of Speech in UK law
Although a signatoly of the ECHR, the UK has not incorporated the
Convention into domestic law 27 . Freedom of speech has traditionally been
seen to enjoy only residual protection under the common law, that is it
exists to the extent that other laws do not restrict it. However, more
recently, the principle of freedom of speech has gained recognition to the
extent that courts will interpret legislation and common law as far as
possible to accord with it.
The first way in which this is done is in accepting that freedom of speech
serves the public interest and can be used to determine the scope of
common law rules relating to the protection of privacy, confidence or the
right to a fair trial28 . In some cases, where free speech remains a residual
interest there seems to be a presumption in favour of confidence which is
26See Kosiek v Germany (1986) 9 EIIItR 328, and Glasenapp v Germany (1987) 9 EHRR
25. See also Vogt v Germany (Council of Europe, 7/1994/454/53 5) and discussion in ECHR
chapter.
27See Chapter six, Whistleblowing and Human Rights, para 5.
28For detail on how this balancing takes place, see Chapter Three, Whistleblowing and
the Contract of Employment.
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rebutted only where iniquity is disclosed 29. However, in other cases,
freedom of speech seems to be the rule, with restraint allowed exceptionally
if there is good reason30.
It may be that this reflects different philosophical approaches to the
protection of free speech. Although this is rarely explicit in the cases,
occasionally judges do give their reasons for upholding the right to free
speech above other rights. For example, in Woodward v Hutchins3 ' Lord
Denning allowed the disclosure of information about a group of singers
because the information corrected a false impression fostered by the group.
He argued that there was, in such circumstances, a public interest in
knowing the truth. Whilst not quite Mill's argument, such an approach, does
recognise the importance of free speech for the discovery of the truth,
where erroneous images are created.
Similarly, in cases involving information about the public sector, the
"argument from democracy" can be identified in the decisions of some
judges who have argued that the public interest in knowing how
government and public industries work outweighs the interests in
confidentiality32. In fact, those cases where the presumption seems to be
29Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 U Ch 113
301n Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] QB 752 Lord Widgery made it clear
that it was for the plaintiff to show that the publication of the material was in breach of
confidence, and that the public interest required that publication be restrained. Thus the
burden of proof in relation to the public interest lies on the plaintiff. This approach was
endorsed by the House of Lords in the Spycatcher case, Attorney-General v Guardian
Newspapers (No. 2) [1988] 3 WLR 776
'[1977] 1 WLR 760
32See A-G v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] QB 752 where an injunction to restrain publication
of cabinet discussions was refused, and the dissenting judgment of Lord Salmon in British
Steel v Granada Television [1981] AC 1097 where he argued that as British Steel was a
nationalised industry, the public was morally entitled to know why it was losing money.
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in favour of disclosure rather than confidence tend to be those in which
information relevant to government is involved33.
The argument from democracy can be identified more strongly in
Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd34 , where the principle
of freedom of speech was used to restrict the rights of government bodies
to bring actions for libel. The right to free speech was being used there in
a much stronger and more direct way, to restrict the development of legal
remedies, rather than simply as way of limiting the scope of common law
rules. A claim by a local authority for damages for libel was not allowed,
on the basis that to do so would be to place an undesirable fetter on the
freedom of expression. Lord Keith recognised that government bodies, both
elected and non-elected, need to be open to public criticism and that the
threat of a civil action for defamation would have an inhibiting effect on
such speech35 . Lord Keith's reasoning on the importance of free speech
echoes Schauer's comment that "[c}riticism of public officials and public
policy is a direct offshoot of the principles of democracy" 36 and is a clear
indication of the argument from democracy gaining recognition by the
judiciary as a basis for providing increased protection for political speech.
This approach can also be seen in Hector v Attorney General of Antigua
and Barbuda37, where the Privy Council was required to interpret the
scope of the Antiguan constitutional right to free speech. It held that a
33 Such as A-G v Jonathan Cape and A-G v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), above.
[1993] 2 WLR 449. See also the case brought by British Coal against the NUM for
libel, in which a High Court judge ruled that public bodies should be open to criticism in the
interests of free speech, The Guardian, 29 June 1996.
35Although he referred to Article 10 ECRR, Lord Keith believed that similar protection
was available under the common law without need to rely on the Convention.
36Schauer, op cit. p 39
[1990] 2 AC 312
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newspaper editor's conviction for printing a false statement likely to
undermine public confidence in the conduct of public affairs, was in breach
of the constitution. Lord Bridge pointed out that any attempt to stifle
criticism of those holding government office or responsible for public
administration amounts to political censorship and, moreover, that the
purpose of such criticism is to undermine public confidence in those in
power, and persuade the electorate that their opponents would do better in
office38 . The clear implication is that such criticism and discussion is
essential for the democratic process, and that such speech should therefore
be given the utmost protection.
3 Protection of the speech of whistleblowers
Freedom of speech may well require special protection, but that protection
can take several forms. It might be argued that a prohibition on criminal
sanctions for speech meets the requirements, or that prior restraint of speech
should be prevented, so that courts are able to compensate any damage
caused by the speech without prohibiting it altogether.
However, if the right to free speech is to be protected fully, wider
protection is necessary. The starting point must be to identify, and then
prevent, deterrents to speech. Criminal sanctions or the threat of damages
are not the only threats that can deter speech; the threat of losing a job can
also deter. This was recognised by Mill in On Liberty: "Men are not more
zealous for truth than they are for error, and a sufficient application of legal
or even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the
38 ibid. at p. 318
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propagation of either.. .men might as well be imprisoned, as excluded from
the means of earning their bread."39
Protection for freedom of speech thus needs to extend to the workplace,
where the threat of dismissal or discipline can act as a significant restraint
on speech. The need for such protection is reinforced by a recognition of
the public interest that can be served by employees'freedom to speak about
work related issues. The extent to which such protection is currently
available in English law will be examined below.
39Mill, op Cit. pp 31 and 34
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Three
Whistleblowing and the
Contract of Employment
1 Introduction
Employees who blow the whistle often face dismissal or disciplinary action.
In contrast to the position in the USA', there is no specific protection for
employees who find themselves in this position in the UK. In order to
determine whether dismissal or discipline gives rise to any legal remedies
for employees in England it is necessary to determine whether
whistleblowing involves a breach of contract. The most obvious way in
which whistleblowing can amount to a breach of contract is when it
involves a breach of confidence. Additionally, blowing the whistle may
amount to a breach of the terms of loyalty and fidelity that are implied into
contracts of employment. If blowing the whistle involves a breach of
contract the legal protection available to the employee will be limited 2. If
there is no breach, disciplinary action against the employee will give rise
to a legal remedy on the part of the employee3.
1.1 The basis of the duty of confidence
1 See Chapter seven, Whistleblower Protection in the USA.
2See Chapter Four Whistleblowing and Unfair Dismissal. Even where there is a breach
of contract, a dismissal could be unfair if carried out using an unfair procedure.
3The action could be for wrongful dismissal if inadequate notice is given, or for unfair
dismissal. See Chapter Four.
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A duty of confidence arises from the recognition in law that it is "in the
public interest that when information is received in confidence - for a
limited purpose, as it always is - it should not be used for other purposes"4.
The duty of confidence that arises from this public interest has been
founded on different juridical bases over time. In the employment
relationship the duty is based on the employment contract and forms part
of the duty of good faith5; where the duty is not express, it is readily
implied by courts6. The duty of confidence is also recognised in equity
where the court is of the view that the relationship of the parties is such
that an obligation of confidence arises. Relationships such as husband and
wife7, and cabinet ministers and colleagues 8 have been said to give rise to
an equitable obligation, and the work relationship should also be covered
by the equitable duty of confidence. In fact in Coco v A.N. Clark
(Engineers) Ltd Megarry J. said that the equitable duty of confidence
could arise in any case where "the circumstances are such that any
reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information
would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information was
being given to him in confidence".
The advantage of the equitable obligation is that it arises where there is no
contractual relationship between the "owner" of the information and the
discloser. Thus it avoids the failure of claims due to the privity of contract
doctrine as well as covering information obtained prior to a contract coming
4Norwich Pharmacal Co. v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1972] RPC 743 per
Lord Denning.
5Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 315
6See below.
7Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch. 302
8Attornev-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] QB 752
[l969] RPC 41
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into operation, or disclosed after its termination. Additional obligations of
confidence have in the past been based on the law of property and tort,
although generally claims are now based on contract or equity. Predicting
which will be used is not always easy; indeed the cross-over between the
two concepts has led some to suggest that the action for breach of
confidence is in fact an action sui generis'°. Courts take a flexible,
pragmatic approach to the question, using whichever jurisdiction gives the
best protection for the information. Concepts and case law from one
jurisdiction are used in proceedings in the other when considering the
meaning of terms such as the public interest11 . For the purposes of the
discussion below, a contractual duty of confidence will be assumed,
although some of the cases considered involve the equitable duty'2.
2 The duty of confidence in the Contract of Employment
Some employers expressly include a duty of confidence in the contracts of
employment of their employees. However, where no express provision is
made, such a term is implied.
'°Guny, Breach of Confidence, (1984) Clarendon Press, Oxford
"Gurry, Breach of Confidence, (1984) Clarendon Press, Oxford. For
more detail on the effect of the conceptual basis of the duty of confidence
on the interpretation of the public interest see Cripps, The Legal
Implications of Disclosure in the Public Interest (1994 Sweet and Maxwell,
2nd Edition) p 17ff.
' 2Given that employees owe a duty of confidence based on contract, this
chapter will concentrate on the contractual duty. See Chapter two of Cripps,
Legal Implications of Disclosure in the Public interest, 2nd edition (1994)
Sweet and Maxwell, London, for the implications of basing a claim on
equity rather than contract.
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2.1 Implied duty of confidence
Terms are implied into contracts both to give effect to the presumed
intention of the parties, and to facilitate the business efficacy of the
contract. Both these aims are served where a duty of trust and confidence
is implied into the contract: first, it can safely be assumed that both parties
to the contract would intend there to be a degree of trust between them in
entering the new relationship; secondly, to attempt to carry on an
employment relationship without some basis of trust between the parties
would be to run into disaster. However, the duty is not an absolute one, as
will be considered below.
Examples of the general implied duty of trust and confidence include
Robinson v Crompton Parkinson Ltd' 3 , where the employer was held to
have breached the contract in falsely accusing the employee of theft; and
Bliss v S.E. Thames R.H.A. 14, where the employer's requirement that the
employee undergo a medical examination after a committee of enquiry had
found no evidence of psychiatric problems was held to be a breach of the
implied term of trust and confidence.
In addition, an implied duty of confidence in relation to specific
confidential information has developed from the need for business to
preserve commercial secrets. Since information can be exploited for
economic gain it is clearly necessary to allow those who invest in invention
and discovery of new processes and products to reap the benefits of such
industry. To do otherwise would discourage invention and competition. As
a result, an implied term of confidence prevents employees from disclosing
'[1978] IRLR 61 EAT
'[1985] IRLR 308
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confidential information during the course of their employment, and from
disclosing trade secrets even after employment has ceased'5.
The public interest in preserving confidence between employer and
employee extends beyond the commercial necessity of encouraging
invention and competition, and ensuring the smooth working of work
relationships. As indicated by Griffiths L.J in Lion Laboratories v Evans16,
there is a moral dimension to the duty as well. "There is a public interest
of a high order in preserving confidentiality within an organisation.
Employees must be entitled to discuss problems freely, raise their doubts
and express their disagreements without the fear that they may be used to
discredit the company and perhaps imperil the existence of the company
and the livelihood of all those who work for it. And I am old-fashioned
enough to think that lo.yalry is a vfrtue that it is in the public interest to
encourage..." (emphasis added)'7.
Although clearly established, the implied duty of confidence is not absolute
and does not apply where it is in the public interest that information be
disclosed. This was recognised in the employment context in Initial Services
v Putterill' 8 where Lord Denning held that the obligation of confidence is
subject to exceptions, including where information is disclosed relating to
"any misconduct of such a nature that it ought in the public interest to be
disclosed to others." The exact scope of this "public interest exception" will
be examined in detail below.
' 5Faccenda Chicken v Fowler [1986] ICR 297
16[1984] 2 All ER 417 CA
' 7lbid at p. 433
18 [1968] QB 398
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2.2 Express terms and other terms requiring confidentiality
Many employment contracts contain express terms requiring that employees
maintain the confidentiality of information to which they are privy as a
result of their employment. Confidentiality clauses may also be incorporated
into a contract from an outside source. For example the terms of a
collective agreement may be incorporated into the contracts of individual
employees who are covered by that agreement. Similarly, terms may be
incorporated from works rules, or company handbooks, or professional
codes of conduct' 9 . Alternatively, confidentiality clauses may be imposed
after the employment contract has terminated as part of a negotiated
settlement.
Express confidentiality clauses sometimes include the proviso that
information can be disclosed where it is in the public interest to do so, but
this is not usually the case. More often, limited exceptions are included,
such as restricting disclosure of information to authorised persons. Many
confidentiality clauses contain no reference to the public interest exception
at all. However, whether or not it is referred to in an express term, and
whether the term is in the employment contract or is part of a post-
employment agreement, the public interest exception will apply.
Implied terms, or terms incorporated into the contract may sometimes
conflict with each other or with an express term. In such cases, express or
incorporated terms will, where possible be interpreted so as not to conflict
with the duties implied into the contract by common law. How this is
achieved is considered below.
'91t is a term of employment of most nurses that they are registered with
the UKCC. Registration requires compliance with the UKCC code of
professional conduct. Similar requirements apply to doctors.
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2.2.1 The interpretation of express terms that omit the public interest
exception, include a limited exception, or conflict with other terms.
At times it is possible to resolve any conflict between contractual terms by
looking at the intention of the parties involved. If, for example, all parties
intended a public interest exception to apply, courts can interpret the
confidentiality clause to include the exception, even though it is not
expressly included. However where the intentions of the parties cannot be
ascertained, the court itself will have to determine the scope of the
employee's duty. Although the general rule is that express terms take
precedence, as courts cannot imply into a contract something that is
expressly excluded, any ambiguities in an express term will be interpreted
so as not to conflict with the terms usually implied into contracts. In
Johnstone v Bloomsburv Health AuthoriW° a doctor's contractual duty to
work 40 hours per week plus an average of 48 hours overtime was
interpreted to be subject to an implied duty to have regard for the health of
the employee. This implied duty meant that the employer could not require
so much overtime of the employee that his health would suffer. Had the
contract specified expressly that the employee was to work 100 hours per
week, this would have been upheld, notwithstanding the dangers to health
involved, as there would have been no ambiguity involved. However, the
lack of precision in the nwnber of hours required enabled the court to imply
into the term the restriction with regard to health.
If this is applied in the context of express confidentiality clauses, it seems
that these will be interpreted so as to include an exception for information
in the public interest, even though this is omitted from the clause itself. In
addition, an express term using potentially ambiguous terminology, for
example requiring that matters be reported to an "appropriate" person, may
be interpreted so as to comply with the law on the implied duty of
20[1991] IRLR 118 CA
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confidence; this could, where the public interest demands, result in even the
media being viewed as an appropriate recipient of information (see below).
2.2.2 Express terms that exclude the public interest exception
Not only will terms that omit a reference to a public interest exception to
confidentiality be interpreted to include one, but any attempt expressly to
exclude the exception is unlikely to be successful. Even where terms are not
ambiguous, they will only be upheld to the extent that they do not conflict
with a recognised public interest. This was made plain in statements of the
Court of Appeal in Initial Services v Putteril?'. Both Salmon L.J. and
Winn L.J. pointed out that an express term prohibiting the employee from
disclosing matters that it is in the public interest to disclose would be void
for reasons of public policy. Equally void would be a term limiting
disclosure to particular recipients such as the police when the information
is such that it ought to be made available on a wider basis.
Evidence of courts refusing to uphold express terms on the basis that they
are void for public policy reasons can be found in the case law on the
enforcement of post-employment restrictive covenants. This indicates that
courts will not enforce contractual terms that are in conflict with the public
interest in freedom of trader; any term purporting to restrain an
employee's freedom to work will only be upheld to the extent that it is
reasonable, notwithstanding that the term is expressly included in the
contract. Similarly, courts will not enforce contracts which involve the
21[1968] 1 QB 396
22See [1968] 1 QB 396 at pp.409 and 412
See in general Employee Competition and Confidentiality IDS
Employment Law Supplement No. 72 (December 1994)
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performance of illegal acts, thereby refusing to uphold express contractual
terms on grounds of public policy.
It will not be possible to determine the exact scope of any express or
incorporated term without knowing the scope of the implied duty of
confidence; this requires a consideration of the nature of the public interest
served both by that duty and in some cases by its opposite, the duty to
disclose information.
3 The scope of the duty of confidence
Determining the precise duties of employees in respect of disclosure of
information at work will require an examination of the duty of confidence
and its interpretation within the general law, both in contract and equity. In
order to discover the exact scope of this duty it is necessary to consider
when disclosures will be said to be in the public interest and when that
public interest will outweigh the interest in confidence. In resolving this
conflict courts undertake a balancing exercise between the competing
interests, weighing factors such as the nature of the information and the
recipient of the disclosure. Case law can provide considerable guidance as
to the outcome of this balancing exercise.
3.1 Information must not be in the public domain
Before examining how the courts determine whether the public interest is
served by a particular disclosure, a more fundamental aspect of the
confidentiality of information needs to be considered. In some cases it may
be argued that the information, although sensitive, is not confidential in the
first place because it is already known to the public.
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It would seem obvious that there can be no confidence in information that
is already known to the public. It used to be assumed that this is because
the fact that the information was in the public domain was a defence to a
breach of confidence action24. It is now clear that the general
inaccessibility of information is a vital characteristic of confidential
information in the first place; thus, where information is in the public
domain there is no confidence to be breached. In Woodward v Hutchins25
Lord Denning, referring to a hypothetical case of a press agent attending a
dance which many others attend, said that "any incident which took place
at the dance would be known to all present. The information would be in
the public domain. There could be no objection to the incidents being made
known generally. It would not be confidential information."26
Whether something is in the public domain or not, however, is something
that cannot be determined in absolute terms, but may be a question of
degree27 . Whilst inaccessibility is a general characteristic of confidential
information, uncertainties remain where information is known to a large
number of people or where information, although accessible to the public,
is used by a person who came across the information in circumstances of
confidence.
3.1.1 Information known to a large number of people
24See Law Commission Working Paper No. 58 where public knowledge
of information was classified as a defence to a breach of confidence action.
25[1977] 1 WLR 760
26 Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760 at 764.
27per Lord Donaldson MR in the Court of Appeal in Attorney General
v Guardian (No. 2) [1988] 2 WLR 805 at 868, quoting Cross J in Franchi
v Franchi [1967] R.P.C. 149.
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One question that arises is whether information can remain confidential
when known by a large number of people, for example, within a large
organisation. The answer is that it can, as long as it is made clear to those
that receive it that the information is confidential despite its seemingly wide
dissemination.
In Sun Printers v Westminster Press Limitec?, a copy of a report on the
future of the company was circulated among unions and all levels of
management. A copy was also passed to the local press who intended to
publish extracts from it. Sun Printers were unsuccessful in seeking a
permanent injunction to prevent the publication. The Court of Appeal held
that the report could not properly be said to be confidential as it had been
widely circulated within the workplace. It could therefore not be said to
have been sent out on a confidential basis. However, it was also said that
confidence could have been preserved by stamping the word "confidential"
on the document and that "there is nothing... to prevent the fullest
communication between management and workforce under a seal of
confidentiality" 29 . Thus, where adequate steps have been taken to maintain
confidence, the fact that information is well known to a large number of
people will not prevent it being confidential as regards the population as a
whole.
Where information is disseminated among a large group of people, such as
the workforce of a large employer, care therefore needs to be taken by the
employer if confidentiality in the information is to be preserved. Otherwise,
an employee may be able to argue that disclosure of the information did not
amount to a breach of confidence as where was no confidence in the
information capable of being breached.
28[1982] IRLR 292
- Per Donaldson U at p.295
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3.1.2 Information obtained in circumstances of confidence
It might be assumed that confidence is lost where information is published
or widely disseminated. However, any such assumption needs to be guarded
following the decision in Schering Chemicals v Falkman Ltd3 ° which
suggests that a duty of confidence will be imposed on a person to whom
information is provided in confidence, even where that information is
available from public sources to any person who cares to investigate.
In Schering Falkman Ltd contracted to provide public relations training for
executives of Schering following bad publicity about the drug "Primodos".
Elstein contracted with Falkman to provide some of the training and it was
in this context that he obtained the information regarding the drug.
Subsequently, Elstein made a television programme about the drug with
Thames TV.
Schering applied for an injunction to restrain what they saw as a breach of
confidence. Since Elstein had no contract with Schering the case had to rely
on equitable principles, and Elstein was said to owe a fiduciary obligation
to Schering not to disclose the information. In Elstein's defence it was said
that the information was already in the public domain; a research assistant
working for Elstein had obtained all the information used in the programme
from material already in the public domain such as research papers,
periodicals, newspapers and magazines. Despite this fact, the injunction was
granted.
According to Shaw L.J., the fact that the information was in the public
domain did not relieve Elstein of the duty of confidence. The argument that
Elstein's duty of confidence ended once the information was public
°[19S1] 2 WLR 848
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knowledge was, in Shaw's view, "at best cynical", and even "specious"31.
However, although such an approach would be understandable had Elstein
himself brought the information into the public eye, the line taken by Shaw
L.J. ignores the fact that the information was readily available to the public
and was already being discussed. Indeed, the reason Elstein was contracted
to provide public relations advice to Schering in the first place was to train
their executives in the handling of this publicity.
Templeman L.J. mentioned that others were free to make programmes about
the drug, but Elstein had voluntarily undertaken the duty not to disclose and
so could not use the information himself. However, the usual view 32 is that
information already known to the public is not confidential in the first
place; if this is the case then no duty of confidence can attach to such
information. The decision of the majority in Schering is disappointing. It
could be used in future to prevent those who have an insider's informed
view on an issue from contributing to public debate on the issue, even
where the facts used in the contribution are already known to the public.
A preferable view was expressed by Lord Denning in his dissenting
judgment. He held that the information was not confidential because it was
in the public domain: "Any stranger starting from scratch... could have got
all this information together and published it without breaking any
confidence at all" 33 . However, Lord Denning also includes an alternative
reason for allowing publication of the information, that it is in the public
interest, suggesting that he could contemplate fmding that there was a
31Ibid at p 870 G.
32See Woodward v Hutchins, above.
33Schering at p 864 H.
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breach of confidence otherwise34 . Thus the public domain issue seems,
even in Lord Denning's view, only to support the public interest issue,
rather than being the deciding factor in the case.
Although all three judges considered other factors in making their decisions,
such as whether the information was in the public interest, the reasoning of
the majority on the public domain issue does cast doubt on the assumption
that information that is in the public domain cannot be disclosed in breach
of confidence. Where information is obtained by a party in circumstances
giving rise to an obligation of confidence, it seems that that party may not
be allowed to disclose the information even though the information is
available to any other party, who is, in addition, free to publicise it.
Further support for this view can be found in Home Office v Harman35,
although the case involves contempt of court rather than breach of
confidence. The case involved contempt proceedings brought by the Home
Office against Harriet Harman, then a legal officer for the National Council
for Civil Liberties. She had given a journalist access to documents that had
been referred to in court although she had given an undertaking that the
documents disclosed on discoveiy would not be used for any other purpose
than for the case in hand. In her defence Harman argued that the documents
had been read in open court and the information would be contained in the
transcript of the trial. Thus the information was readily available to the
journalist and her disclosure involved no contempt.
In the majority judgment, Lord Diplock held that Harman was in contempt
of court even thought the journalist could have obtained the information by
our present case, the public interest in the Primodos and its effects
far outweighs the private interest of the makers in preventing discussion of
it. Especially when all the information in the film is in the public domain"
(per Lord Denning at p 865 H.)
[1982] 1 All ER 532
56
other means. Although Diplock said that the case was purely a contempt of
court case and involved no issues about documents coming into the public
domain, the case does add support for the argument one person may be
restricted from disclosing information while the rest of the world remains
free to do so. The court, however, was not unanimous in finding that
confidentiality and the public domain were not in issue. Lords Scarman and
Simon dissented, arguing that the undertaking given in relation to the
documents did not apply once the documents were no longer confidential.
Thus once the information was in the public domain it was no longer
confidential and there could be no contempt of court in allowing the
journalist access to the documents.
Again, in the interlocutory hearings in the "Spycatcher" litigation36 the fact
that the book was readily available to anyone who wanted to read it did not
prevent the granting of injunctions against publication in the UK, although
Lords Oliver and Bridge dissented, arguing that as the information was in
the public domain, publication should not be restrained. When the case
reached the House of Lords in the final hearing of the case, however, these
latter arguments prevailed and the wide availability of the book did lead to
the lifting of the injunctions37.
On the public domain issue, the dissenting views of Lord Denning in
Schering and Lords Scarman and Simon in Harman, and the views of the
House of Lords in "Spycatcher No.2" are to be preferred. Although
confidentiality can remain in information that is known to a finite number
of people, once the public have access to information, there seems no
reason to uphold a duty of confidence in the information in relation to one
particular person. A disclosure may involve breach of some other duty, such
36Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 1248.
37Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1988] 3 WLR
776 and [1990] 1 AC 109
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as the duty of loyalty in the employment contract 38 , but it does not breach
confidence as the information is not confidential.
3.1.3 The public domain issue and whistleblowers
Prior to the Schering case, one might have assumed that there would never
be a breach of confidence where information is accessible to the public.
However, such an assumption would be unsafe, particularly where
information is obtained by a party in circumstances giving rise to an
obligation of confidence, as will be the case for most whistleblowers.
This is of little significance to watchdog whistleblowers, whose information
is unlikely to be in the public domain in any event, and who must rely
totally on the public interest concept, discussed below, to defend themselves
against a breach of confidence action. It may, however, be of significance
to protest whistleblowers, particularly those who wish to use their
knowledge and experience to add to public debate. As will be seen below,
they may find it more difficult to show that their whistleblowing meets the
public interest criteria, particularly because they are likely make their
disclosures to a wide audience. In some cases they may wish to rely on the
argument that the information is in the public domain. If the majority
judgments in Sche ring and Harinan are followed, this avenue may be closed
to them. It is to be hoped that instead, courts will in future follow the
alternative views referred to above, so that such speech will not be seen to
be in breach of confidence.
38 See below.
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3.2 Determining whether the public interest is served by a disclosure.
Where information is not in the public domain, it will be prima facie
confidential, unless the public interest is served by its disclosure. A
distinction needs to be drawn between information that is in the public
interest and information ofpublic interest, that is, merely interesting to the
public39 . The general public interest in preserving confidentiality cannot
be outweighed by the fact that the public find particular information
interesting or even fascinating. In contrast, where it is in the public interest
that information be disclosed the information will not be viewed as
confidential.
3.2.1 A Public Interest defence?
In many cases, the fact that the public interest is served by a disclosure is
said to act as a defence to an action for breach of confidence. For example,
Initial Services v Putterill° involved an application to strike out the
defence that the disclosure was in the public interest. The assumption is that
confidence will be upheld and the onus lies on the discloser to make out the
defence that the infonnation is in the public interest.
391n Lion Laboratories v Evans [1984] 2 All ER 417, which involved
the disclosure of documents casting doubt on the reliability of breathalyser
machines, this distinction seems partly to be blurred in the judgment of
O'Connor L.J. who said "once the public interest has been properly aroused
and brought out in public, then it seems to me that material such as that
contained in the documents... should be before the public and not restrained
from use." (at p. 432 d) However, it is also clearly argued elsewhere in the
case that the information was in the public interest, as well as being
interesting to the public.
°[1967] 3 All ER 145
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However, in Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd41 , it was said instead
that lack of a public interest in the information is a prerequisite of the duty
of confidence. Lord Widgery made it clear that it was for the plaintiff to
show that the publication of the material was in breach of confidence, and
that the public interest required that publication be restrained. The burden
of proof in relation to the public interest was thus shifted to the plaintiff.
This development in Jonathan Cape is important in that it strengthens the
view that restraint of information should be the exception rather than the
rule. However, it has not always been followed and later cases continue to
refer to the "defence" of public interest42. In "Spycatcher No.2" the House
of Lords again held that a lack of public interest in the information was a
prerequisite of confidentiality, suggesting that this may be the case in
relation to government information, with the duty of confidence still
assumed in the case of private information, unless public interest can act as
a defence43.
If this is the case, it raises the question of whether it should apply to
disclosures of information about government funded institutions and the
public sector in general. If so, this could be of considerable help to
public sector employees, particularly those who engage in protest
whistleblowing, where it is more difficult to make out that the public
interest is served by the disclosure. The presumption would then be that
'[l976] QB 752
42For example Lion Laboratories v Evans [1984] 2 All ER 417 and
Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers [1984] 1 WLR 892
43See Cripps, The Legal ImplicatIons ofDisclosure in the Public Interest
(Sweet and Maxwell, 2nd Edition, 1994) at p. 116. She points out that in
Fraser v Evans [1969] QB 349 the public interest issue is framed in terms
of "just cause or excuse" for publication of confidential information even
though the case involved Government documents. See also discussion under
"The Public Sector and Private Sector Divide".
4 \Thist1eblowing, IDS Brief 1995, 544, 7-12
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disclosure would be lawful, with the onus on the employer to demonstrate
why the information should be restrained45.
3.3 Interpretation of Public Interest Concept
Both confidentiality and disclosure can be in the public interest and the job
of the court is to balance these conflicting interests. Predicting the outcome
of this balancing exercise can be difficult as it is influenced by a variety of
factors.
3.3.1 Type of Information
The early cases in which the concept of public interest disclosure was
developed concerned the disclosure of crimes or civil wrongs; the public
interest definitions accepted in the cases seemed to be limited to such
information. Hence "[t]here is no confidence as to the disclosure of
iniquity"46 and "the duty to the public to disclose the criminal or illegal
intention may properly be held to override the private duty to respect and
protect the client's confidence."47 In later cases the categories of
information that may be disclosed in the public interest have increased,
45See Cripps, op. cit. p. 26 for some possible advantages of continuing
to classify the "public interest" as a defence, because of the increased
potential this allows for the court to exercise discretion in the granting of
remedies for breach of confidence. Such a discretion could potentially be
used in a breach of contract claim to allow a defence if the employee
reasonably believed that her disclosure was in the public interest. In
contrast, if a lack of public interest is a precondition of a duty of
confidence, the duty will still arise where the employee is mistaken,
however reasonably, in her belief that the public interest is served by the
disclosure.
46Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 L.J.Ch. 113
47 Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1919] 1 KB 520 at 527
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representing a welcome expansion to the concept of the public interest,
albeit at the cost of certainty.
In Initial Services v Putterill48 Lord Denning thought the public interest
exception was not restricted to cases of crime or civil wrong, but extended
to "any misconduct of such a nature that it ought in the public interest to
be disclosed."49 He went on "...The exception should extend to crimes,
frauds and misdeeds, both those actually committed as well as those in
contemplation... u'50• Again in Fraser v Evans5' Lord Denning said
"[iniquity] is merely an instance of just cause or excuse for breaking
confidence. There are some things which may be required to be disclosed
in the public interest, in which event no confidence can be prayed in aid to
keep them secret"52.
In subsequent cases various types of information apart from illegal conduct
have been said to be eligible for disclosure in the public interest. In
Hubbard v Vosper53 it was held that a book describing courses run by the
"Church of Scientology" could be published despite the fact that the
information contained in the book was obtained in breach of confidence.
"[T]he courses... indicate medical quackeries of a sort which may be
dangerous if practised behind closed doors... There is good ground for
thinking that those courses contain such dangerous material that it is in the
public interest that it should be made known." There was no suggestion
[1968] 1 QB 396
49Ibid at p. 405 D
50Jbid at 405 F
'[1969] 1 QB 349
52Ibid at 362 G
[1972] 2 QB 84
54	 .
Ibid, per Lord Denning at p 96
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that the information revealed illegal conduct, just that it was "medically"
dangerous.
Again in Lion Laboratories v Evans55 the type of information that could
serve the public interest was not restricted to illegal behaviour. The case
involved the disclosure of information casting doubt on the reliability of
breathalyser machines used by police to provide evidence of intoxication in
drink-driving cases. Even though there was no suggestion of misconduct on
the part of the manufacturers, disclosure by former employees was allowed
because the information affected "the life, and even the liberty, of an
unascertainable number of Her Majesty's subjects." There was clear public
interest in avoiding wrongful convictions based on unreliable evidence and
this outweighed any duty of confidence owed by the employees to their
former employer.
Perhaps the widest classification of information that can be in the public
interest was given in Woodward v Hutchins56 where a public relations
agent to some well known singers57 had written a series of articles for a
national newspaper disclosing information relating to the singers' private
lives, conduct and personal affairs. Lord Denning pointed out that the
singers had sought publicity in order to present themselves in a favourable
light. He went on to say that there was a public interest in knowing the
truth and where a party builds up a particular image to gain advantageous
publicity, the public interest will be served where it is demonstrated that the
image fostered is untrue. It was in the public interest that the information
be published because "[t]he public should not be misled"58.
[1984] 2 All ER 417
56[l977j 1 WLR 760
57Professionally known as Tom Jones, Engelbert Humperdinck, Gilbert
O'Sullivan and Gordon Mills.
58thid at p 764 B
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The statement in Woodward admits a veiy broad concept of the public
interest, and should not be used to introduce a "defence of truth" ifltO the
duty of confidence. To do so would be to ignore the basis of the duty of
confidence, which is founded on the public interest in respecting the
confidence in information disclosed for a limited purpose. On the other
hand, where a particular message has be given to the public, the case is
authority for the fact that information indicating the falsity of such
information may be disclosed in the public interest.
However, the trend to widen the categories of information that may be
disclosed is not uniform. In Beloff v Pressdram Ltd59 the public interest
was given a more restrictive interpretation: "The defence of public interest
clearly covers and, in the authorities does not extend beyond, disclosure...
in the public interest, of matters carried out or contemplated, in breach of
the country's security or in breach of law, including statutory duty, fraud,
or otherwise destructive of the country or its people, including matters
medically dangerous to the public; and doubtless other misdeeds of similar
gravity... Such public interest, as now recognised by the law, does not
extend beyond misdeeds of a serious nature and importance to the country
and thus, in my view clearly recognisable as such" 60.Jnformation relating
to the reliability of breathalysers may not be regarded as in the public
interest according to this formulation, let alone information about the
private lives of pop stars!
In 1981 in British Steel v Granada Television6' Lord Wilberforce would
not allow that the revelation of "mismanagement and government
intervention" could amount to the type of misconduct envisaged by Lord
[l973] 1 All ER 241
60Jbid, per Ungoed-Thomas J. at p.260 g
61[1981] AC 1097
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Denning in Initial Services62. Although the information may not have
related to "misdeeds of... importance to the country", it is arguable that the
conclusion reached by the majority in British Steel was unduly restrictive.
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning pointed out that the documents
revealed that there had been government intervention in the steel strike,
intervention that had previously been denied. If his view in Woodward had
been adopted, this could have provided grounds for allowing disclosure as
the public had been misled as to the government involvement in the
strike63.
Despite the disappointingly narrow interpretation of the public interest in
British Steel, it is worth noting that the categories of information that may
be in the public interest are not yet closed; courts have accepted that they
may "alter from time to time.., as social conditions and social legislation
develop"4.
3.3.1.1 Disclosure of beneficial information
It is notable that all the cases suggest that the public interest is served by
disclosure, if not of misdeeds, then of damaging information, such as
information indicating danger, or the misleading of the public, as opposed
to disclosures of information that may be of benefit to the public. If an
620n the other hand Granada in that case never argued that it was
disclosing "iniquity".
63However, Lord Denning was of the view that Granada's irresponsible
handling of the documents was such that it forfeited right to the protection
of its source. The fact that alleged mismanagement related to a publicly
owned company was another factor ignored by the court in assessing
whether the public interest was served by the disclosure, although this was
recognised by Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal and Lord Salmon in his
dissenting judgment in the House of Lords. For discussion of the relevance
of disclosure relating to the public sector or the private sector, see below.
v NSPCC [1977] 1 All ER 589 at p 605 b, per Lord Hailshani
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employee working for a drugs company believed that a cure for AIDS had
been found, but that the company had "commercial" reasons for suppressing
that information (preferring, for example, to wait until a more profitable
vaccine can be produced), it is not clear whether courts would say that the
public interest would be served by allowing that disclosure. The more
restrictive interpretations of the public interest in the case law suggest that
the disclosures that are in the public interest must relate to illegal
behaviour, or misdeeds. The more generous approach still suggests
information must relate to a detriment to the public before it is in the public
interest to disclose it65 . It is arguable that withholding a known treatment
for a fatal disease does amount to a detriment to the public and a moral
wrong of such proportions that it is can be classed as a misdeed, which
would make it much easier to show that the public interest is served by its
disclosure.
However, less extreme examples, where there may be genuine reasons for
maintaining secrecy, are easy to imagine. A company may wish to maintain
the confidentiality of the make up of a drug; an employee knowing that the
drug could be produced much more cheaply discloses this information. The
case law on trade secrets provides strong protection for employers against
employees who disclose information that is commercially sensitive and may
deprive the employer of the profit that he could otherwise expect from the
goods he manufactires. There is no indication that the rule that
employers are entitled to protect trade secrets is subject to the public
interest exception except where that information discloses wrongdoing or
65For example the concern over the reliability of the breathalyser in
Lion Laboratories, or the public interest in disclosing impending disasters
suggested in Malone v Commissioner of Police (No.2), above.
66See Employee Competition and Confidentiality, IDS Employment
Supplement 72, Incomes Data Services Ltd. December 1994.
67Faccenda Chicken v Fowler [1986] ICR 297
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misconduct, or at the very least, discloses a potential harm, as opposed to
a benefit, to the public.
3.3.1.2 The public sector and private sector divide
It has been argued that the public interest is served more directly where
information relates to public sector industries or services, and that therefore
disclosures of such information should be more readily protected. Certainly,
disclosures of government information appear to be treated differently by
the courts with the onus on the government to show why disclosure should
be restrained68 . The reason for distinguishing between government secrecy
and private sector confidence is explained by Lord Goff in "Spycatcher No.
2 ": "in the case of Government secrets the mere fact of confidentiality
does not alone support ... a conclusion [that confidential information should
be protected], because in a free society there is a continuing public interest
that the workings of government should be open to scrutiny and
criticism. "°
Information relating to the public sector is not limited to government
information however, and the same distinction between public sector and
private sector can be drawn for a wider range of information than
government secrets. It has been argued that the public have an interest in
knowing what occurs within industries and services funded by them, and
that they should be open to scrutiny and criticism as the government is. As
68See discussion above on whether there is a public interest "defence"
in confidentiality cases.
69Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1988] 3 WLR 776
70Ibid at p. 807 H
67
with government secrets, there will be times where information needs to
remain confidential71 , but the general rule should be to promote openness.
Such a line does have some judicial support. In his dissenting judgment in
British Steel Corporation v Granada 72, Lord Salmon argued that the it was
in the public interest that the information leaked to Granada should be
disclosed, as it related to a publicly owned industry: "it is a nationalised
industry... If it operates at a serious loss, it causes serious harm to the
nation... It is not surprising that the public should wish, and indeed are
morally entitled to know how it is that B.S.C. is in such a parlous
condition."73 A similar approach was taken by Lord Denning at the hearing
before the Court of Appeal where he said that the documents raised a
number of points "of considerable public interest... Especially as the British
Steel Corporation was a public corporation accountable to Parliament"74.
Although this line of reasoning has yet to be adopted by the majority75, it
is arguable not only that it should be, but that it should be extended to
cover the recently privatised sector and those parts of the private sector
providing services previously provided by the public sector. As has been
71For example, in respect of government information for national
security reasons, and in respect of publicly owned companies in respect of
some commercial information.
72[1981] AC 1097
73Ibid at p. 1187-1189
[198l1 AC 1097 at p. 1123.
"However, the extent to which judges appear willing to challenge
government decision, reflected in a series of judicial review cases which
have found against the government suggests that a change of attitude among
the judiciary is taking place, which may in time be reflected in the case law
on the definition of the public interest.
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argued above76, Government changes to the public sector including local
government, education and the NTIS are issues of public importance and the
public interest is served by having information relating to them readily
available. There should be very clear reasons for restraining the disclosure
of such information.
This can be contrasted with the position in the private sector. Where a
company is owned and run by private individual the public interest is
served by the maintenance of confidentiality unless there is good reason for
breaching it. This allows parties to carry on business in the knowledge that
negotiations and decisions can be made in private. Information indicating
mismanagement, or disclosing how particular spending decisions are made
are unlikely to be public interest issues, whereas such information relating
to the public sector may be. However, where information reveals illegal or
wrongful conduct, the type of information involved means that the public
interest will be served by its disclosure whether the industry or service is
in the public or the private sector.
3.3.1.3 Type of information disclosed by whistleblowers
Given the sometimes contradictory case law on this issue, anticipating with
any certainty whether information disclosed by a whistleblower will be said
to be of a type that may serve the public interest is difficult. However,
some conclusions can be drawn. Disclosures of illegal conduct, such as
fraud, tax irregularities, corruption, or breach of health and safety
regulations at work are all clearly eligible for protection, subject to the
balancing of the other factors examined below. Indeed, the need to extend
protection beyond disclosures of misconduct and misdeeds to protect the
76See Chapter two, Whistleblowing and Freedom of Speech
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disclosures of other whistleblowers was recognised in Malone v
Commissioner of Police77, where Megarry V-C said "there may be cases
where... there is a just cause or excuse for breaking confidence. The
confidential information may relate to some apprehension of an impending
chemical or other disaster, arising without misconduct, of which the
authorities are not aware, but which ought in the public interest to be
disclosed to them" 78 . Thus, those involved in watchdog whistleblowing
should find that they can clear the first hurdle in showing that their
disclosure was in the public interest.
Protest whistleblowers may have more difficulty. Concerns of the type
raised by some NHS whistleblowers such as disclosures of mismanagement
and complaints regarding funding, managerial support or staffing levels79,
clearly do not amount to legal wrongs, and even though they are of a
serious nature, it could be said that the public interest is not directly served
by their disclosure. On the other hand, taking the NHS as an example, it
can be argued that it is in the public interest that these concerns be made
known, especially where the information contradicts statements and
publicity about the state of the Health Service made by the government and
by individual hospitals and trusts. However, the courts have yet to adopt
such reasoning.
[l979] 2 All ER 620
78Ibid at p 635 c
79These were the most common concerns expressed by nursing staff
contacting the RCN Whistleblow Scheme, Whistleblow, Report on the Work
of the RCN Whistleblow Scheme, RN (1992).
70
3.3.2 Identity of Recipient
A second factor considered by the courts when determining whether a
particular disclosure is in the public interest or not is the identity of the
person or organisation to whom the information is given. Whilst it may be
in the public interest that the information is revealed to someone, it is not
necessarily the case that the public interest is served by general disclosure.
In Initial Services v Putterill80, which involved a disclosure to the press,
Lord Denning made the point that in some cases disclosure to the general
public via the media may not be justified, although disclosure to a relevant
official might be (in that case the registrar responsible for enforcing the
Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956). Later cases have also taken the line
that the public interest may be served by disclosure to some, but not to all.
In Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers No. 281, the House of Lords
said that even where disclosure was in the public interest, it did not follow
that publication should be via the media. In some cases it would be better
to disclose to some other body who could investigate. Where security
personnel wished to claim that a disclosure was in the public interest they
would need to show that they had tried internal channels before resorting
to disclosure to the press. In Re a Company 's Application 82, arising from
an employee's threat to reveal financial irregularities to FIMBRA and the
Inland Revenue, the fact that disclosure was to be to a relevant regulatory
body was central to the decision that no breach of confidence was involved,
despite the malicious reasons for the disclosure83 . Again, in W v Egdell84,
80[1968] 1 QB 396
'[ l988] 3 WLR776
82[1989] 2 All ER 248
83 See discussion under "Motive" below.
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disclosure of a medical opinion within the hospital system was not a breach
of patient confidence, although wider publication, for example in an
academic article, probably would have been.
On the other hand, in Initial Services Lord Denning recognised that in
certain circumstances disclosure on a wider scale can be justified, and
indeed disclosure via the press has been allowed in many cases. Initial
Services itself concerned an unsuccessful attempt to prevent disclosure of
price fixing in a newspaper article, with the Court of Appeal finding that,
at times, the person with a proper interest in receiving information may be
the press. Similarly, in Fraser v Evans 85, and Woodward v Hutchins86
disclosures by journalists, and in Hubbard v Vosper87 disclosure in a book.
were not prevented.
In Lion Laboratories v Evans88, where an injunction was sought to prevent
former employees disclosing information about the unreliability of
breathalysers to the press, no issue was raised about the identity of the
person to whom the disclosures were made. The information was important
for the proper administration of justice as the machine could be used to
provide evidence in criminal prosecutions. Clearly the general public should
have access to information that could be important in defending criminal
8411990] 2 WLR 471
8511969] 1 All ER 8. "There are some things which are of such public
concern that the newspapers, the Press, and, indeed, eveiyone is entitled to
make known the truth and to make fair comment on it." per Lord Denning,
at p. 12 D
8611977] 1 WLR 760
8711972] 2 QB 84
8811984] 2 All ER 417
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charges89; thus disclosure on the widest possible scale was justified. This
was approved in "Spycatcher No. 2" where it was agreed that in
circumstances such as those in Lion Laboratories, media publication was
acceptable.
3.3.2.1 Recipient of information and the whistleblower: the exhaustion
of internal procedures
Despite the cases indicating a willingness by courts to allow publication via
the press, whistleblowers should be wary of using the media, particularly
if other channels have not been exhausted. Those who contemplate acting
as watchdog whistleblowers, raising concerns about illegal or irregular or
unsafe conduct should try to raise matters internally at first. Once any
internal procedure is exhausted, or if an adequate response is not received,
or if internal disclosure is unsuitable (for example the concern relates to
internal management) then disclosure to other bodies, such as a regulatory
body, trade union, or an MP may be appropriate. Where this has been done,
courts are unlikely to find that the disclosure involves a breach of the duty
of confidence. In addition, express terms attempting to restrict the categories
of persons to whom information may be disclosed will be void to the extent
that they conflict with the public interest. It would therefore not be open to
an employer to rely on a contractual clause that prevents external disclosure
where the public interest is served by that disclosure90.
Clearly, where concerns are urgent, on matters of health and safety for
example, internal disclosure will not be appropriate. Instead, the quickest
89u We are here dealing with a machine on the accuracy of which may
depend a person's livelihood, or even his liberty" Ibid. per Griffiths L.J. at
p. 433
90See the judgment of Winn L.J. in Initial Services v Putterill [1968] 1
QB 397
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way to reach the widest number of people will be by disclosure via the
media. In addition, where other channels have been exhausted, or where
there is no alternative channel of investigation, disclosure via the press may
again be acceptable.
Greater difficulty on this issue is faced by the protest whistleblower who
will by definition want to catch the public eye, most obviously via the
media. The types of concern raised by protesters are less likely to be of an
urgent nature requiring disclosure on such a wide scale, and it may
therefore be that a court will find that the public interest is not served by
the disclosure. The only way to counter such a conclusion is to raise the
argument made above that, particularly where it relates to public sector
institutions, protest serves the public interest. To be effective, the protest
needs publicity; thus the public interest is served by public disclosure.
Given the approach to the issue in the cases such as Fraser v Evans91,
Woodward v Hutchins92 and Hubbard v Vosper93 where wide disclosures
were allowed, it is not impossible that such an approach may be taken in
a whistleblowing case.
3.3.3 Timing of Disclosure
In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in
confidentiality, the courts also consider whether the public will be protected
by disclosure of the information. Thus, where the disclosure of information
is likely to prevent harm to the public the courts are unlikely to require the
'[1969] 1 All ER 8. "There are some things which are of such public
concern that the newspapers, the Press, and, indeed, everyone is entitled to
make known the truth and to make fair comment on it." per Lord Denning,
at p. 12 D
92{1977] 1 WLR 760
[l972] 2 QB 84
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maintenance of confidentiality. This was apparent in the judgment of Shaw
L.J. in Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd 4. "If the subject matter is
something inimical to the public interest or threatens individual safety, a
person in possession of knowledge of that subject matter cannot be obliged
to conceal it although he acquired that knowledge in confidence." 95 Thus,
in Lion Laboratories, the information about reliability of breathalysers
could bring immediate benefit to any person facing criminal charges based
on evidence from such machines, and so the court allowed its wide
publication.
Where a concern relates to a future danger, then again the courts appear to
favour disclosure. In Initial Services v Putterilf7 Lord Denning held that
the public interest exception to the duty of confidence should extend to
"crimes, frauds and misdeeds, both those actually committed as well as
those in contemplation"98, and in Malone v Commissioner of Police
Megany V-C held that information relating to "some apprehension of an
impending chemical or other disaster" should, in the public interest, be
disclosed'°°.
The case law is more contradictory in relation to the disclosure of past
misconduct. In Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd'° Shaw Li.
[1981] 2 WLR 848
95lbidatp 869.
[1984]2AllER417
[1968] 1 QB 396
98Ibid at p 405 F
[1979] 2 All ER 620
'°°Ibid at p. 635 C
lO1 [1981] 2 WLR 848
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argued that the fact that the drug "Primodos" had been withdrawn from the
market and that the immediate threat to health had therefore passed meant
that the public interest was not served by disclosure of the information: "No
such consideration [of public safety] has existed in this case since the time
that Primodos was withdrawn from the market. Neither the public nor any
individual stands in need of protection from its use at this stage in the
history."°2 As Cripps points out 103 this statement is unfortunate in that
it suggests that there is no lesson to be learnt from the Primodos affair and
no public interest in how it occurred. However, the comments perhaps help
explain the judgment of Talbot J., who granted an injunction to restrain
publication in Distillers Co. (Biochemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers
Ltd'°4, where information was to be disclosed many years after the
harmful effects of the thalidomide drug had been discovered.
However, the fact that the threat to the public had passed was raised by
Lord Denning in his dissenting judgment in Schering, to the opposite effect.
The publication of material revealing information about the drug Primodos
could not affect its sales since it had been withdrawn from the market long
since, and this was one reason he used to argue that the information should
be revealed.
Given the contradictory case law on this issue, it is difficult to predict how
courts will view the fact that a disclosure made by an employee relates to
past wrongdoing. However, it is suggested that a court's approach should
depend on whether the duty of confidence owed by the employee is express
or implied. Where a duty of confidentiality is only implied courts should
'°2thid at p 869.
'°3 Cripps, Y. Legal Implications of Disclosure in the Public Interest
(2nd edition, 1994) Sweet and Maxwell, London at p. 132
b04[1975] 1 QB 613
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make a presumption in favour disclosure; the fact that the threat is past will
mean that there is no good reason for restrictions and publication will
involve no breach of duty. Where confidentiality is imposed as an express
term of a contract, the presumption should be in favour of confidence; in
such a case, the fact that a threat is not current means that there is no good
reason to upset that presumption and disclosure is less likely to be
acceptable.
3.3.4 Motive for Disclosure
There are some indications that courts will consider the motives of the
person who reveals information and may more readily find there to be a
breach of confidence where information is disclosed out of malice, spite or
for material gain. In Initial Services v Putterill'°5 Lord Denning made
clear that he would not have approved of disclosure in the case had it been
made out of spite or for financial reward: "That indeed would be a different
matter. It is a great evil when people purvey scandalous information for
reward."°6 This view is also reflected in comments made by the court
when upholding the injunction against disclosure of information in
Schering'°7: Templeman L.J. pointed out that Elstein had obtained the
information because he "agreed for reward" to take part in the training
session. He had then used that information "for his own gain" 108 . He went
on to say that if the injunction were not granted the court would enable "a
trusted adviser to make money out of his dealing in confidential
'°[1968] 1 QB 396
lO6jbjd at p. 406 G
10711981 ] 2 WLR 848
iospjid at p. 879
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informatio.' Io9 Shaw L.J. spoke of the lack of protection for "mercenary
betrayal"° Concern was also expressed in the "Spycatcher" cases about
publication of information disclosed by disloyal employees for financial
gain".
This view has not been taken in all cases. In British Steel Corporation v
Granada" 2 Lord Fraser said that "[t]he informer's motives are...
irrelevant" 3; and in Lion Laboratories"4 Stephenson L.J. said that the
public have a right to know some confidential information "even if [it] has
been unlawfully obtained in flagrant breach of confidence and irrespective
of the motive of the informer" 5 . Moreover, the fact that financial gain
was made from the disclosures did not prevent the court from allowing the
disclosures in Woodward v Hutchins" 6 and Hubbard v Vosper"7.
In Re a company's application" 8 the possible malicious motive of the
defendant was explicitly referred to and still did not prevent a finding that
the disclosure could be allowed. Scott J. reasoned that if the alleged
breaches of FIMBRA rules had taken place, then they ought to be reported.
'°9lbid at p. 881 E.
"°Ibid at p. 869 H
"See Lord Griffiths in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd
(No. 2) [1988] 3 WLR 776 at p. 804
112[1981] AC 1097
"3lbid. at p. 1202 D
"4[1984]2A11ER417
" 5lbid at p. 422 j
116[1977] 1 WLR 760
"[l972] 2 QB 84
Il8[1989] 2 All ER 248
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If they were untrue, FIMBRA would discover this, and no harm would be
done to the company. In neither case was the public interest in the
investigation taking place affected by the motive of the discloser. This
reasoning suggests courts will treat the motive of the person making the
disclosure as secondary to other factors when weighing up whether or not
to allow disclosure.
Although the motive of the discloser may not affect a decision on whether
to allow publication of information, it may affect the remedy available to
the employee who is dismissed for any breach of confidence. Although
where the public interest is served by disclosure there may be no breach of
confidence, the level of remedy available to the wrongfully dismissed
employee could be affected by any financial reward already obtained by the
disclosure. The remedy could similarly be affected in an unfair dismissal
case where compensation must be just an equitable"9.
3.3.5 Reasonable belief in the truth of facts disclosed?
The public interest is unlikely to be served by disclosure of unfounded
suspicions of wrongdoing. It has been suggested that the public interest
exception to breach of confidence depends on the employee being able to
show that she has reasonable grounds for the belief that the information
sought to be disclosed is true. Thus, the exception will not be allowed
"upon a mere roving suggestion... or even, perhaps, on a general suggestion
" 9s 123 ERA 1996 (previously s 74 EP(C)A 1978). Employees should
also note that where information is disclosed for financial reward they may
be in danger of committing an offence under the Prevention of Corruption
Acts 1906 and 1916 and the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889. See
Cripps, op. cit. p. 173 ff.
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[that there might be wrongdoing]" 20; and "the generic defence to breach
of confidence, that it is in the public interest to publish, must be supported
by evidence to show why the plaintiff should not be given interlocutory
relief"21 . This point was repeated in Attorney-General v Guardian
Newspapers (No. 2)122 when Lord Keith said that "it is not sufficient to
set up the defence merely to show that allegations of wrongdoing have been
made. There must be at least a prima facie case that the allegations have
substance."23
This requirement is not absolute and the amount of evidence needed to
support the contention that the public interest is served by the disclosure
may vary depending on who disclosure is made to. In Re a company 's
application' 24, Scott J. refused to consider whether the allegations of
breaches of FIMBRA regulations and tax irregularities were true; these were
issues that would be considered by FIMBRA and the Inland Revenue after
the disclosures had been made to them. If the allegations were substantiated
action would follow, and if unsubstantiated would be ignored. There was
no need for the judge hearing the case to be concerned with the veracity of
the claims. However Scott J. distinguished Attorney-General v Guardian
Newspapers (No. 2)125 on the basis that the case dealt with disclosure on
a wide scale via the media. In such cases the court would need to consider
whether there was reasonable basis to the allegations. In contrast, where
there is no more than "disclosure to a recipient which has a duty to
' 20 Garrside v Outram (1856) 26 U Ch 113 at 114
' 21Lion Laboratories v Evans [1984] 2 All ER 417 per O'Connor Li.
atp. 431 f
122[1988] 3 WLR 776
1119881 3 WLR 776 at 787
124[1989] 2 All ER 248
125p0
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investigate matters within its remit, it is not.., for the court to investigate
the substance of the proposed disclosure"26
Thus the employee who blows the whistle to the wider world will need to
be sure that her belief in misconduct or other wrongdoing is based on
reasonable grounds in order to be confident that disclosure will not amount
to a breach of the duty of confidence. Less solid suspicions of misconduct
may only safely be disclosed where the disclosure is internal to the
organisation or to a body charged with a duty to investigate such concerns.
3.4 Balancing the public interest factors
Where a court must decide whether an employee's whistleblowing serves
the public interest, all the above factors are considered. If the balance is in
favour of disclosure then the whistleblowing will entail no breach of
confidence, and so no breach of contract. This is the case regardless of any
express or incorporated terms requiring confidentiality'27.
Re a company 's application (above) illustrates the balancing exercise that
courts undertake. The threatened disclosure was to a regulatory body, not
to the general public, a factor that weighs in favour of the disclosure being
made. The disclosure was motivated by malice, a factor that can weigh
against disclosure. However, other factors weighed in favour of disclosure;
the disclosure was to a limited audience with an proper interest in the
information, and the information was of a type the it was clearly in the
public interest to disclose (tax irregularities and breaches of FIMBRA rules,
both 'misdeeds'). The disclosure was therefore allowed, and had. this been
in issue, would not have involved a breach of contract.
' 26Re a company's application [1989] 2 All ER 248 at p. 252d
' 27See section 2.2 on express terms above.
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4 Whistleblowing as a breach of the contractual duty of mutual trust,
cooperation and fidelity
Thus far discussion has been limited to the potential breach of confidence
involved in any disclosure. However, a disclosure may also involve the
breach of other contractual terms, namely the implied terms of trust,
cooperation and fidelity. These terms may be breached where the employee
expresses her opinion on work related matters, or makes statements of
opinion unfavourable to the employer, whether or not the information is
already in the public domain.
In Ticehurst v British Telecommunications plc' 28 a duty of fidelity was
implied into the contract of employment by the Court of Appeal, and said
to include exercising any discretion in supervising work faithfully in the
interests of the employer. The duty was implied in the context of industrial
action, but it indicates an approach by the court to employees' implied
duties that extends beyond the strict confines of job descriptions and
express terms, to a more general duty of faithful service. It is arguable that
disclosing information to external bodies breaches such a term, whether the
information is confidential or not.
In the earlier case of Thornley v ARA Ltd", where the employee was
dismissed for disclosing confidential information to the press following
what he believed was an unsatisfactory response by his employer to
concerns raised, the EAT held that the disclosure amounted to a breach of
trust owed to his employers and a breach of the "fundamental, common
128[l992] IRLR 219
' 29 Thornlev v Aircraft Research Association Ltd, September 14 1976,
539/11 and, May 11, 1977 EAT 669/76
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sense, contractual obligation upon a servant not to let his master down13o.
Thus, participation in debate on sensitive issues by an employee may well
involve the breach of one of these additional implied terms, even if it does
not involve a breach of confidence, because, for example, information is in
the public domain.
However, these additional implied terms will be subject to the public
interest exception in the same way as the implied duty of confidence. If a
contract contained a term expressly limiting the disclosure or discussion of
information even where it is in the public interest that it be disclosed, such
a term would not be enforced for reasons of public policy. If unsustainable
as an express term, courts will clearly not imply such a term into a contract.
Thus a court is unlikely to hold that the implied duties of fidelity and
loyalty have been breached where information that is in the public interest
is disclosed or discussed.
For the watchdog whistleblower, where the public interest is more easily
made out, this will have the result that the disclosure involves the breach
of neither the implied duty of confidence nor any other implied term.
However, the protest whistleblower may still face uncertainty. The
difficulties in showing that the public interest is served by protest speech
have been highlighted above. Even where a public interest in disclosure is
difficult to make out, for example because it is made to the media, the
protester may sometimes be able to argue that the information is in the
public domain, and so no breach of confidence is involved. However, the
additional duties of trust, cooperation and fidelity mean that there may still
be a breach of contract, even though there is no confidence to be breached.
Given that the criteria for assessing the public interest are the same
'°l977 EAT 669/76, p. 8 para g-h
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regardless of the implied term involved, the protester remains dependent on
showing that the wider public interest is served by the disclosure, an
argument, as showed above, that courts have been reluctant to endorse.
5 Conclusion
5.1 Watchdog whistleblowers
Where the employee acts as a watchdog whistleblower, the type of
information revealed, such as fraud, tax irregularities or corruption, or
breach of health and safety regulations at work, is clearly of a type that
warrants disclosure in the public interest. Where the employee works within
the public sector' 31 , then a wider range of information may be suitable for
disclosure including financial mismanagement, and information that tends
to show that the public image promoted by the sector is misleading.
However, before deciding that the disclosure is indeed in the public interest,
the court will consider other relevant factors, the main one being that the
disclosure should be to a suitable recipient. Disclosures to a regulatory body
are more likely to be in the public interest even where the information is
commercially highly sensitive, or where evidence to support the allegation
is vague. Disclosure to the press is less likely to be warranted unless it
reveals a current danger to health and safety or to liberty. In addition, a
court may require that there is some evidence, beyond mere suspicion of the
employee, that any such danger exists although even this may depend on
the seriousness and imminence of the danger exposed.
In theory, then, watchdog whistleblowers wishing to raise a concern and
have it investigated ought not to have too much difficulty in meeting the
' 31 and arguably in certain sectors of the private sector, such as providers
of monopoly services, and of services until recently provided by the public
sector. See Chapter two, Whistleblowing and Freedom of Speech.
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requirements of the public interest concept. However, in practice, they may
still find themselves unprotected. The courts may continue to take the
restrictive view of the public interest, illustrated in some of the cases
discussed above, and find that there is a breach of contract on the facts,
despite the arguments that exist to the contraty. In addition, cases may be
unsuccessful, because they may fail to show that any adverse action taken
against them was caused by the alleged breach of contract' 32, in which
case any success in showing that there is no breach is of no value.
5.2 Protest whistleblowers
Protest whistleblowers may face even more uncertainty. On the one hand,
engaging in protest about work related issues may involve no disclosure of
confidential information at all, as the information may be in the public
domain. Thus NHS staff speaking in public about the move to trust status,
or British Rail staff speaking in public about rail privatisation may not
disclose any information not already accessible to the public. However, such
conduct may involve breach of additional implied contractual terms
examined above.
Furthermore, in order to add weight to the protest, the speaker may disclose
information that is prima facie confidential. For example, in discussing
recent changes in the organisation of the NHS, a speaker may disclose
current staffing levels, information that may be commercially sensitive after
the introduction of the internal market to the NHS. Given that such
disclosure does not reveal misconduct or illegal behaviour, it is not clear
that the disclosure will be said to be in the public interest. The other factors
taken into consideration by the courts in determining the issue, such as the
recipient of the information, may also weigh against a finding of public
interest. The fact that the disclosure will almost certainly be made publicly,
' 32For more detailed discussion of causation problems see Chapter Five.
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rather than through a regulator, and the fact that it will be hard to verify
whether staffing levels are adequate in any event, may mean that disclosure
may be said not to be in the public interest.
Yet effective protest requires publicity. Internal disclosure is therefore
inappropriate. In order to gain protection, protesters need courts to recognise
more readily the wider public interest served by public debate on issues of
public importance, and the public interest served by the participation of
insiders in that debate. They will then be able to rule that the protesters'
disclosures containing confidential information are warranted in the public
interest.
5.3 Effect of finding breach of contract.
Given the number of variables involved in the question, it can be hard to
determine in advance whether a particular incident of whistleblowing
involves a breach of contract. Employees proposing to make a disclosure
will therefore be involved in a certain amount of risk-taking. Where, taking
into account all the factors considered above, it is decided that there is a
breach of contract, the employer will be justified in taking disciplinary
action against the employee. Unless the breach of contract serious enough
to warrant summary dismissal, notice would need to be given if disciplinary
action were to include dismissal, to avoid a fmding of wrongful dismissal.
If the disclosure serves the public interest, and therefore involves no breach
of contract, any adverse action taken by the employer will be without legal
justification. Although dismissal will not be wrongful if proper notice is
given, any disciplinary action would be unfounded. It would therefore
amount to a breach of contract by the employer, so that the employee could
treat the contract as terminated and claim a remedy for constructive
dismissal. In such circumstances, the employer is very unlikely to have
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given notice, and so a wrongful dismissal claim will probably be successful.
Where whistleblowing leads to dismissal, whether or not it involves a
breach of contract, the employee may have a remedy for unfair dismissal.
The extent to which whistleblowers can use the protection offered by the
right not to be unfairly dismissed is the subject of the next chapter.
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Four
Whistleblowing and Unfair
Dismissal
1. Introduction
The Employment Rights Act 1996' provides that where an employee has
worked for the same employer for the requisite period2, and complies with
other qualifying conditions3 she will have the right not to be unfairly
dismissed4 . This general protection is available to employees dismissed for
blowing the whistle. Dismissal is given a wide meaning in the Act, and
covers termination of employment by the employer, expiry of a fixed term
contract without renewal and constructive dismissal 5 . The remedies
provided under the Act are reinstatement, reemployment or compensation
(see below).
'The provisions relating to unfair dismissal were previously found in the
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. In this chapter, references
to the old legislation will continue to be given.
'Currently two years, though see R v Secretary of State for Employment
ex parte Seymour-Smith [1995] IRLR 464
3The worker must be an employee, under the normal retiring age and
employed in the UK
4s 94 ERA 1996, previously s 54 Employment Protection
(Consolidation) Act 1978
5s 95 ERA 1996, previously s 55 EP(C)A 1978. Employees employed
on a fixed term contract of a year or more may contract out of the
protection provided in respect of termination of the contract without renewal
if this is agreed in writing prior to the expiry of the term, s 197 ERA 1996.
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The statutory protection against unfair dismissal operates on a separate basis
from the common law. Even though it involves a breach of contract by the
employer, a dismissal may still be fair; conversely a dismissal on the
grounds that the employee is in breach of contract can be unfair. Thus,
where a whistleblower is dismissed, deciding whether or not the disclosure
amounted to a breach of contract will not resolve the question of whether
the dismissal was unfair or not. The question may be relevant, however, to
deciding whether there was a fair reason for the dismissal in the first place.
Where an employee brings a claim for unfair dismissal, she must first show
that there has been a dismissal. The onus then shifts to the employer to
show that there was a fair reason to dismiss. The potential fair reasons are
limited to those listed in s 98 ERA 1996 (s 57 EP(C)A 1978), namely the
capability or qualification of the employee, the conduct of the employee, the
fact that the employee is redundant, that the continued employment of the
employee is illegal, or some other substantial reason that justifies the
dismissal of a person holding the position that the employee held (s 98 (1)
and (2) ERA, previously s 57 (1)(a) and (2) EP(C)A). This last reason acts
as a catch all provision that can be used to cover almost any reason for
dismissal, and together with "the conduct of the employee" is the most
applicable reason in the context of public interest whistleblowing6.
Where the employer can show that the dismissal was for one of the fair
reasons, then the tribunal decides whether the dismissal was fair or unfair,
having regard to the reasons shown by the employer and looking at
whether, in the circumstances (including the size and administrative
resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or
'Whistleblowing will be presumed to be in the public interest for the
purposes of the following discussion.
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unreasonably in treating the reason as sufficient reason for dismissing the
employee. (s 98 (4) "the s 98(4) fairness test")7.
In addition to the five fair reasons contained in s 98 ERA 1996, there are
some "automatically unfair" reasons for dismissal, including dismissal for
carrying out health and safety duties, dismissal on grounds of pregnancy,
dismissal for asserting a statutory right, dismissal in connection with a
transfer of an undertaking and dismissal for taking part in the activities of
a trade union8. Dismissals for these reasons are unfair whether or not the
employer could show that the test of fairness contained in s 98(4) would be
satisfied.
2. The s 98(4) fairness test
The s 98(4) fairness test is of key importance in assessing the extent to
which a dismissal for blowing the whistle will be fair or unfair. The
intention was to make the test neutral as between the parties and so s 98(4)
is worded to ensure that the burden of proving fairness does not rest on
either party. However when the decisions of tribunals are examined it is
clear that the neutrality of the legislation is somewhat elusive. The fairness
or unfairness of the decision to treat the reason as sufficient reason to
dismiss is a question of fact9; it is not the job of the tribunal to substitute
its own judgement for that of the employer. It is accepted that there may be
7Previously s 57(3) EP(C)A 1978
8Ss 99, 100, 104 ERA (previously ss 57A, 60 and 60A EP(C)A) and
Regulation 8(1) TUPE Regulations 1981 (although regulation 8(2) provides
that where there is an economic, technical or organisational reason entailing
changes in the workforce, dismissal can be fair) and s 152 TTJLR(C)A. The
automatically unfair reasons for dismissal that can be used by
whistleblowers are considered in detail in Chapter Five.
9 UCATT v Brain [1981] IRLR 224
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a range of employer responses that are reasonable and fair and as long as
the employer's decision to dismiss does not fall outside this range of
reasonable responses the decision will be fair'°.
In effect the bench mark against which the fairness of an employer's
response is tested is that of other employers. If it can be shown that many
employers react in a certain manner to particular types of conduct the
tribunal is unlikely to find that the reaction is unfair, it cannot find that the
response was outside the range of reasonable responses that can be expected
of an employer unless it is prepared to find that most employers are
unreasonable". This may cause problems for whistleblowers, as there can
be little doubt but that the average employer will not wish to continue
employing a person who has blown the whistle on malpractice or
wrongdoing, regardless of the size of the employer's undertaking.
Nevertheless, before the fairness of a particular dismissal is considered, the
employer will need to show that there is a prima facie fair reason for the
dismissal. Those that are most appropriate are misconduct and "some other
substantial reason justifying the dismissal". These reasons will be
considered in the context of whistleblowing, together with the s 98(4)
fairness test as it applies to each potentially fair reason.
3. Misconduct as a fair reason
Where an employee has breached a term of the contract of employment, it
will be open to the employer to use this as a fair reason to dismiss. It
should be emphasised that this is not determinative of the issue of fairness;
'°Rolls Royce Ltd v Walpole [1980] IRLR 343
Richmond Precision Engineering Ltd v Pearce [1985] IRLR 179
"See Saunders v Scottish National camps [1980] IIRLR 174
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the dismissal is still subject to the s 98(4) fairness test. It is worth noting
that the term used in s 98 is the conduct of the employee; reference is not
specifically made to breach of the terms of the employment contract,
although given the implied duty of trust and confidence owed by the
employee, most misconduct will amount to a breach of contract.
As has been said above, where disclosure of information is in the public
interest, no breach of the implied duty of confidence will have taken
place' 2 . Any attempt to present misconduct based on breach of confidence
as a fair reason for dismissal should therefore fail. Any argument that other
contractual terms, express or implied, have been breached will also fail if
the public interest is served by the disclosur& 3 . However, an employer
may still argue that such conduct gives rise to a substantial reason for
dismissal (see below).
3.1. Whistleblowing as misconduct
Where information disclosed is plainly in the public interest, for example
where it concerns wrongful or illegal conduct and is disclosed internally or
to appropriate external agencies, there is no misconduct on the part of the
employee and an employer who argues that a dismissal was for such a
reason will fail to establish a prima facie fair reason for the dismissal.
Those who act as watchdog whistleblowers should therefore find that any
attempt by an employer to argue that dismissal was for misconduct will fail.
However, as has been seen, the definition of the "public interest" is not
certain and will depend on the balancing of many different factors in each
particular case. An employee may well find that her disclosure made in
' 2See Chapter Three.
' 3 See discussion in the Chapter Three.
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good faith will not be found to be protected by the public interest defence.
In particular, protest whistleblowers who use inside knowledge to add to
public debate on an issue of public importance may not be covered by the
defence and could find themselves dismissed for misconduct. However, this
will not necessarily mean that dismissal is fair as the decision will still be
subject to the s 98(4) test of fairness.
4. Misconduct and the s 98(4) test of fairness
The main reasons for dismissals on the ground of misconduct being held to
be unfair are the lack of a fair procedure and inconsistency on the part of
the employer in treating the misconduct as a reason to dismiss. Particular
problems can arise for whistleblowers where the employer believes there to
have been misconduct at the time of dismissal yet it is subsequently
discovered that there was in fact no misconduct, because the public interest
was served by the disclosure.
4.1. Fair procedure
The s 98(4) test is usually interpreted to require that dismissals are carried
out using a fair procedure. Even where there is no contractual right to a
particular form of hearing, a fair dismissal will need to be preceded by a
system of warnings before the final sanction of dismissal is imposed. On
the other hand, in cases of dismissal for gross misconduct, there is no need
for warnings to be given, and summary dismissal without notice will be
fair.
It may be that the particular circumstances of the case mean that the breach
of confidence or trust involved in a whistleblowing incident does amount
to gross misconduct. However, unless this is the case, dismissal will be
unfair unless the conduct persists after warnings have been given. This will
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be so even though the public interest is not served by the disclosure and the
whistleblowing involves a breach of contract.
Where the public interest is served by the disclosure, it will be hard to
argue that the conduct amounts to misconduct at all. The dismissal should
thus be unfair, unless the employer can show some alternative fair reason
for the dismissal.
4.2. Inconsistencies
There are two elements to the need for consistency: the employer must act
consistently as between different employees in similar situations, and there
must be consistency between the reason given for dismissal and the
treatment of the employee.
In The Post Office v Fennell' 4, the employee's dismissal for assault of a
fellow employee was held to be unfair as the employers had not dismissed
other employees for similar conduct in the past. This rule applies regardless
of the "human agency" through which employer acts, and so the fact that
different decisions are taken by different individual managers will not
excuse the employer15. Unless employers have a clear and consistent
policy on the treatment of whistleblowers they may find that dismissal, even
where disclosure amounts to misconduct, is unfair.
The second element of consistency is that the employer needs to be
consistent in relation to any disciplinary action taken. For example, an
employer may choose to ignore an initial disclosure and then take severe
'[l981] IRLR 221
' 5 Cain v Leeds Western HA [1990] IRLR 168
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action such as dismissal on a later occasion. If no formal warning or other
action is taken at first, it is harder to argue subsequently that outright
dismissal is appropriate' 6; if disclosure is so serious, the employer needs
to explain the lack of action on the first incident' 7. On the other hand, if
an employer reacts to a first incident with dismissal, a tribunal may feel that
the action is unfair, for lack of a fair system of warnings.
4.3. Employer's belief in misconduct
Where it is unclear whether there has been misconduct in a particular case
the employer can dismiss fairly as long as she believes on reasonable
grounds that there has been misconduct. For example, where an employer
suspects that the employee is guilty of misconduct such as theft from the
workplace, the dismissal can be fair if it was based on a genuine and
reasonable belief that the employee dismissed was the culprit, even though
the truth of the matter, proved after the dismissal, is that the employee was
not'8
The reasonableness of the employer's belief is judged according to the facts
known to the employer at the time the decision to dismiss was taken. It is
not open to an employer to rely on information acquired after the event to
' 6See F.S. Investment Services v Lawson [1991] IRLIB 426, 12-13
'7Graham Pink disclosed information to the press on various occasions
and at first no action was taken. He was dismissed for a subsequent
disclosure, after refusing to accept an offer of alternative employment. The
alternative employment involved as much scope for breach of confidence
as his old post, another factor that was inconsistent with a dismissal for the
gross misconduct involved in the breach of confidence.
' 8BHS v Burchell [1980] ICR 303. This part of the decision is
unaffected by the later decision in Boys and Girls Welfare Society v
McDonald [1996] IRLR 129
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demonstrate that the dismissal was fair' 9 . This can work to the employee's
advantage where the employer subsequently discovers additional misconduct
that could have given rise to a fair reason to dismiss had it been known at
the time. However, the converse is also true, and can work harshly on the
employee who cannot rely on later information to show that the dismissal
was unfair. If the employer reasonably believed that the employee was
guilty of misconduct at the time of the dismissal, the fairness of the
dismissal is judged on the assumption that the employer's belief was
correct, even though it later transpires that there was no misconduct.
This can cause problems for whistleblowers, as the question of whether the
disclosure was justified or not, and therefore whether there was misconduct
or not, cannot easily be determined without a court hearing in which all
aspects of the case are weighed and considered. As seen in Chapter Three,
it is hard to predict the outcome of the balancing exercise involved.
However, the employer is faced with a situation which may need to be dealt
with immediately. If, at the time when the decision to dismiss is made, the
employer believes that it is not in the public interest to disclose the
information, the decision, based on a genuine belief that the conduct was
in breach of contract, will probably be seen to be fair. This will be the case,
even though it is later decided that the public interest is served by the
disclosure.
t9Although the later discovery of such information may affect
compensation. WDevis and Sons Ltd v Atkins [1977] AC 931, confirmed
in Polkev v A.E. Dayton Services Ltd [1988] ICR 142. This is not affected
by the apparent retreat from Polkey in Duffy v Yeomans and Partners Ltd
[1994] IRLR 642.
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5. "Some other substantial reason" (SOSR) and whistleblowing.
The final fair reason contained in the ERA, "some other substantial reason
that justifies the dismissal" is a catch all provision which, in effect, allows
any reason that is sufficiently substantial to be subjected to the s 98(4) test
of fairness. It has been used to provide a potentially fair reason for
dismissal in many cases which do not fall easily into the other fair reason
categories, for example the refusal to accept changes in the terms and
conditions of employment which were necessary for business reasons20.
The wide ambit of SOSR means that it can be used in whistleblowing cases
where, strictly, there is no breach of contract. The result is that the fairness
of a dismissal can then be determined without reference to the question of
whether the disclosure is in the public interest. For example, a particular
disclosure may or may not serve the public interest and so may or may not
involve a breach of contract. Nevertheless, the employer could argue that
the resulting bad relationship between the parties is itself a substantial
reason that justifies ending the employment relationship. In deciding
whether such a reason for dismissal is a potentially fair reason, the tribunal
would not need to consider questions of confidentiality and the public
interest. The justification for the employee's conduct would not be legally
relevant to that question2'.
A further "substantial" reason that an employer might use is that the
working relationships between employees have been adversely affected by
20RS Components v Irwin [1970] 1 All ER 41, where a dismissal for
refusal to accept the introduction of a restrictive covenant in the contract of
employment was fair.
21 0ne would hope that it would be relevant once s 98(4) was being
applied, but see below on the tendency for the application of s 98(4) to be
merged with the question of whether the reason for dismissal was
substantial.
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the whistleblower's conduct. Again issues of confidentiality and the public
interest are avoided. Tribunals have even been willing to accept the
employer's genuinely mistaken belief that a fair reason existed as "some
II"other substantial reason justifying the dismissal. -- Thus, even though there
may in fact be no misconduct because disclosure was in the public interest,
an employer could argue that her own, mistaken belief that there bad been
misconduct was sufficient reason to dismiss23.
Some substantial reasons that may lead to a decision to dismiss are worthy
of specific discussion: pressure to dismiss brought by colleagues of the
whistleblower and pressure brought by those external to the organisation
such as customers of the business.
5.1. Internal pressure
If the wrongdoing disclosed by a whistleblower implicates fellow
employees, they may exert pressure on the employer to dismiss the
employee. However, s 107 ERA (previously s 63 EP(C)A) requires the
tribunal to ignore any pressure exercised on the employer by way of
industrial action when deciding on the reason for dismissal. In Callanan v
Surrey A HA 24, a student nurse had reported on a colleague whom he had
witnessed hitting a patient. The other nurses in the hospital then refused to
work with him, and he was sent to work in the nursing school. He later
resigned and claimed constructive dismissal. The employing health authority
22Bouchaala v Trust House Forte Hotels Ltd [1980] IRLR 382. Here the
employer mistakenly believed that continued employment of the employee
was illegal.
23 Such an argument should not be necessary, given the rule in WDevis
and Sons Ltd v Atkins and Polkey v A. E. Dayton Services Ltd, that the
employer is judged according to the facts as he believed them to be,
discussed above.
24C01T 994/36 5th Feb. 1980
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was not allowed to rely on the internal pressure to justify the dismissal.
Since there was no other reason for the dismissal, this left the employer
with no potentially fair reason for the dismissal, and the dismissal was
unfair.
This is likely to be the outcome in many cases in which the reason for
dismissal is pressure by fellow workers aimed at persuading the employer
to dismiss, as the extent of s 107 ERA is quite broad, covering any
industrial action (not only strikes), as well as threats of such action25.
However, pressure to dismiss may take other forms. A personality clash
between staff can provide a potentially fair reason for dismissal, although,
it will not be fair where insufficient attempts are made by the employer to
improve the relationship before dismissal 26. Alternatively, where
employees are very unhappy about working with the whistleblower, it could
affect their work, amounting to a commercial pressure on the employer to
dismiss (see below).
Internal pressure to dismiss may not operate directly. It may be that
colleagues continue to work with a whistleblower, but treat her so badly at
work that she feels she has no option but to leave. The position in relation
to poor working relationships as a result of whistleblowing is unclear 27. On
the one hand, employers who fail to protect an employee from harassment
may themselves be in breach of contract; on the other, tribunals are
reluctant to require employers to employ workers where trust and
confidence have broken down.
25Faust v Power Packing Casemakers Ltd [1983] IRLR 117
26 Turner v Vestric Ltd [1981] IRLR 23
27see Napier, AIDS, Discrimination and Emplo.ym entLaw (1989) 18 lU
84 and Watt, HIV, Discrimination, Unfair Dismissal and Pressure to
Dismiss (1992) 21 lU 280
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In Wigan Borough Council v Davies' 8 the employer's failure to provide
support to an employee to enable her to cariy out her job without
harassment from colleagues, was found to be a breach of contract entitling
the employee to claim constructive dismissal. In such circumstances, it is
difficult for an employer to show that dismissal was fair. In Smith v YHA29
the constructive dismissal of a storeman was held to be unfair because
insufficient support was given by management when he reported serious
stock losses. The employer's attitude was a breach of the implied term of
trust and confidence implied into the contract of employment.
Resignation followed by a claim of constructive dismissal is always a risky
course of action for employees as the onus is on them to show that there
was cause to treat the employment relationship as ended. In addition, whilst
an employer owes a duty to protect the employee from harassment of fellow
employees, it may not be practicable to require people to work together
when relationships have clearly broken down between them. This is
especially so where the work involves a high degree of trust and
cooperation between colleagues. In such a case, it may be possible for the
employer to succeed in arguing that their approach (even if it amounts to
constructive dismissal) is within a range of reasonable responses for an
employer. It is to be hoped that such an argument would not be successful,
given that after a successful claim of unfair dismissal, the employee does
not have to return to work. An award of compensation to the employee
could be awarded which would in some measure meet the requirements for
justice to the employee without forcing an ongoing working relationship on
to the parties.
28[1979] IRLR 127
29March 6, 1980, COlT 977/213
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5.2. External pressure
Additional problems arise when employers face pressure to dismiss from
those outside the organisation, such as customers. The employer may feel
that the commercial interests of the business will be best served by yielding
to the pressure and that this is a substantial reason justifying the dismissal.
Tribunals have varied in their approach to this issue. In Scott Packing and
Warehousing Co Ltd v Paterson3° a major customer of the employer
demanded an employee's dismissal in return for its continued custom. The
dismissal, in compliance with the demand, was held to be fair. The EAT
held that "an employer cannot be held to have acted unreasonably if he
bows to the demands of his best customer ... even if the customer's motive
for seeking the removal of the employee was suspect."
This reasoning, especially that referring to the motive of the customer, has
been disapproved in later cases31 , and it has been pointed out that although
the demands of a customer may be a substantial reason justifying the
dismissal, the reason must still be subjected to the s 98(4) test of fairness,
and a resulting dismissal cannot be assumed to be fair. In Wadlev v Eager
Electrical Ltd32, the employee was dismissed following his wife's arrest
and conviction for theft (his wife also worked for the company). The
employer believed Wadley's continued employment would lead customers
to lose confidence in the company. Although the EAT accepted that concern
about customers' loss of confidence could amount to a substantial reason
justifying the dismissal, when all the circumstances of the case were
considered, such as the fact that the employee had 17 years' service and had
been dismissed without notice, it was not reasonable for the employer to
30Scott Packing and Warehousing Co Ltd v Paterson [1978] IRLR 166
31 see Grootcon (UK) Ltd v Keld [1984] IRLR 302 EAT
32[1986] IRLR 93
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treat the reason as a fair reason to dismiss. The dismissal was thus
unfair33
This scenario may become more common in future as a result of increased
contracting out of services within the public sector, with the result that the
service providers are dependent on a small number of clients, perhaps only
one. Problems could arise if the employee of a subcontractor blows the
whistle on issues that concern the main contractor. For example, if a worker
is employed by a company which contracts to provide a service to the NHS,
and that worker speaks publicly about health service issues, the contractor
may feel it necessary to dismiss her in order to continue to hold the contract
for the service. The fairness of the dismissal then turns on the
reasonableness of the employer's action in dismissing the employee in order
not to jeopardise the continued custom of a major client. Whether or not the
disclosure amounted to a breach of confidence, and whether or not the
public interest is served by the disclosure, are not of direct relevance to that
issue. Indeed, to require the employer to take account of the wider public
interest in taking the decision to dismiss would be to require the employer
to serve the public interest before commercial interests, a requirement that
is not currently made by the legislation.
6. "Some other substantial reason" and the s 98(4) test of fairness
Despite the broad nature of the SOSR as a fair reason for dismissal, such
a dismissal is not automatically fair. The employer must still comply with
the requirement that it be fair to treat the reason as a reason to dismiss; for
example the employer should give notice or warning of any dismissal. In
cases of dismissal after pressure exerted by customers, the employer may
33 See also Dobie v Burns International Security Services (UK) Ltd
[1984] IRLR 329
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need to see whether the employee can be moved on to work that does not
involve that customer, before the use of dismissal will be considered to be
fair.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the SOSR potentially fair
reason is often interpreted such that s 98(4) becomes redundant, the enquiry
into the substantiality of the reason being merged with that of the fairness
of the reason 34. This merging can have great disadvantages for the
employee as substantial reasons can be assumed to be fair, without
sufficient emphasis on the fair procedures required in relation to dismissals
for redundancy, capacity and misconduct, a danger recognised and remedied
in Wadley v Eager Electrical Ltd35.
There is a second danger; where dismissal seems fair, or at least within a
range of reasonable responses of an employer, the dismissal may be held
to be fair without sufficient investigation of whether the reason was
substantial in itself. Yet, the requirement that the reason for dismissal be
substantial is the only requirement that the tribunal can judge objectively
when assessing the fairness of the decision to dismiss under s 98(l)(b). If,
in relation to SOSR, the tribunal determines whether there was a fair reason
by reference to the standards of the average employer then, in effect, the
question of whether there was a fair dismissal becomes a single question
("was the dismissal fair?"), rather than remaining twofold as it is for the
other fair reasons, where the tribunal decides first whether the reason is
made out (judged objectively), and then applies s 98(4) (applying the
standard of the average employer).
34Bowers and Clarke, Unfair Dismissal and Managerial Prerogative: A
Study of "Other Substantial Reason" (1981) 10 lU 34
[1986] IRLR 93 see also Grootcon (UK) Ltd v Keld [1984] IRLR 302
EAT
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Where the dismissal is only judged according to the standards of the
average employer, issues such as the public interest served by the
employee's action are likely to receive less attention than they deserve in
the determination of whether there was an unfair dismissal.
7. Relevance of public interest factors in dismissal for whistleblowing.
In considering the fairness and equity of a dismissal for blowing the
whistle, it is to be hoped that the tribunal members would look at the issue
of public interest; indeed, some of the factors that determine whether or not
a disclosure is in the public interest may influence the decision on the
fairness of a dismissal. For example, dismissal is more likely to be unfair
if a disclosure is made internally than if it is made to the press. In Thornlev
v ARA Ltd36, the plaintiff raised matters of concern about aircraft design
internally at first. It was only when he disclosed confidential information
to the press (following what he believed was an unsatisfactory response by
the employer) that he was dismissed. It is clear from the reasoning of the
Industrial Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal that it was the
disclosure to the press that formed the grounds for dismissal 37. The
assumption can be made that had disclosure remained internal (a factor that
would also affect whether there was a breach of confidence), then the
dismissal might have been said to be unfair.
In Cornelius v London Borough of Hackne y38, an employee disclosed
confidential documents, revealing corrupt practices by council staff, to a
local councillor and to his union. His dismissal was found to be unfair, and
36September 14 1976, 539/11 and, May 11, 1977 EAT 669/76
37"...the real gravamen of the employer's complaint ... was that b.v
sending the letter to The Guardian on the 7th June 1976 he was in breach
of trust to his employers" Thornley, p. 8 f (italics supplied).
38EAT/1061/94, reversing the IT decision COlT 4376192/LS.
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an earlier order reducing his compensation by 50% on the basis that he had
contributed to his dismissal by failing to use the proper channels of
communication with management was overturned. The EAT held that
communication to a councillor and to the union was a proper means of
communication; it was also pointed out that Mr Cornelius was acting from
good motives. Again, factors that would affect the classification of a
disclosure as a breach of contract at common law affected the tribunal's
assessment of the fairness of the dismissal.
Similarly, matters such as the motive of the employee and the identity of
the recipient of the information may be taken into consideration when
considering the level of compensation to be awarded to the employee39.
However, tribunals are not required to take such matters into account when
assessing the fairness of a dismissal by anything in the ERA. The question
is whether the dismissal itself was a reasonable response by the employer
at the time of dismissal, not whether the action by the employee that led to
dismissal was reasonable or, indeed, in the public interest. For example, in
Bvford v Film Finances Ltd40, the employee gave information about her
employer to the opposing side in shareholders dispute because she believed
that the employer was involved in illegal conduct. In finding the dismissal
to be fair, the EAT were concerned with the reasonableness of the
employer's actions at the time of the dismissal and gave short shrift to
arguments based on the reasonableness of the employee 's actions.
This accords with the s 98(4) test of fairness, which provides that it is the
fairness of the employer's actions which is judged, not the fairness or
justice of the outcome from the employee's perspective. The requirement
39Compensation is to be the amount that the tribunal considers just and
equitable in all the circumstances. s 123 ERA 1996 (previously s 74
EP(C)A 1978). This is discussed further below at para 9.2.
40EAT/804/86 (Lexis Transcript)
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that the fairness be assessed in accordance with the "equity and substantial
merits of the case" is not used by tribunals to broaden the question to cover
the fairness of the outcome from the employee's point of view.
8. Automatically unfair dismissal
In addition to the potentially fair reasons contained in s 98 ErA 1996, there
are also various "automatically unfair" reasons for dismissal where it is not
open to the employer to argue that the dismissal was fair. The automatically
unfair reasons that can be of use to whistleblowers, such as the protection
for those who raise concerns about health and safety matters, are considered
in Chapter Five. The advantage for the employee of the dismissal being for
an automatically unfair reason is that it avoids the application of the s 98(4)
test of fairness; the employer cannot argue that the dismissal was within a
range of reasonable responses. However, employers are likely to argue that
the dismissal was for a potentially fair reason. In such a case it will be for
the employee to show that the dismissal was, in fact, for the prohibited
reason, a task than can prove difficult.
9. Remedies for unfair dismissal
Despite the fact that the unfair dismissal legislation may not always protect
the dismissed whistleblower, it will be successful in some cases. In these
cases the employee will be entitled to the remedies available under the
ERA, consisting of reinstatement, re-engagement or compensation41.
9.1 Reinstatement and Reengagement
The remedies of reinstatement and re-engagement are discretionary, and in
exercising their discretion in the matter the tribunal are required to take into
41 s 105 ERA, previously s 68 EP(C)A 1978
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account whether the employee wishes to be re-engaged or reinstated, and
whether it is practicable for such an order to be made 42. The tribunal also
considers whether it is just to order reinstatement where the employee
contributed to the dismissal. Often, by the time the case has been through
the tribunal, relations between employer and employee have broken down
to such an extent that the employee does not wish to return to the job.
Similarly, where trust and confidence between the parties has broken down,
the employer may suggest that it is not practicable for the employee to
return even where she wishes to. In such cases it is unusual for a tribunal
to order re-engagement or reinstatement, and the most usual remedy granted
by the industrial tribunals is compensation43.
Although where an ongoing working relationship is impossible
reinstatement or reengagement would be impracticable, the rarity of these
remedies limits the usefulness of unfair dismissal protection for many
employees, who may be more interested in preserving job security than in
returning to the job market with a low level of financial compensation. The
lack of reinstatement or reengagement as a remedy may be a particular
problem for specialised employees of large employers such as the health
service, local authorities, the police and armed services, where it may not
be feasible to find similar work with a new employer. In the case of
whistleblowers, even moving area to a new employer may be a problem if
the particular incident of whistleblowing is publicised generally and within
the sector in which the employee works.
42Previously s 69 (5) and (6) EP(C)A 1978
43Reinstatement and re-engagement have been ordered in less than 5%
of cases. However, Dickens et al. argue that reinstatement or reengagement
could be ordered more often and that the assumption that employees do not
favour these remedies may be false. Dickens, Jones, Weekes and Hart,
Dismissed: A Study of Unfair Dismissal and the Industrial Tribunal System
(1985) Oxford
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The limitation of remedies to compensation in many cases may act as a
severe limitation on the confidence which employees feel in the unfair
dismissal protection. Whilst this may be of little relevance for those
dismissed for fair reasons such as incapacity or redundancy, who have no
choice in whether they are dismissed, it is relevant for those contemplating
blowing the whistle. These employees face a choice: to speak out and risk
dismissal or to keep quiet and remain employed. If the remedies available
for dismissal are inadequate, they may decide to remain silent with the
result that the public is denied information that it is in its interests to have.
9.2 Compensation
The remedies for unfair dismissal are further limited by the fact that levels
of compensation are restricted. The basic award is calculated on the basis
of length of service and weekly pay, subject to a maximum of 20 years'
service and £210 weekly pay.
The compensatory award is supposed to be that which is just and equitable
in all the circumstances45. The aim is not to punish the employer for unfair
conduct, but to compensate the employee for her loss". Where dismissal
is automatically unfair the compensatory award is increased by a special
award, which does reflect disapproval at the employer's conduct. It will be
argued47 that a special award should be available where employees are
dismissed for making public interest disclosures, in order to reflect the fact
that the employer's actions were in breach of the public interest.
And a multiplier on the basis of age.
45 s 123 ERA 1996.
CIarkson International Tools Ltd v Short [1973] IRLR 90 and
Lifeguard Assurance Co. Ltd. v Zadrozny [1977] IRLR 56
47Chapter Nine, Conclusions and Proposals for Reform, para 3.1.6.
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The compensatoly award is currently subject to an upper limit of
£1 1,30048. Although the maximum is increased at times, the level remains
low in comparison with the actual losses suffered by those on all but the
lowest incomes. Employers may see this amount as an acceptable price to
pay to settle cases before they attract adverse publicity. The limit set on
compensation means that it is relatively cheap for employers to remove
those they see as trouble makers, thereby discouraging other workers from
speaking out. Although clearly some compensation for the employee is
better than none, the dismissed employee may well be left without a job,
and with losses far in excess of £11,300.
Obviously, the only way to recoup these losses is to get another job.
However, unless re-engagement or reinstatement are ordered, which is rare,
the employee may have difficulties in doing this, as the ERA only prohibits
unfair dismissal, not unfair refusal of employment 49. Once it is known that
an applicant is seeking work because of a previous dismissal for blowing
the whistle, a potential employer may well choose to give the job to another
applicant. The compensatoiy award is supposed to enable the tribunal to
compensate for future losses, but, given that whistleblowers may well
remain out of work for some time,.the limit on awards of £11,300 means
48This amount can be increased where a reinstatement or re-engagement
order is made and not complied with. However, given that reinstatement or
re-engagement are rarely ordered, this additional award is rarely going to
a protect the employee.
It is arguable that, following the approach in Marshall v Southampton (No.
2) [1993] IRLR 445, compensation for dismissal in breach of s 100 ERA
(57A EP(C)A) should not be limited to the statutory limit because it is
based on EC Directive 89/39 1. However, Directive 89/391 does not contain
an equivalent of Article 6 of Directive 76/207 which was the subject of the
Marshall case.
49Contrast the protection available for refusal to employ on grounds of
trade union activity (s 137 Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Consolidation) Act 1992) and similar protection for refusal to employ on
grounds of sex (s 6 Sex Discrimination Act 1975) or race (s-4 Race
Relations Act 1976).
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that future losses remain uncompensated. Again, the potential whistleblower,
faced with a choice of whether or not to risk dismissal by speaking out,
may decide not to, with the public interest the loser.
9.2.1 Contributory fault
A tribunal may reduce compensation paid to an employee if it finds that she
contributed to her dismissal to any extent50 . In Cornelius v London
Borough of Hackney, the industrial tribunal reduced an employee's
compensation by 50% on the basis that he had contributed to his dismissal
by disclosing information to his union. Although the EAT overturned the
decision on the basis that this was not an improper channel of
communication, it was not suggested that a reduction for contributory fault
would have been inappropriate if improper channels had in fact been used.
The use of this mechanism to reflect fault on the part of the employee could
be useful in whistleblower cases. Where a disclosure of information that is
otherwise in the public interest, is made through an inappropriate channel,
tribunals should reduce compensation on the grounds of contributory fault
rather than find the dismissal fair. Similarly, where an employee makes
what is otherwise a public interest disclosure maliciously, compensation can
be reduced.
Reducing compensation for contributory fault in this way allows the
decision of the tribunal to reflect the fact that it was in the public interest
that the information be disclosed, whilst still ensuring that the employee
does not gain from misconduct. If, in contrast, an employee's bad motive
means that a dismissal is held to be fair, there is no way for the tribunal
50s 123(6) ERA 1996 (previously s 74(6) EP(C)A 1978.
51 EAT/1061/94, reversing the IT decision COlT 4376/92/LS.
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decision to reflect the fact that she may have disclosed serious wrongdoing
by the employer.
10. Conclusion
It is clear from the above that the employee who is dismissed for blowing
the whistle at work cannot be assured of a sufficient remedy even though
it is in the public interest that the information be disclosed. Not only are the
remedies inadequate if dismissal is found to be unfair, but even that finding
cannot be guaranteed. Remedies would be improved by removing the limit
on compensation and encouraging the use of reinstatement and
reengagement. Of the other problems in using unfair dismissal in
whistleblowing cases some are fairly practical, while others are more deep
rooted, and involve the standard of fairness currently contained in s 98(4).
Specific proposals for the creation of a new automatically unfair reason for
dismissal for those who blow the whistle in the public interest are made in
the concluding chapter. The following sections will consider general
shortcomings in the law on unfair dismissal. These apply equally to those
dismissed for other reasons, but are of particular relevance to
whistleblowers. This is because employees have a choice of whether to
make a disclosure or not; where the protection is perceived as limited, they
may well decide not to speak at all, and so not be put in a position where
the protection is needed.
10.1. Practical problems
Only employees have the right not to be unfairly dismissed. Thus anyone
who works on a self-employed basis has no protection against dismissal for
blowing the whistle. A short term contract for services may be terminated,
or not renewed, without redress, other than for wrongful dismissal if
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insufficient notice is given. In addition, those without sufficient continuity
of service are not protected. Increasing numbers of employers are
introducing temporary contracts for staff 2. Although once one has worked
for more than two years for an employer, even on a series of temporary
contracts, one is eligible for unfair dismissal protection, the fact that the
contract is up for renewal gives an added sense of insecurity to the
individual. Unfair dismissal protection would be enhanced by a reduction
of the two year qualification for eligibility53.
Further problems arise when considering the practicalities of bringing a case
before a tribunal. Research indicates that an employee's chances of success
are greatly enhanced by having legal representation at the hearing 54. The
intricacies that may be involved in the determination of whether the public
interest is served by a particular disclosure mean that the public interest
whistleblower may be in particular need of legal representation at a hearing.
Although unionised employees may be able to gain help from their unions,
without legal aid to fight a case, such representation may well be beyond
the resources of other employees.
10.2. Problems with the test of fairness
As already discussed, the dismissal of the whistleblower, whether for
misconduct or for some other substantial reason will be subject to the test
contained in s 98(4): whether in the circumstances, including the size and
administrative resources of the employer's undertaking, the employer acted
reasonably or unreasonably in treating the reason for dismissal as a
52See Industrial Relations Service (1994) Non-Standard Working Under
Review, Industrial Relations Review and Report, August 1994.
53 See conclusions where it is proposed that there be no minimum
qualifying period for whistleblowers.
54Dickens, Jones, Weekes and Hart, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair
Dismissal and the Industrial Tribunal System (1985) Oxford
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sufficient reason for dismissing the employee. That question is interpreted
to require that the employer's response to the employee's action must have
been within a range of reasonable responses expected of an employer. It is
judged purely from the point of the employer, and the question is
determined on the basis of facts known to the employer, and the employer's
reasonable beliefs, at the time of the decision to dismiss.
This test puts the employee at a considerable disadvantage in comparison
with the employer in cases of dismissal for whistleblowing. The employee's
reason for breaching the employer's trust (and possibly the factor that
makes the dismissal seem unjust) is not relevant55 , and the dismissal can
be fair even though it is later established that in fact the employee was right
to speak out.
Collins has argued that the s 98(4) test is not neutral as between the
parties56. The phrasing of the test favours the employer, the tribunal must
be satisfied that the dismissal is unfair57. It appears to be neutral but in the
end claims regarding dismissals that cannot be said to be actually unfair
must fail. In Collins's view this amounts to a presumption of fairness on the
part of the employer.
The validity of his argument is evidenced by the interpretation of the range
of reasonable responses test which assumes that as long as some other
employers tend to behave in the way that the employer in question has
behaved, then the behaviour is reasonable. Although a dismissal which lacks
a fair procedure may well be unfair (even though such behaviour is
common even among "reasonable employers), it is likely that in
considering other aspects of fairness, such as whether it is fair to dismiss
55Bvford v Film Finances Ltd EAT/804/86 (Lexis Transcript)
56Collins, Justice in Dismissal (1992) Clarendon Press, Oxford
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an employee who has disclosed information which embarrasses the
employer, the question will turn on whether other employers would do the
same. As Elias puts it, "[tJhe concept of fairness is located within a
framework which accepts that the employer has in principle the right to
dismiss where this is necessary to protect his business interests."58
To this extent, "the concept of fairness ... becomes norm-reflecting rather
than norm-setting" 59. As long as the test of fairness reflects current
employment practice, the whistleblower, traditionally seen by the employer
as a disloyal employee, will have difficulty in showing that her dismissal
is unfair as dismissal will be a common response. The only way to avoid
this is to show that there was no potentially fair reason for dismissal. This
may be possible in cases of dismissal for misconduct where the public
interest in information means that there is no breach of contract; however,
this argument on the part of the employee can be blocked if the employer
chooses to argue that dismissal is for some other substantial reason.
The s 98(4) test means that the fairness of the dismissal is judged from the
perspective of the employer; the question is whether the employer 's conduct
was reasonable or unreasonable. The overall fairness in the outcome, from
the employee's point of view, is not considered. The fact that the employee
discloses in good faith, and the fact that the information is in the public
interest are not put into the equation in assessing the fairness of the
dismissal.
58Elias, Fairness in Unfair Dismissal: Trends and Tensions, (1981) 10
lU 201 at 211
59Elias, Fairness in Unfair Dismissal: Trends and Tensions, (1981) 10
lU 201 at 213
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This was approved in Polkey v Dayton Ltd6° where it was said that "[t]he
choice in dealing with [s 98(4)] is between looking at the reasonableness of
the employer or justice to the employee.., the correct test is the
reasonableness of the employer." If many employers would dismiss for
disclosure, dismissal is within a range of reasonable responses, and fair. The
viewpoint of the employee with information which it is in the public
interest to disclose is ignored.
Given that a choice between looking at the reasonableness of the employer
and justice to the employee must be made, it is arguable that the decision
in favour of the reasonableness of the employer is as good as any other.
However, where choosing justice to the employee also involves upholding
the employee's decision to serve the public interest, this would seem good
reason to exercise the choice in favour of the employee.
10.2.1. The introduction of public law concepts
Collins suggests61 that the general weakness of the unfair dismissal
legislation in protecting employees arises from the fact that unfair dismissal
is essentially a remedy of the private sphere. Although the assumption of
freedom of contract between the parties is amended by the introduction of
a right not to be unfairly dismissed, the right operates in the context of a
private contractual relationship in which the parties do not enjoy equality
of bargaining power. The use of management prerogative is limited to an
extent by the unfair dismissal legislation, but it nevertheless remains in the
interpretation of s 98(4) to include as fair any dismissal that comes within
6o[1988] ICR 143, where Lord Mackay adopted the statement by
Browne-Wilkinson 3. in Sillfant v Powell Dufflyn Timber Ltd [1983] IRLR
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61 in Justice in Dismissal (1992) Clarendon Press, Oxford
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the range of reasonable responses. As has been pointed out above, this test
can be fatal to the whistleblower's chances of success as many employer
dismiss for disclosure of information.
Collins suggests that this general weakness in the protection can only be
overcome if the legislation is used to set standards and to review the
exercise of power by the employer over the employee62 . This would enable
principles of natural justice, already present in the public law remedy of
judicial review, to be considered by the tribunal. The tribunal would assess
whether the employer's power had been exercised with proper consideration
for the rights of those affected. This would enable the tribunal to move
away from a standard of fairness based on employer custom and practice,
towards a recognition of the employee's legitimate expectation of fair
treatment within the employment relationship, with the question of fairness
being judged from both the employer's and the employee's perspective.
Collins's suggestions have been questioned by Fredman and Lee 63 who
point out that public law remedy of judicial review only allows the
procedure by which a decision is reached to be challenged. They argue that
the unfair dismissal legislation is superior in this respect in that it allows
the fairness of the decision itself to be called into question. Fredman and
Lee are probably right in that to replace the unfair dismissal legislation with
a system of judicial review would merely lead to an alternative set of
weaknesses in the protection available to employees, not least because it is
not clear whether the remedies available under judicial review would be of
any use to employees.
62Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power and the Contract of
Employment (1986) 15 lU 1
63Fredman and Lee, Natural Justice for Employees: The Unacceptable
Faith of Proceduralism (1986) 15 lU 15
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However, the suggestion is not so much that unfair dismissal should be
replaced by judicial review as it currently operates, but that the test of
fairness in s 98(4) should be moderated, taking on board concepts currently
used in judicial review jurisprudence. At present, under s 98(4) the
employer's interests and values outweigh those of the employee. The
introduction of concepts and vocabulaiy of natural justice and legitimate
expectation into the s 98(4) test could balance Out the test enormously. It
would allow tribunals to consider the justice of a dismissal from the
employee's perspective, taking into account the reasonableness of the
employee's actions as well as that of the employer. Tribunals could then be
vehicles through which standards of employer practice could be improved,
rather than merely being mirrors of current standards.
The incorporation of such ideas into unfair dismissal law would be of
benefit to all employees seeking protection 65 . It may be of particular help
in public interest whistleblowing cases, where a consideration of the wider
interests represented by the employee and the public may have an impact
on the outcome. For example, the employee who discloses information later
shown to be in the public interest may, under the current law, be fairly
dismissed if, at the time of the dismissal, the employer reasonably believed
the employee to be guilty of misconduct. However, allowing the tribunal to
consider the justice of the outcome from the employee's perspective, as
well as the justice of allowing someone acting in the public interest to be
punished for that action, may mean that such a dismissal would be held to
be unfair.
MA proposal for protection to be based on an alternative model, that of
discrimination, is discussed in the Chapter Nine, Conclusions and Proposals
for Reform.
651t is worth noting that the orange of reasonable responses" test is the
product of case law, and is not contained in s 98(4) ERA.
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Clearly to take such a line would mean that the employer pays for what
may have been innocent conduct, rather than the employee. It is arguable
that the employer is in the better position to meet the cost than the
employee, especially given the options of reinstatement and reengagement,
remedies that need not cost the employer greatly in financial terms. The
likelihood of any change that would increase the costs to the employer is
slim. However, the alternative is that the employees pay for conduct that is
both innocent and in the public interest by losing their jobs without
compensation. Given that some employees will not be prepared to pay this
price, information may well remain undisclosed, and the public interest
unprotected.
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Five
Special Situations:
7•	 •	 •
v ictimisation and the exercise of
statutory rights
1. Introduction
Employees who blow the whistle on certain specific matters may enjoy
additional protection to that available against unfair dismissal under the
Employment Rights Act 1996. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA),
Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA) and Disability Discrimination Act 1995
protect those who raise concerns about equal pay, sex, race or disability
discrimination and s 100 ERA 1996 (s 57A EP(C)A 1978) provides
protection for those who take action on health and safety matters at work.
Employees who raise concerns via a trade union may enjoy the specific
protection in TULR(C)A 1992 for those taking part in trade union activities.
This protection needs to be viewed along side the more general protection
from unfair dismissal if the full range of legal protection available to
whistleblowing employees is to be understood.
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2. Protection under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations
Act 1976 and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995
The Sex Discrimination Act and Race Relations Act provide virtually
identical protection against discrimination by way of victimisation. The
provision in the Disability Discrimination Act is substantially the same,
although the wording is not identical. It is assumed that, in this area at
least, the provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 will be
interpreted in the same way as those in the SDA and RRA, although there
is as yet no case law on the Act. What follows will therefore refer to the
SDA and RRA only, but is likely to apply equally to the Disability
Discrimination Act.
Section 2 of the Race Relations Act provides:
2. Discrimination b y way of victimisation
(1) A person ("the discriminator'9 discriminates against another person
("the person victimised") in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of
any provision of this Act f he treats the person victiinised less favourably
than in those circumstances he treats or would treat other persons, and
does so by reason that the person victimised has -
(a) brought proceedings against the discriminator or any other
person under this Act; or
(b) given evidence or information in connection with proceedings
brought &v any person against the discriminator or any other person under
this Act; or
(c) otherwise done an ,vthing under or by reference to this Act in
relation to the discriminator or any other person; or
(d) alleged that the discriminator or any other person has committed
an act which (whether or not the allegation so states) would amount to a
contravention of this Act, or by reason that the discriminator knows that the
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person victimised intends to do any of those things, or suspects that the
person victimised has done or intends to do, any of them.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to treatment of a person &v reason of anv
allegation made by him f the allegation was false and not made in good
faith.
Section 4 of the Sex Discrimination Act provides exactly the same
protection except that it covers the bringing of proceedings or giving of
evidence in proceedings under the Equal Pay Act 1970 and Part I of
Schedule 5 to the Social Security Act 1989 as well as the Sex
Discrimination Act. As a result, case law on s 4 of the Sex Discrimination
Act can be used in interpreting s 2 of the Race Relations Act and vice
versa'. The remedy available to employees where victimisation has taken
place is compensation. There is no statutory limit on levels of compensation
awarded.
Evidence suggests that many of those who bring proceedings under the two
Acts suffer some form of victimisation as a result2 and these provisions are
designed to protect against this. Yet, the protection is not limited to this; in
addition it covers those who merely allege that discrimination has taken
place and those who do "anything under or by reference" to the Acts, a
phrase that is capable of covering a wide range of activity including raising
general concerns about discrimination. It would thus appear that an
employee who blows the whistle on a specific incident of discrimination or
who raises general concerns about discrimination or equal pay should be
covered by the Acts. However, restrictive interpretation of the provisions
mean that this may not always be the case.
'It will presumably be used to inform any discussion on the scope of
the protection under s 55 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
2See Ellis, Victimisation of Applicants [1992] NLJ 1406
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Before considering its limitations, the potential width of the protection
should be recognised. The protection of any action done "under or by
reference" to the Acts is very wide and can cover a variety of behaviour.
In Kirby v Manpower Services Commission 3 the EAT held that an
employee who reported a concern about race discrimination to a local
Council for Community Relations was doing something under or by
reference to the Act (although the case failed on other grounds). This
confirms that there is no need for a concern to be linked to current or
prospective proceedings in order for the protection to be available. It thus
can clearly be used to protect an employee who reports or protests about
race or sex discrimination or equal pay.
Furthermore, the SDA and RRA provide that the protection of the employee
is only lost if an allegation is neither true nor made in good faith 4. This
means that if an allegation is true, protection is available regardless of the
motive of the reporter, and alternatively, that if the allegation turns out to
be false, that the reporter will be protected as long as the allegation was
made in good faith. This provision is of clear benefit to the employee,
particularly the assurance that reports made in good faith will be protected.
However, despite these strengths, the protection is limited both by the
wording of other sections of the SDA and RRA and by restrictive
interpretations given by the courts. First, they limit the protection to
discrimination "in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any
provision of this Act". This means that only victimisation by way of
adverse treatment in employment, education or provision of goods, services,
facilities and premises is covered, as these are the areas of discrimination
covered by the SDA and RRA. Victimisation by discrimination in any other
[198O] 1 WLR 725 EAT
4s 2(2) Race Relations Act 1976 and s 4(2) Sex Discrimination Act
1975. s 55(4) Disability Discrimination Act has a similar provision.
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way is not covered, for example discrimination by a fellow employee where
the actions cannot be said to be in the course of employment5 . More
comprehensive protection would provided by prohibiting any adverse
treatment of complainants6.
Secondly, successive restrictive interpretations by the courts have had the
effect of rendering the protection virtually unusable for many employees.
Although an early restriction was overruled, it has been replaced by an
interpretation equally able to undermine the working of the Acts.
The first case that limited the effectiveness of the Acts was Kirby v
Manpower Services Commission 7 which concerned the reporting of
discrimination against black job applicants. Kirby was employed at a job
centre run by the Manpower Services Commission, where he interviewed
applicants for jobs. In the course of his job he received confidential
information from both employees and employers. The MSC discovered that
on various occasions Kirby had reported to the local Council for
Community Relations cases where potential employers had refused to
employ black applicants. Kirby was demoted and brought a claim under s
2 RRA. Although it was held that such action could be victimisation in that
it was action taken with reference to the Race Relations Act, Kirby was
ultimately unsuccessful in his claim. The EAT held that in reporting the
employers, Kirby had breached their confidence, and that the MSC were
only treating Kirby as they would have treated any other employee who
breached confidence. Kirby had therefore not been treated less favourably
5See Waters v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] ICR
510
6Proposed by The Commission of Racial Equality, Second review of the
Race Relations Act 1976 (CRE, 1992) referred to in Ellis and Miller, The
Victimisation of Anti-Discrimination Complainants - Is it Contempt of
Court? [1993] PL 80 at 82.
[198O] 1 WLR 725 EAT
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than any other employee who acted as he did and so could not claim the
protection of the section.
Interpreted in this way, the Act's ability to protect those who raise concerns
about race or sex discrimination was severely limited. It would only protect
those who were victimised because of the specific subject matter of the
concern raised, rather than for raising a concern per se. It allowed
employers an easy route to avoiding the implications of the Act. Given that
there is no protection for raising general public interest concerns at work,
almost any employee who raised discrimination concerns would be open to
victimisation on the basis that an employer would legally victimise those
who raise other concerns8.
Doubts about the interpretation of the Act in Kirby were expressed in
subsequent cases9 and it was eventually overruled in Aziz v Trinity Street
Taxis Ltd'°. The case involved a taxi driver, Aziz, who, suspecting unfair
treatment by the company of which he was a member (Trinity Street Taxis),
made a secret recording of conversations with members of the company to
see whether the sympathy he received publicly was maintained in private.
After making the recordings he made a claim for race discrimination against
the company. In the course of proceedings the existence of the recordings
became known and Aziz was expelled from the company. He claimed that
this amounted to victimisation under s 2 of the Act. However, Aziz was
unsuccessful at the Industrial Tribunal, Employment Appeal Tribunal and
8The argument that there was no breach of confidence by Kirby because
he raised matters that were in the public interest, was not raised. However,
had it been, it might have been successful, given that Kirby had raised
legitimate concerns with a body charged with investigating such matters, the
local Council for Community Relations.
9 Wild and Joseph v Stephens and David Clulow Ltd, 16 June 1980,
COlT, 103 1/35 (Sir Jocelyn Bodilly, Chairman).
'°[1988] IItLR 204
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Court of Appeal. The Industrial Tribunal held that he was expelled because
of the breach of trust involved in making the secret recordings of his
conversations. The EAT followed the approach in Kirby, holding that Aziz
had not proved that he had been treated less favourably than others who
engaged in a similar breach of trust. The Court of Appeal held that this was
the wrong approach. Instead of considering whether the applicant had been
treated less favourably than a person who had done the same acts but
outside the context of discrimination proceedings, the tribunal should
compare the applicant with a person who had not done the acts that the
applicant had. In so deciding, the Court of Appeal overruled Kirby.
However, the Court introduced a new limitation on section 2. It held that
a causal link must be shown between the action of the applicant and the
reaction of the discriminator. Without the causal link, no claim is made out.
In Aziz's case, the decision to expel him was made because the making of
secret recordings was felt by members to be underhand and a breach of
trust. This broke any chain of causation between the complaint of
discrimination and the expulsion from the company.
Although the overruling of Kir&v was to be welcomed, in effect the
restriction on the use of the SDA and RRA is maintained through different
means. The extent to which this interpretation undermines the working of
the Acts can be seen in various cases. For example, in British Airways
Engine Overhaul Ltd v Francis 11 , a case decided before Kirby or Aziz but
using similar reasoning, the EAT held that there was no victimisation where
Mrs Francis, a union shop steward was reprimanded after making a
statement to the press complaining that her union was not carrying out its
policy of seeking equal pay for women. The company claimed that the
reprimand was for the breach in company regulations involved in making
an unauthorised statement to the press. The EAT confirmed the industrial
"[1981] IRLR 9 EAT
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tribunal's finding that this did not amount to discrimination by way of
victimisation for making an allegation about breach of the Equal Pay Act.
Interestingly, it also found that the reprimand did amount to a penalty for
taking part in trade union activities' 2, although there seems no logical
reason why, if the reprimand was purely for breach of company regulations
this latter claim should succeed any more than the claim under the Sex
Discrimination Act.
A similar approach was taken in Re York Truck Equzvrnent Ltd' 3 where the
applicant lost her claim for discrimination by way of victimisation following
her dismissal after reporting an attempted rape by one of the employing
company's clients. The employer argued that the dismissal was not a
reaction to the allegation of rape but was caused by the applicant's
disruptive conduct in continuing to involve the company in her "private life
problems", including enquiries by the police, after the employer had taken
what it felt to be adequate steps to ensure that there would be no further
trouble. The industrial tribunal found in favour of the employer and this
was upheld by the EAT. There was no causal link between an action related
to the Sex Discrimination Act and the dismissal. Instead, the cause of the
dismissal was the disruptive conduct of the employee in the manner in
which she raised the concern.
If this approach continues, then the potential for the SDA and RRA to
protect employees from victimisation is severely restricted. It appears that
an employer is allowed to separate out the subject matter of a concern from
the manner in which it is raised; where the manner is unacceptable to the
'2Now contraiy to s 146 TULR(C)A 1992
' 3 Reported in Industrial Relations Legal Information Bulletin 20
February 1990, p 11.
126
employer then this can be grounds for dismissal' 4. This leaves the
employee in a veiy difficult position, especially considering that in some
cases, lack of reaction from an employer to a concern may tempt an
employee to use some form of "disruptive" behaviour in order to ensure that
the employer considers the complaint. Clearly such a tactic could leave the
employee unprotected.
In Nagarajan v Agnew' 5, there is evidence of a degree of retreat from the
approach in Aziz. The EAT pointed out that Aziz was a case where there
was only one motive for the dismissal, a motive that was not related to the
Race Relations Act. In contrast, where there are mixed motives for an
action, as there were in Nagarajan, the actor will be liable as long as one
of the motives is discriminatoiy. Support for this approach was found from
cases dealing with other parts of the RRA and SDA, in which a more
generous approach to the interpretation of the Acts is taken, in contrast to
that in relation to the victimisation provisions. In 0 'Neil! v Governors of St
Thomas More Upper School' 6 a similar approach to causation was taken
to that in Nagarajan. The respondent school in the case argued that the
dismissal of a female member of staff was not by reason of her pregnancy,
but because the father of the child was a Roman Catholic priest. The EAT
held that the factor alleged to be causative of the discriminatory act did not
even need to be the main cause, as long as it was an effective cause. In this
case the fact of the pregnancy permeated the decision to dismiss and so the
dismissal was discriminatory. Such an approach to causation in
victimisation would improve the protection provided by the law.
'41t should be noted that in this case the applicant did not qualify for
unfair dismissal protection; had she done so, the industrial tribunal would
have found the dismissal unfair.
'[l994] IRLR 61 EAT
16[19961 IRLR 372
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Further support for those seeking to prove victimisation can be found in
Baker v Cornwall County Council' 7, where the Court of Appeal pointed
out that in discrimination cases the discriminator is vely unlikely to admit
the discrimination. If the alternative explanation for the discriminator's
behaviour is accepted too readily, then it will often be very difficult to
prove the complainant's case. Instead, the Court suggested that tribunals
should be prepared to draw the inference that there has been discrimination
in cases where the circumstances are consistent with discrimination, unless
the alleged discriminator can show otherwise. In Owen and Briggs v
James' 8, the Court of Appeal held that a finding that a racial consideration
was an important factor in a decision is sufficient to found a case of
discrimination. Clearly, tribunals must allow defences to succeed where
appropriate, but once the ease with which an alternative explanation can be
given has been recognised, the victims of discrimination should find it
easier to succeed in their claims, even though they retain the burden of
proving the causal link between the victimisation and an act with reference
to the SDA or RRA.
One final limitation of the victimisation provisions was confirmed in
Nagarajan' 9. Nagarajan, whilst an employee of London Underground Ltd.,
made several claims of discrimination against his employer. He was later
unsuccessful in his application for a new job with London Regional
Transport, after an unfavourable report was written about him. He claimed
that this was victimisation for making the earlier claims of discrimination.
Despite its more generous approach to finding discriminatory motives, the
EAT held that the anti-victimisation provisions only applied to events
occuning during the course of employment and not to the victimisation of
a former employee. Thus an employee is only protected against
'[199O] IRLR 194
18[1982] IRLR 503
'[l994] IRLR 61
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discrimination by a current employer 20 . No protection is granted for those
denied a fair reference by reason of any actions done with reference to the
SDA or RRA. This limitation has the potential seriously to undermine the
protection provided by the sections, especially as many employees prefer
to raise concerns about a workplace after they have left.
In conclusion, the victimisation provisions of the RRA, SDA and Disability
Discrimination Act provide welcome protection to those who blow the
whistle on race, sex or disability discrimination at work. However, the
protection is limited, the most serious limitation being the strict requirement
for a direct causal link between the action of the employer and the fact that
the action of the employee had reference to the Acts, allowing the employer
to escape liability where objection is taken to the method by which a
concern was raised. A more flexible approach on this issue, for example
following the approach to causation taken in the USA21 , would strengthen
the protection provided by the Acts.
3. Scope of Protection under s 100 ERA 1996
Section 100 ERA provides special protection of relevance to an employee
who blows the whistle on health and safety matters. It is automatically
unfair to dismiss a safety representative for raising concerns about health
and safety in the workplace. Where there is no safety representative or
safety committee, or it is not practicable to use those means, the protection
extends to cover any employee who raises such concerns. The dismissal of
employees who leave their place of work (or refuse to return to it) in
circumstances of serious and imminent danger is also covered. Section 44
ERA (previously s 22A EP(C)A 1978) provides parallel protection against
2O employee could also be protected against victimisation by a future
employer, s 6 SDA and s 4 RRA.
21Discussed in Chapter Seven, Whistleblower Protection in the USA at
para. 3.2.2.3.
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action short of dismissal. These sections were introduced into the EP(C)A
1978 following the adoption of the EC Framework Directive 89/391
which requires measures to be taken to encourage the improvement in
safety and health of workers. Employees are already under a duty to inform
their employer of concerns about health and safety; sections 44 and 100
22Article 13(2)(d) of the Framework Directive imposes a duty on
employees to inform their employers and fellow workers of any
shortcomings in the protection arrangements and any work situation which
they have reasonable ground for considering represents an immediate danger
to safety and health. Workers representatives are required to take part in
measures that can affect health and safety and are not to be placed at a
disadvantage for doing so.
23 
s 7 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974
"It shall be the duty of every employee while at work -
(a) to take reasonable care for the health and safety of himself and of other
persons who may be affected by his acts or omissions at work...."
SI 1977/500 Safety Representatives and Safety Committees (SRSC)
Regulations 1977 includes in the safety representative's functions the
making of representations to the employer on general matters affecting the
health, safety or welfare at work of the employees at the workplace -
Regulation 4(1 )(d)
The SRSC Regulations only apply to union appointed safety representatives
and committees. The more recent regulations below apply to all employees.
SI 1992/2051 Management of Health and Safety at Work (MHSW)
Regulations 1992, Regulation 12
"Every employee shall inform his employer or any other employee of that
employer with specific responsibility for the health and safety of his fellow
employees -
(a) of any work situation which a person with the first-mentioned
employee's training and instruction would reasonably consider represented
a serious and immediate danger to health and safety; and
(b) of any matter which a person with the first-mentioned employee's
training and instruction would reasonably consider represented a
shortcoming in the employer's protection arrangements for health and
safety,
insofar as that situation or matter either affects the health and safety of that
first-mentioned employee or arises out of or in connection with his own
activities at work, and has not previously been reported to his employer or
to any other employee of that employer in accordance with this paragraph.
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strengthen this commitment to health and safety by providing the protection
of job security that is necessary if employees are to feel safe to fulfil these
duties24.
In addition to protection against dismissal and action short of dismissal,
designated employees and safety representatives are also eligible for
'5additional remedies such as a special award and intenm relief- . The
advantage to the employee is not only in the increased compensation
represented by the special award, but also the fact the case is heard
speedily, with the opportunity for reengagement, reinstatement or payment
of wages, pending a full hearing26.
The protection is subject to various limitations and cannot be used by all
employees. In the first place, the main focus of the Framework Directive
and sections 100 and 44 is on the protection of safety representatives and
the additional remedies of interim relief and the special award are only
available to these employees 28. Other employees are protected only when
there is no safety representative or committee, or, if they do exist, when it
In addition, the Approved Code of Practice which accompanies the MHSW
regulations, provides that employees should inform their employer of any
matter relevant to health and safety so that the employer can fulfil his duty
to provide safe work environment.
24The Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations
1996 SI 1996/1513 extends protection to employees consulted on health and
safety matters.
25ss 125 and 128 ERA (previously ss 75A and 77 EP(C)A)
26ss 129 and 130 ERA (previously ss 77A and 78 EP(C)A)
27Sections 100 and 44 are drafted in substantially the same terms.
Discussion will be limited to s 100 but the same points will apply to the
protection available under s 44.
28ss 118(3) and 128 ERA (previously ss 72(3) and 77 (1) EP(C)A)
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is not reasonably practicable to use them as the channel through which to
communicate concerns29 . The circumstances in which a tribunal will find
that it was not "reasonably practicable" to use the designated means are not
clear, but more worryingly, it is not at all clear why an employee may not
raise genuine concerns about health and safety without going through the
designated route of safety representatives where they exist. For example, an
employee who voices concern direct to management will not come within
the protection of s 100. Of course, a dismissal for such action may still be
unfair, but it is not automatically so.
The second limitation of the protection is that it seems only to protect those
who raise concerns about health and safety in the workplace, rather than,
for example, concerns about the safety of consumers of the goods once they
have left the workplace. The only possible exception to this is where
"appropriate action" is taken to protect the employee or other persons from
serious and immediate dangers30. Again, the dismissal of an employee for
raising concerns about the safety of consumers in less urgent circumstances
will not come within the protection of the section.
This was confirmed in Brendon v BNFL Flurochemicals Ltd31 . where an
employee was unsuccessful in claiming the protection of s 100 in relation
to his dismissal for his reluctance to sell a particular chemical to customers
abroad as he believed that they might sell the product on illegally. The
tribunal commented that "the protection given by the subsection extends
only to matters concerned with the health and safety at work or in the
workplace and not to matters which are ... not connected with the safety of
the products but are in reality ethical considerations regarding [the] possible
end user [of the product]".
29s 100(l)(c)
30s 100(1)(e) and s 44(1)(e)
31 C01T Case No. 59 163/94
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Thirdly, s 100(3) provides a defence to employers where it can be shown
that the action taken by the employee is negligent. This is presumably
designed to cover the situation where, for example, an employee leaves the
dangerous place of work without taking simple steps to avoid the
continuation of the danger, such as switching off a machine. However, it
has been suggested32 that this could cover negligence liability for
statements made by employees which might cause economic loss to the
employer, such as where statements about the safety of goods manufactured
by the employer are made publicly. Arguably this would be covered by s
100(1)(e) (taking appropriate steps to protect others in circumstances of
danger), but dismissal for such action may nevertheless be fair if the
statement is made negligently and the employer incurs loss. On the other
hand, if it is in the public interest that the statement was made, the
employer defence may not apply33.
The limitations outlined above mean that there is often no automatic
protection for ordinary employees who blow the whistle on health and
safety matters. However, it may be the case that those who are not covered
by s 100 will still be able to find a remedy for dismissal. One possibility
for public sector employees is that where the Framework Directive provides
more extensive coverage than domestic legislation, and where the rights are
sufficiently clear, the directive may be used directly34. However, although
the directive does include some wider obligations than those in domestic
legislation on matters such as the extent to which employers must provide
information on health and safety, it does not give any wider employment
32Cripps, The Legal Implications of Disclosure in the Public Interest
(1994) Sweet and Maxwell, London at p 320.
33Ibid, at p 320.
34See Van Duvn [1975] Ch 358 and Foster v British Gas [1990] IRLR
353 and [1991] IRLR 270
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protection to those who raise health and safety matters. Thus, employees
remain dependent on domestic protection against dismissal.
There is nothing to stop the employee who does not come within s 100
from claiming that the dismissal is unfair using the general unfair dismissal
protection. Although the failure to bring the claim within s 100 means that
the unfairness of the dismissal is not automatic, it is still open to a tribunal
to find that it was unfair. There are two factors in health and safety cases
that may improve the chances of success in a claim beyond those in other
the whistleblowing cases. First, it may be difficult for an employer to claim
that there has been misconduct because employees are, by virtue of s 7 of
the Health and Safety at Work Act, under a duty to take reasonable care for
the health and safety of people who may be affected by their acts or
omissions at work, a duty which may involve disclosing concerns more
widely than envisaged by s 100. Secondly, the public interest in
encouraging the protection of health and safety at work is clear, and it is to
be expected that tribunals, in applying the s 98(4) test of reasonableness,
will be unwilling to find that a dismissal for such a reason is fair35.
It is thus arguable that the additional protection provided by s 100 is not the
panacea for health and safety dismissals that it might seem at first sight.
This view is confirmed when one considers that designation of certain
dismissals as automatically unfair does not overcome the severe practical
problems faced by employees in showing that a dismissal was caused by
raising matters of health and safety. The fact that the dismissal is
automatically unfair merely avoids the uncertainty of whether an industrial
tribunal will find the dismissal fair or not. It does not avoid the problem of
showing that the dismissal (or other detrimental treatment) was caused by
the reporting of health and safety concerns. As in the case of discrimination
by way of victimisation, unless this causal link is shown, an employee will
35See previous chapter on interpretation of s 98(4) in the case law.
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not come within the protection of the section. Given the consequences of
a finding that a dismissal was for a health and safety (or indeed a
discrimination) reason, employers have eveiything to gain from showing
that the dismissal was for some other reason.
4. Scope of Protection for taking part in Trade Union Activities
The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 provides
protection against dismissal and action short of dismissal for membership
or non-membership of a trade union and for taking part in the activities of
a trade union at an appropriate time36. It is possible that an employee who
is a member of a trade union and who discloses information as part of a
trade union campaign may be able to use these sections as protection
against any resulting or threatened penalty. However, the protection is
limited to actions that are endorsed by the trade union and can therefore be
said to be an activity of the trade union; a unilateral decision by an
employee to disclose information will not be protected merely because the
employee is a trade unionist37.
As with the protection outlined above, the protection is more generous than
that for other unfair dismissals as interim relief is available together with
the added compensation of a special award if the case is made out.
However, although such dismissals are automatically unfair, this by itself
does not solve all the problems. Even where there is an activity of a trade
union, the sections only apply where the "reason" for dismissal 38 or
36 146 and 152 TULR(C)A 1992.
37Chant v Aquaboats Ltd [1978] ICR 643 where an employee acted as
a spokesman for a group of employees in raising concerns with
management. The action was not an action of the union just because he was
a trade unionist. His actions may now be covered by s 57A EP(C)A 1978.
38s 152 TULR(C)A 1992
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"purpose" of action short of dismissal39 is to penalise the individual for
taking part in the trade union activity. This imposes restrictions on the
operation of the section similar to the causal requirement in relation to the
protection provided by the Sex Discrimination Act and Race Relations Act.
In fact, the restriction may be even stronger in that even where the
employee can show that but for the participation in the trade union activity
she would not have been dismissed or subjected to the detrimental
treatment, the employer may have a defence if it can be shown that there
was some ulterior motive or purpose for the action40.
The "purpose" or "reason" requirement may well prevent whistleblowers
using the protection. In cases where employees are dismissed or have action
short of dismissal taken against them for blowing the whistle on matters
relating to the work place, it may well be that tribunals find that the
purpose or reason for the action is the breach of confidence involved, or the
consequent lack of trust between the parties 41 , rather than the fact that the
action was a trade union activity.
On the other hand, the result in British Airways Engine Overhaul Ltd v
Francis42, suggests that the causal link requirement in the SDA and RRA
may prove a bigger obstacle to employees than the "purpose" or "reason"
requirement in relation to ss 146 and 152. Here the trade unionist employee
was reprimanded for making a press statement about equal pay without
authorisation. The EAT held that this was not victimisation under s 4 SDA
39s 146 TULR(C)A 1992
40Associated Newspapers Ltd v Wilson and Associated British Ports v
Palmer [1995] 2 All ER 100
41 Even if the disclosure is in the public interest and so does not involve
a breach of confidence it may result in a lack of trust between the parties
which could affect future working relations.
42[198l] IR.LR 9 EAT
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because the reprimand was for the breach of company rules involved. It
might seem logical that it could therefore not be for the purpose of
penalising trade union activity either, however the EAT held that the
reprimand did amount to action short of dismissal for taking part in trade
union activities. Similarly, in Bass Taverns Ltd v Burgess43 the Court of
Appeal did not allow an employer's claim that a dismissal for making
critical remarks about the company at a union recruitment meeting was not
a dismissal for trade union activities. It referred with approval to Lyon v St
James Press Ltct4 where the court warned that ready acceptance that a
dismissal was for the actions actually undertaken could obstruct the
protection of trade union activities; instead it was important to bear in mind
the trade union context of the actions.
The circumstances in which a whistleblower can use the protection provided
by sections 146 and 152 TULR(C)A will be fairly rare. The disclosure
would need to be part of recognised trade union activity and the penalty
would need to have been imposed because it was trade union activity rather
than because of the breach of confidence involved. The weakness of the
sections in adequately protecting the whistleblower is perhaps unsurprising.
The sections were designed to provide support for individual workers
seeking to further their collective interests. Although whistleblowing in the
public interest can be seen as the pursuit of collective interests it tends to
be carried out by individualist means, and is not one of the core activities
that the legislation aims to protect.
[1995] IRLR 596
[1976] IRLR 215
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5. Protection for witnesses who give evidence at public inquiries
Under the Witness (Public Inquiries) Protection Act 1892 it is an offence
to threaten, punish, damnify or injure a person for having given evidence
at an inquiry45 . An employee who is penalised, by dismissal or otherwise,
for disclosing confidential information at an inquiry may also claim
compensation46. The protection is limited to the giving of evidence at a
public inquiry held "under the authority of any Royal Commission, or by
any committee of either House of Parliament, or pursuant to any statutory
authority,"47 and does not cover evidence at informal inquiries or evidence
given at court48 . The Act's ambit is therefore rather narrow and it will
only protect the whistleblower in very limited circumstances49.
6. Conclusions
The provisions discussed above provide legal protection for employees who
blow the whistle on certain specific issues at work, and can be seen to
complement the protection available under the general law. Despite the
various origins of the protection, they share the same major weakness in
protecting whistleblowers; the difficulty in showing that the adverse
treatment was caused by protected conduct. If any additional protection for
whistleblowers is to be introduced and is to be effective, the problem of
causation will need to be addressed.
45Section 2 Witnesses (Public Inquiries) Protection Act 1892
Section 4
47Section 1
48Attempts to injure or punish a witness in court proceedings would be
contempt of court.
49See chapter 10 in Cripps, The Legal Implications of Disclosure in the
Public Interest, (1994) Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2nd Edition.
138
Clearly, employers need to guard against the possibility of employees
avoiding legitimate disciplinary action by making a disclosure, so a causal
link does need to be shown between the disclosure and any adverse action.
Equally, insistence on a direct link can be exploited by employers, who
have all to gain from showing that dismissal was for a reason that is not
prohibited.
As considered above, there is, within the current law, the potential for a
broader approach to causation to be taken. Where the circumstances are
consistent with dismissal for a prohibited reason, a causal link can be
inferred, and the onus put on the employer to refute it50. Courts can also
be warned against accepting too readily any contention that dismissal was
for a legitimate reason, and reminded of the ease with which alternative
reasons can be presented 51 . Where there appears to be more than one
reason for a dismissal, a causal link should be accepted where the
prohibited reason is one of the effective causes, and in considering this
question, the context of the dismissal should be considered52.
Taken together, these developments suggest that courts could take a more
flexible approach to causation, without waiting for any major amendments
to the law. If applied to whistleblower protection, a more flexible approach
on causation could allow courts to look at issues such as whether the raising
of concerns was justifiable, or whether there was a bona fide reason for
raising the issue, as well as the manner in which the concern was raised.
Where it is right that the concern should have been raised, protection should
be available for any resulting victimisation, even though there may be other
50Baker v Cornwall County Council [1990] IRLR 194
51Bass Taverns Ltd v Burgess [1995] IRLR 596, Lyon v St James Press
Ltd [1976] IRLR 215
52Q 'Neill v Governors of St Thomas More Upper School [1996] IRLR
372
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causes involved. Such an approach to causation could strengthen the
protection available under any new legislation, although the potential for
any changes in the test of causation should not be overestimated. The
experience of the USA suggests that changes to the test of causation only
has a limited effect; the main problem in using legislative protection for
whistleblowing remaining that of proving causation53.
Arguably, these provisions are of additional and wider significance, beyond
the protection they provide to specific types of whistleblower. They
demonstrate a recognition by the legislature that individual protection
against reprisal is needed if the wider objectives of the legislation are to be
achieved. A right not to be discriminated against on grounds of sex will
clearly be ineffective if employees can be dismissed for exercising it.
Equally, if employees are to be encouraged to raise concerns about matters
that are in the public interest, similar protection is needed. Indeed, it was
a desire to end corruption and maladministration that led to legislation to
protect whistleblowers in the USA.
The inclusion of victimisation provisions in the legislation examined above
indicates that in respect of the specific issues covered, the argument for
employee protection has been won. These provisions could therefore be
used to argue for protection to be extended to cover employees who
disclose a wider range of matters which are equally in the public interest.
"See the experience in the USA, discussed in Chapter Seven.
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Six
Whistleblowing and Human Rights:
Protection available under Article
10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights
It will be asserted that the uncertainties in the law on confidentiality, and
the limitations inherent in unfair dismissal legislation mean that the UK law
fails adequately to protect those who blow the whistle at work. It is
therefore worth considering the extent to which a whistleblower who is not
protected under domestic law would be successful if a claim were to be
brought under the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 10
provides the right to freedom of expression, and is the provision of the
Convention that is most relevant when an employee is disciplined or
dismissed for speaking out on matters of public concern.
Article 10:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference &v public authority and
regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
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2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed bv law and are necessaiy
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartialit y of the judiciary.
I The Aims of Protection
The preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights provides that
the "fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace
in the world are best maintained.., by an effective political democracy...".
The European Court of Human Rights (the Court) recognises that freedom
of speech is central to those aims; it is clear from the case law on Article
10 that freedom of speech is protected because of its importance to the
democratic process. Citizens need information so that informed participation
in the political process can take place. Thus the right to free speech (to
impart information) and the right to receive information are protected by the
same article of the Convention. This rationale for the protection of speech
is reflected in the judgement of the court in Handyside that "freedom of
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a 'democratic
society'], one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the
development of every man".
It is clearly important that, if the public is enjoy freedom of information,
free speech should enjoy general protection; this is particularly important
(1981) 1 EHRR 737. See also Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 ERRR
245, Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407, Barthold v Germany (1985) 7
EHRR 383.
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in relation to information that is of public interest or concern. For this
reason protection should be available to employees who may have specialist
knowledge to enable them to participate and contribute to debate on issues
of public importance. However, it is not clear that such protection is always
available under the Convention.
2 Use of the European Convention on Human Rights by individual
employees
Before an individual can bring a claim to the European Court of Human
Rights she must have exhausted any local remedies and be able to show
that the failure to protect her rights can be imputed to the State. The first
condition will be fairly easily met: the employee dismissed for blowing the
whistle will need to bring a claim for unfair dismissal to a tribunal, and go
through any appeal process open to her. Public sector employees will easily
meet the second condition as the failure to uphold the employees' freedom
of speech will be an action of the State. Private sector employees may have
more difficulty in meeting this condition.
2.1 Action of the State
It has been accepted by the Commission and Court that a failure to enact
legislation to protect employees from breaches of the Convention can be
imputed to the State. This was confirmed in Young, James and Webster v
UK2, where the three applicants, employed in a workplace which operated
a closed shop, were dismissed for non-membership of a union. They
successfully argued that this was in breach of their right to freedom of
association under Article 11. The failure to provide domestic legislation to
prohibit dismissal for non-membership was the responsibility of the state
2[19811 IRLR 408
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and could therefore be imputed to the state for the purposes of claiming the
protection bringing the case. Arguably, then, any failure by the domestic
courts to protect whistleblowers could similarly be imputed to the state and
give rise to a claim.
However, in Rommelfanger v FDR3 the European Commission on Human
Rights ruled inadmissible a case concerning the dismissal of a doctor in a
Roman Catholic hospital for writing a letter to the press disapproving of the
Church's attitude to abortion. The Commission held that the case involved
no direct state interference with the applicant's freedom of expression. His
contractual duties to the hospital had been breached by the letter, and the
Commission was of the view that the enforcement of contractual duties, if
the contract had been freely entered into by the parties, did not constitute
an interference by a public authority warranting the action of the
Commission or Court. This was particularly the case because the law
applied by the domestic courts included a degree of flexibility as to its
application, allowing the court to weigh up competing interests of employer
and employee. This meant that the employee was adequately protected by
the domestic law, even though in this instance the discretion was exercised
against him.
This case may cause difficulties for a private sector employee who wishes
to claim the protection of the Convention. Arguably, there exists sufficient
flexibility in the domestic law, whether in the interpretation of the public
interest defence to a breach of confidence claim, or in the application of the
test of fairness in unfair dismissal4, for the Commission to find that the
enforcement of this area of law does not constitute an interference by the
State. On the other hand, failure of the domestic law to protect public
3Applic. No. D12242/86 (1989) 62 D&R 151
4s 98(4) ERA 1996, previously s 57(3) EP(C)A 1978
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interest whistleblowers, particularly by the operation of the "range of
reasonable responses" test in unfair dismissal is, equally arguably, the
responsibility of the State, and thus a claim under Article 10 of the
Convention may be possible.
2.2 Approach of the Court where penalty for speech is dismissal
A further difficulty for an employee in bringing a claim under the
Convention is that dismissal has not always been seen as a sufficient
infringement of human rights to warrant protection. However, after the case
of Vogt v German?, this difficulty may have diminished.
In Kosiek v Germanv, where a probationary lecturer was dismissed from
his post because of his active membership of the National Democratic
Party, it was stated that the Convention did not cover access to public
office, and this was what was at the heart of the issue in this case.
Similarly, in Glasenapp v Germany7, a probationary secondary school
teacher was dismissed amongst other things for refusing to certify in writing
that she did not support the German Communist Party, the KPD. The Court
held again that the issue was one of access to the civil service, and thus not
covered by the Convention.
By taking this line, the Court did not have to consider whether the
dismissals were necessary in a democratic society nor whether they were
justified or proportionate8 . If it had done so, it would have had to address
the fact that in neither case was the mode of interference (dismissal) related
(1996)2l EHRR 205
6(1986) 9 EHRR 328
'(1987) 9 EI-IRR 25
8See discussion on this below.
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to the speech. The speech was totally unconnected with the applicants'
duties in school. It is arguable that action taken in connection with
employment can never be a proportionate response to speech outside that
employment. The finding that there was no prima fade breach of the
Convention meant that this issue was ignored.
A similar approach was taken in Leander v Sweden9 where the applicant
claimed that the refusal to offer him ajob as a museum technician, because
certain secret information allegedly made him a security risk, was in breach
of Article 10. The application was dismissed on the basis that the right to
recruitment to the public service was not recognised by the Convention.
According to these three cases, employees dismissed for speaking on
matters relating to their work may find that they cannot claim the protection
of the Convention as there is no prima facie breach of the convention'0.
However, these fears have been lessened following the case of Vogt v
Gennanv". Like Kosiek and Glasnapp the case involved the dismissal of
a teacher for being a member of the German Communist Party. This time,
the court upheld her claim that this breached Article 10. It distinguished
Kosiek and Glasenapp on the basis that they concerned probationary
employees and therefore access to the civil service. Vogt, in contrast, was
already a permanent civil servant at the time of the dismissal. This meant
that the Court could no longer avoid the issue of whether dismissal
amounted to an interference with the rights guaranteed under the
Convention. Although the margin in favour of finding that the dismissal
(1987) 9 EHIRR 433
'°Although in each of these cases the penalty for speaking was dismissal
from the civil service, the reasoning could apply to other employees
dismissed for speaking on work-related matters.
11(1996) 21 EHRR 205
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amounted to an interference warranting protection was veiy narrow (ten
votes to nine), it sets a clear precedent to be followed.
After Vogt, it is much less likely that the Court or Commission will take the
view that dismissal does not involve a prima facie breach of the
Convention' 2. Even before Vogt there were cases that supported the
contention that dismissal for exercising the right to freedom of expression
is in breach of the Convention. In Lingens' 3 it was said that the threat of
legal proceedings could inhibit participation in public debate: although
prosecution is a more serious penalty than dismissal, the threat of dismissal
will operate as a very real restraint on speech on sensitive issues. In the
admissibility proceedings in Glasenapp'4 it was said that "the scope of
Article 10(1) may be wider than merely to forbid the complete interruption
or prevention of freedom of expression, and may extend further to protect
the individual against certain other restrictions or penalties which result
directly from the expression or holding of an opinion". In addition, in Van
Der HeUden v the Netherlands' 5 the Commission recognised that to
dismiss for exercising the right to free speech is to restrict and penalise that
freedom, and this can be just as strong a deterrent to speech as total
prohibition'6.
' 21n 1995 Ahmed v UK (1995) 20 EHHIR C.D. 72 which involves a
claim under Article 10 by local government employees whose political
activities are restricted by the Housing and Local Government Act 1989,
was found admissible.
'(1986) 8 EHRR 407
v Germany 9228/80 (1983) 5 EHRR 471
'11002/84 (1985) decision of 8th March
' 6The case involved the dismissal of the director of an immigration
centre on account of his political activities. The Commission stated that
although the case concerned only the effects of exercising the right of free
speech, not the removal of the freedom itself, nonetheless the termination
of employment did restrict and penalise freedom of speech as it resulted
from its exercise. The case was declared inadmissible as the measure was
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As was pointed out in one of the dissenting judgments in Vogr' 7, the
distinction between the protection of the freedom of speech of probationers
and that of permanent staff is difficult to maintain on any principled basis.
Indeed, if the distinction is raised in a future case, rather than confirm the
distinction between probationary and permanent staff, it would be preferable
for the Court to admit that there has been a change of policy, and to follow
the approach of Lingens and Van Der HeUden, recognising that dismissal
for exercising the right to free speech is sufficiently strong a deterrent to
speech to warrant protection.
Once the issue is seen to be one of freedom of speech, rather than access
to jobs, then an employee who has been dismissed for exercising that right
will be able to have the necessity and proportionality of the dismissal
considered. Dismissal is a severe response and the interest in restricting
speech will need to be very strong to be proportionate. Such an approach
is also consistent with the statements of principle in cases such as
Handvside that free speech is vital for a democratic society. Once it is
recognised that the threat of dismissal is a serious disincentive to speaking
out on matters of public importance, it is clear that such action needs the
full protection of the Convention.
3 General provisions of Article 10
Article 10 protects the holding and expressing of opinions, and the
imparting and receiving of information. Although the protection covers all
types of information and opinion and "is applicable not only to
necessary in a democratic society; his political activity was on behalf of
party that was hostile to presence of foreign workers and was clearly
incompatible with his job.
' 7That of Judge Jambrek.
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'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend,
shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population" 8, the level of
protection given varies according to the type of information as will be seen
below. Furthermore, the protection is not absolute, but is limited by the
operation of Article 10(2).
3.1 Restrictions contained in Article 10(2)
Article 10(2) recognises that freedom of expression carries with it duties
and responsibilities, and therefore that in some cases freedom of expression
must be limited. However, the circumstances in which such limitations are
to occur are restricted. They must be prescribed by law; they must be for
one of the reasons listed in the section; and they must be necessary in a
democratic society. All three of these conditions must be met before a
restriction or interference with freedom of expression will be acceptable
under the Convention. The legitimate reasons that will be most relevant to
the whistleblower will be the protection of the reputation of others; the
prevention of the disclosure of information received in confidence and, in
some cases, interests of national security. Even where such a legitimate
reason for interference with freedom of expression exists, such interference
will still be in breach of the Convention unless the interference is prescribed
by law and necessary in a democratic society.
3.1.1 Prescribed by Law
In The Sunday Times v UK' 9 the Court had to consider how precise legal
prescriptions had to be to meet the requirements of Article 10(2). The case
' 8Handvside, as above
'(1979) 2 E}IRR 245
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involved an injunction to prevent the publication of articles about the
thalidomide drug whilst litigation was ongoing between the drug
manufacturers and the parents of children born with deformities whose
mothers had taken the drug during pregnancy. The law governing contempt
of court, under which the injunction was obtained was, at that time,
contained in imprecise rules of English common law. The Court's answer
on the question of whether there was sufficient certainty for the injunctions
to be "required by law" was as follows:
"First the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be
able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of
the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot
be regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient
precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be
able to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances,
the consequences which a given action may entail. Those
consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty:
experience shows this to be unattainable."20
Where the legitimate aims of a restriction on speech relate to the protection
of the reputation of others or prevention of disclosure of information
received in confidence, such restrictions will be provided by the laws on
defamation and on restraint of disclosure of confidential information. Any
uncertainty in the outcome of a case of defamation probably is within the
bounds of acceptable uncertainty envisaged by the Court in The Sunday
Times case. In respect of the rules on breach of confidence, the outcomes
are difficult to predict, given the many different factors that can be taken
into account in assessing the public interest in any particular case. However,
20Ibid at para 49. See also Hodgson and others v UK (Applications
11553/85 and 11658/85, Admissibility decision, 9th March 1987) 51 D&R
136 where the Commission said that "The mere fact that a legislative
provision may give rise to problems of interpretation does not mean that it
is so vague and imprecise as to lack the quality of 'law' in this sense".
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given the approach in The Sunday Times the rules preventing disclosure of
confidential information would probably be considered sufficiently certain.
It is arguable that the implied employment terms requiring trust and
confidence between the parties mean that dismissal for breach of confidence
is a penalty that is prescribed by law. The terms are certain and well
established, and are implied by the operation of the common law.
Alternatively, dismissal or discipline may be prescribed by professional
rules that govern the employee, such as the professional codes of conduct
that impose a duty of confidence on medical staff. In Barthold v
German?' the Court accepted that restrictions on professional advertising
imposed by a professional body were 'prescribed by law' for the purposes
of Article 10(2). The 'law' for these purposes is not limited to national laws
but extends to professional rules and codes of conduct. Discipline or
dismissal of an employee may therefore be 'prescribed by law' where this
is provided for by a professional code of conduct.
3.1.2 Legitimate aims listed in Article 10(2)
If an employee speaks out about matters of concern at work, and
restrictions on that speech are provided by law, the restriction must be for
a purpose listed in Article 10(2). Restrictions in the interests of national
security are clearly necessaiy although the Court should consider any such
claim carefully. The other purposes that are likely to be applicable are the
protection of the reputation of others and the prevention of the disclosure
of information received in confidence.
Where information relates to matters of public interest, no duty of
confidence atises. It is therefore arguable that any restrictions on the
21(1985) 7 EHRR 383
22 Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 U Ch 113
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communication of such information are without a legitimate aim and so will
be in breach of the Convention. If this were accepted by the Court and
Commission in a particular case, there would be no need to undertake the
subjective assessment of whether the restriction would be necessaty in a
democratic society; the public interest whistleblower could be fairly safe in
assuming that, because of the lack of a legitimate aim, restrictions to speech
would be in breach of the Convention. However, it is not clear that the
Court and Commission would take this approach, and in any event, other
legitimate aims, such as the protection of the reputation of others would still
give rise to a legitimate restriction.
Furthermore, it is not easy to predict in every case whether the public
interest will be sufficient to negate the confidence in the information.
Where it does not, the restriction will be for a legitimate aim and, as in
other cases where the restriction is for the one of the purposes listed in
Article 10(2), the necessity of the restriction will then fall to be considered.
3.1.3 Necessary for a democratic society
"The Court notes... that, whilst the adjective 'necessary', within the
meaning of Anicle 10(2), is not synonymous with 'indispensable',
neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as 'admissible',
'ordinary', 'useful', 'reasonable', or 'desirable'. Nevertheless, it is
for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the
reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of
'necessary' in this context.... Article 10(2) leaves to the Contracting
States a margin of appreciation."
23Handyside at para 48
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3.1.3.1 Proportionality
In Handyside the court said that in order for a restriction to be necessary in
a democratic society, it must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued24. A disproportionate response will involve a breach of the
Convention. What is a proportional response will vary from case to case,
depending on the context and the type of speech. This is recognised by the
Court and it allows a margin of appreciation to states in their application
of the Convention.
3.1.3.2 The Margin of Appreciation
The Handvside judgment makes it plain that as the necessity for a
restriction on free speech will not always be easy to judge, a margin of
appreciation, that is, a degree of latitude or flexibility, is allowed to states
in their observance of the Convention. It is also clear that this flexibility is
limited. It is subject to European supervision and any restriction is to be
proportionate to the aim pursued.
The extent of the margin allowed may depend on the type and subject
matter of the speech25. In Handyside where the concept was used in
relation to Article 10(2), the court was concerned with the prosecution of
the publisher of a book under the Obscene Publications Acts. The book
called 'The Little Red Schoolbook' was aimed at school aged children and
contained a number of pages with information relating to sex and drugs,
with no mention of the illegality of the drugs mentioned, nor of the
illegality of sexual intercourse between boys over 14 and girls under 16. In
24Handvside at para 49
25 "The scope of the domestic power of appreciation is not identical as
regards each of the aims listed in Article 10(2)." The Sunday Times at para
59.
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deciding that the prosecution involved no breach of the Convention, the
Court recognised that there is no uniform European concept of morals and
that individual states are in a better position to decide necessary limits on
freedom of speech in such matters. The margin of appreciation referred to
by the court allowed such discretion to be introduced into the concept of
necessity in the Convention. In contrast, in The Sunday Times, the need to
maintain the authority of the judiciary could be judged more objectively
than the moral questions in Handyside26. There was therefore a narrower
margin of appreciation and the Court was willing to find that the UK was
in breach of the Convention.
A margin of appreciation is probably necessary for the Convention to be
workable, given that there is always room for judicial discretion in
interpretation, and especially given the rather vague language of the
Convention27. On the other hand, the margin of appreciation should not be
interpreted so widely that it prevents the Court from undertaking effective
supervision of national courts and legislation. This was the fear of the
dissenting judges in Jacubowski v Germany28. The majority of the Court
held that there was no breach of Article 10 where an injunction was
allowed preventing the applicant from circulating to journalists newspaper
cuttings which were critical of his former employer. They said that although
this amounted to an infringement of the applicant's freedom of expression,
26"Precisely the same cannot be said of the far more objective notion
of the 'authority' of the judiciary.... Accordingly, here a more extensive
European supervision corresponds to a less discretionary power of
appreciation. " (The Sunday Times at para 59.) Also see O'Donnell, The
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standard in the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights [1982] Human Rights Quarterly 474
27Also, ultimately countries can withdraw from the Convention if it is
interpreted against their interests and it is preferable to keep them within the
Convention rather than have them leave altogether even though the price
may be the weakening of the convention. See O'Donnell, op. cit.
28(1994) 19 EHR.R 64
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it was not disproportionate (and was therefore necessary) bearing in mind
the wide margin of appreciation needed in complex and fluctuating matters
such as unfair competition. The three dissenting judges argued that the
majority had given excessive significance to the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation and had, as a result, relied too heavily on the findings of the
domestic courts. Allowing too wide a margin of appreciation meant that the
Court had not undertaken the effective supervision required by the
Convention.
The dissenting judges may well be right. The concept should not be allowed
to weaken the protection provided by the Convention 29. Although the
margin of appreciation can play a useful part in the interpretation of the
Convention, if used too freely it can lead to the Court abdicating
responsibility for setting standards and relying too heavily on the findings
of domestic courts.
3.1.3.3 The relevance of the type of speech
The concepts of proportionality and the margin of appreciation taken
together mean that the content of speech will be relevant in determining
whether interference is in breach of the Convention. For example, as noted
above, speech relating to moral issues will be subject to less supervision
than speech relating to the authority of the judiciary. Moreover, where the
content of speech upholds one of the stated aims of the Convention (that is,
the maintenance of a democratic society), the Court will be very reluctant
to sanction interference. The Court recognises that "freedom of political
debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society which
291n Brind v UK (Application No. 18714/91) (1994) 18 EFIRR CD 76
the Commission decided that, given the margin of appreciation given states,
the Government's broadcasting ban on those representing proscribed
organisations under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
1984 did not contravene Article 10 of the Convention.
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prevails throughout the Convention" 30. As a result, political discussion is
given special protection.
In Lingens v Austria3 ' the applicant was convicted of criminal defamation
after publishing two articles that criticised the Austrian Chancellor. In
holding that this violated Article 10, the Court recognised that press
freedom was the best way for people to learn the views and opinions of
political leaders, and that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as
regards a politician than as regards a private individual. Despite the fact that
the restriction on speech was for the legitimate aim of protecting the
reputation of others, it still infringed the rights of the applicant to enjoy
freedom of speech as it was disproportionate.
Similarly, in Castells v Spain32, the Court held that the conviction of the
applicant for insulting the government was in violation of Article 10, even
though it served the legitimate aim of preventing public disorder and
protecting the reputation of others. The Court pointed out that "[iJn the
democratic system the actions or omissions of the government must be
subject to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial
authorities but also of the press and public opinion"33.
The Court recognises the vital role of the press in informing public opinion
on political and other matters of public interest. In several cases the vital
30Lingens v Austria, at para 42.
'(l986) 8 EHRR 407
32(1992) 14 EHRR 445
33Ibid. at para 46. See also Schwabe v Austria (1993) 14 HRLJ 26 and
Oberschlick v Austria (1991) 19 EHRR 389.
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role of the press as "public watchdog" is recognised and protected 34. Taken
together these cases indicate that the Court will be reluctant to sanction
infringements on the freedom of expression of those who speak about
matters that can be said to be of political importance.
However, the converse does not apply. In Thorgeirson v Iceland35, the
applicant was convicted of defamation for writing newspaper articles
criticising the police. The government of Iceland sought to argue that the
restrictions allowed by Article 10(2) varied according to the type of speech
or expression, with political speech accorded the greatest level of
protection; since the opinions expressed by the applicant did not relate
directly to the participation of citizens in a democracy, they did not amount
to political speech, and therefore interference would be more readily
justified. The Court did not accept the argument. It stated that the
restrictions of freedom of expression should be narrowly interpreted and
that there is no warrant in case law for distinguishing between one type of
speech and another. It thus seems that the 'type of speech' argument can
only be used to argue for an increase, and not a decrease, in protection36.
4 Application to the whistleblower
Thus far, it would appear that an employee who is restricted from speaking
out about misconduct or wrongdoing at work, or who uses her inside
knowledge to contribute to public debate will enjoy the protection of the
Convention. In cases where the information is 'confidential' but of public
34See Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843, para 63; Barthold
v Germany (1985) 7 EHRR 383, para 58; Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19
EHRR 1, para 31.
(47/199l/299/370) Judgment 25th June 1992
361t seems that all types of speech are equal but some are more equal
than others! At any rate, in this regard, any inconsistencies seem to be
resolved in favour of increased protection.
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interest, it may be arguable that no legitimate aim is served by a restriction
since there is no confidence to be protected. Alternatively, no penalties are
prescribed by law to protect the reputation of others where statements are
true, or can be classed as fair comment. In other cases the Court will need
to look at the third requirement of Article 10(2), that the restriction is
necessary for a democratic society. Any restriction will need to be
proportionate; given the importance the it affords freedom of public debate,
it would seem unlikely that the Court would allow a restriction that would
discourage others from contribution to that debate 37. This will be
especially so where the debate can be classed as political38.
Whether or not the speech of the whistleblower would be protected may
depend on the nature of the restriction imposed. In Lingens and Thorgeirson
criminal defamation proceedings were brought in respect of the publication
and writing of articles criticising a senior politician and the police
respectively. In both cases, such penalties for the expression of opinion
were found to be in violation of the Convention as the threat of criminal
proceedings would inhibit contribution to public debate. In other cases
where there has not been a total ban on speech, the protection of the
Convention has been more limited.
First, in the case of injunctions prohibiting speech, the position may depend
on whether the restriction totally prevents expression of the opinion. One
of the reasons for the decision in Jacubowski39 that an injunction against
the circulation of newspaper cuttings did not constitute a violation of the
37Note that in Jacubowski v Germany ( 1992) 19 E}IRR 64, the Court
stated that "[t]be fact that, in a given case, [freedom of speech] is exercised
other than in the discussion of matters of public interest does not deprive
it of the protection of Article 10" (at para 25).
38See Chapter Eight for argument that speech relating to the NHS can
be seen to be political.
(1995) 19 EHRR 64
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Convention was that the injunction did not prevent every expression of the
opinion, but only prevented publication of the circular. Injunctions that
prohibit all expression of an opinion would be more likely to be in breach
of the Convention.
Secondly, in several sets of admissibility proceedings the Commission has
recognised that those accepting certain jobs should accept corresponding
restraints on their freedom of speech. In E v Switzerlanct°, a judge, who
was reprimanded for distributing a leaflet that commented on pending legal
proceedings, argued that such an interference with his free expression was
not necessaiy for the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary. The Commission disagreed and in finding the complaint
inadmissible said that the judge should, as a public official serving in the
judiciary, show restraint in the exercise of his freedom of expression. In
Morrisens v Belgium 41 , an application to the Commission was declared
inadmissible where a teacher was dismissed following a television interview
in which she had made allegations against the provincial authorities and
made "unacceptable insinuations" concerning the heads of the school. The
Commission considered that by entering the civil service, the applicant had
accepted certain restrictions on the exercise of her freedom of speech42.
Although, as particularly illustrated in E v Switzerland, restrictions on
speech may be necessary in a democratic society, it is perhaps unfortunate
that the Commission was so ready to recognise special duties of certain
people to restrain speech without recognising the special duty these same
people may have in contributing to public debate on matters of public, and
40Decision of 7th May 1984, 38 D&R 124
'(l988) Decision on admissibility of 3rd May 1988 (Application
Number 11389/85)
42See also admissibility proceedings in B v UK(1986) 45 D&R 41, and
Hasledine v UK (1992) 73 D&R 225.
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at times political, importance, despite the fact that elsewhere the importance
of such debate is clearly stressed43.
Furthermore, the fact that Morrisens made her statements on television, the
impact of which is both wide and immediate, was noted by the
Commission; although it is unclear what weight it gave this factor, it clearly
did not regard it favourably. Such an attitude is perhaps surprising given the
strong indications in the case law on Article 10 that freedom of the press
and other media are to be afforded special protection as "public
watchdogs". It is to be hoped that where a person is engaging in a
legitimate exercise of the freedom of expression, the medium through which
the speech is communicated would not unduly sway the Court towards a
finding that an interference is necessary.
The final limitation on the protection offered by the Convention to the
whistleblower is that mentioned earlier the Court's reluctance at times to
recognise that dismissal is sufficient interference with free speech to warrant
protection. As argued above, it is to be hoped that, following cases such as
Vogt45, the Court and Commission will in future recognise that dismissal
or the threat of it can act as a significant fetter on free speech.
However, these reservations should not be used to detract from the fact that
the Convention contains great potential to protect public interest disclosure.
The decisions of the Commission and Court demonstrate a clear
commitment to the principle that free speech and public debate are vital to
a democratic society. Once the Court recognises that the threat of dismissal
43 See Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EERR 407
"Thorgierson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843, para 63; Barthold v
Germany (1985)7 EHRR 383, para 58;JersildvDenmark(1995) 19 EHRR
1, para 31.
45Although the narrow margin in that case (10 votes to 9) should be
noted.
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inhibits that debate then employees who are dismissed for disclosure of
wrongdoing in the workplace, or for using inside information to contribute
to public debate, will have a better chance of success in claiming the
protection of the Convention at the European Court of Human Rights.
5 Use of the Convention at a domestic level
The whistleblower who seeks the protection of the European Convention on
Human Rights cannot be guaranteed success. However, in addition to the
legal difficulties that may arise in claiming that there has been an
infringement of the right to freedom of expression, an applicant will also
face extremely long delays as the European Commission and Court struggle
to deal with an ever increasing number of applications.
Clearly, the protection of the Convention, such as it is, would be of more
direct use to applicants if it were to be incorporated into UK law. Although
the growing movement backing incorporation of the Convention 47 may
eventually prevail, until this happens, an individual can only rely directly
on the Convention if a claim is taken to Strasbourg.
See Warbrick, Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and
English Law (1994) 19 European Law Review 34.
Under Protocol 11 the Commission and Court will be merged and a new
Court structure introduced. It is hoped that when all parties have ratified
Protocol 11, the process will be speeded up. See Schermers, The Eleventh
Protocol to the European Convention on Hwnan Rights (1994) 19 European
Law Review 367.
47see for example, the aims of Charter 88 and Bingham, The European
Convention on Human Rights: Time to Incorporate (1993) 109 LQR 390.
It will be interesting to see whether the move towards incorporation is
advanced, following Bingham's elevation to the position of Lord Chief
Justice.
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Even without direct incorporation, in some areas the Convention has been
in effect been accepted into UK law via its relationship with EC law. The
ECJ has accepted that EC law is to be interpreted so as to conform with the
Convention48. Since the UK courts must interpret domestic legislation to
comply with EC Law, there will be areas of UK law that must be
interpreted by UK courts to comply with the Convention. Although the
areas covered by EC law tend to be those of economic activity, this is
interpreted widely and already covers areas such as employment and
discrimination law. In addition, as the European Union moves towards
greater unity the areas covered will expand49.
In addition, there is a growing trend for courts to refer to the Convention
when considering the scope of the domestic law50. For example, the
Convention has long been used to aid interpretation of the domestic primary
and secondary legislation where they contain ambiguities 51 . In Waddington
v Miah52 Lord Reid referred to Article 7 of the Convention in deciding
that the criminal offence created by s 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 could
be applied retrospectively. This use of the Convention was confirmed in R
v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Brina 3, but was
48Prais v Council, case 130/75 [1976] ECR 1589. More generally, see
Grief, The Domestic Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights
as Mediated Through Communirp Law [1991] PL 555
49See Lord Browne-Willcinson, The Infiltration ofa Bill ofRig/its [1992]
PL 397 at p. 401-2
501f this trend continues, it has been argued that full incorporation of the
Convention may become unnecessary, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, The
Infiltration of a Bill of Rights [1992] PL 397
51 For discussion of the uses of the Convention in domestic law see the
judgment of Lord Balcombe in the Court of Appeal in Derbyshire C. C. v
Times [1992] 3 All ER 65.
S2[1974] 1 WLR 683
[1991] 1 AC 696
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strictly limited to ambiguity, that is where the wording of legislation is
capable of bearing more than one meaning. The Court refused to extend the
principle to cover the exercise of discretion; ministers could not be required
to exercise the discretion granted by legislation in accordance with the
Convention. This was confirmed in R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte
Smith54 in which the Court of Appeal held that a failure to take account
of the Convention was not of itself grounds for impugning the exercise of
discretion of a minister. The Convention could only provide background to
a complaint of irrationality in a claim for judicial review.
However, the Convention can be used by courts (as opposed to Ministers)
in considering whether or not to grant discretionary remedies such as
injunctions. In Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd55 the House
of Lords considered the Convention in deciding to uphold the injunctions
against publication of the book "Spycatcher" on grounds of national
security. The Convention is also used where the common law is uncertain.In
the Court of Appeal hearing of Derbyshire C. C. v Times56, Lord Balcombe
decided the question of whether local authority could sue in libel solely on
the basis of the Convention. In Attorney General v Blake (Jonathan Cape
Ltd, third party)58 Sir Richard Scott V-C considered the Article 10 in
determining the scope of the duty not to disclose information that is not
confidential. Moreover, in R v Chief Metropolitan Stzpendiary Magistrate,
ex parte Choudharv59, the Divisional Court considered the Convention in
[1996] 1 All ER 257
"[1987] 1 WLR 1248
56[1992] 3 All ER 65
57"...since it states the right to freedom of expression and the
qualifications to that right in precise terms, it will be convenient to consider
the question by reference to art 10 alone." [1992] 3 All ER 65 at 77 g
58[1996] 3 All ER 903
[l99l] 1 All ER 306
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determining the scope of the blasphemy laws, an area where the common
law was not even uncertain 60 . The Convention clearly has a place within
the common law and its use could aid the whistleblower both in considering
the scope of the duty of confidence, and in considering the need for an
injunction to restrain the speech.
60' the common law of blasphemy is, without a doubt, certain.
Nevertheless [counsel] thought it necessary, and we agree, in the context of
this case, to attempt to satisf,' us that the United Kingdom is not in any
event in breach of the convention" (ibid. at p. 320).
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Seven
Whistleblower Protection in the
U.S.A.
PART ONE - Common Law Protection
I Introduction
The legal protection for whistleblowers available in the United States of
America provides an interesting contrast to that available under English law.
The most obvious contrast is that the USA has a constitution that protects
freedom of speech. Thus the culture in which employees m.y raise concerns
is one where freedom of speech is assumed.
However, any benefit that this may offer the whistleblower is tempered by
a second main contrast between the UK and the USA: the fact that the USA
has no general employment protection equivalent to the right in the UK not
to be unfairly dismissed. Instead the basic position is that employees can be
hired and fired at will, and no reason need be given. To a certain extent this
may cancel out the advantage of the constitutional guarantee of free speech,
although the harshness of the rule is mitigated to some extent by the
creation within the common law of a remedy in contract and tort where
dismissal breaches public policy. This remedy has been used with a degree
of success by whistleblowers, although it is not designed for such use.
A further contrast with the UK is that some employees are covered by
specific statutory protection against reprisal for blowing the whistle at work.
Given that one proposal for reform in the UK is the introduction of
165
statutory protection for whistleblowers, it is worth considering the
experience of the USA in some detail, to see whether it provides a model
that could be followed here.
2 Employment-at-will
Employees who are members of a union are usually covered by collective
agreements that provide a right not to be discharged, or dismissed, without
good cause. This is a right that is similar to the unfair dismissal protection
available in the UK. However, the majority of employees are in non-
unionised employment', mostly employed on an "at-will" basis, unless the
contract is for a fixed term. "At-will" employment is said to reflect the
voluntary nature of the agreement and means that the contract is regarded
as indefinite; it may be terminated by either party "with or without cause
or justification. This means a good reason, a wrong reason, or no reason."2
The justification of the rule is that it provides equal freedom to both parties
to discontinue the relationship at any time, the freedom to fire being
counterbalanced by the freedom to resign. Further justification is provided
by the view that restrictions on the right of the employer to fire at will can
have severe implications for the business of the employer, with the fear of
wrongly losing a potential lawsuit preventing employers from dismissing
inefficient workers3 . However, it is increasingly recognised that the
dependence of the employer on wages means that her freedom to resign is
'Only about 40% of workers work in unionised employment and
numbers are reducing. See Pitt, Dismissal at Common Law: The Relevance
in Britain of American Developments (1989) 52 MLR 22 and Wiler,
Governing the Workplace, Harvard University Press, 1990.
2Hinrichs v Tranquilaire Hospital (1977) 352 So.2d 1130
3 See Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of Deterrence,
(1989) 60 University of Colorado Law Review 91.
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more apparent than real, with the result that the freedom of the employer
is unchecked and open to abuse.
In the absence of general legislative protection for employees along the
lines of that available against unfair dismissal in the UK, it is perhaps not
surprising that exceptions to the common law rule have been developed in
the US. For example, statutory protection is available against discrimination
on specific grounds such as race, sex and disability, and public sector
employees are entitled to have personnel decisions made on grounds of
merit only4. Dismissals that have the effect of punishing employees in the
exercise of their constitutionally protected rights, such as the right to free
speech, are also unlawful. Furthermore, some of the harshness of the basic
contractual rules have been tempered by a more generous use of implied
terms as well as the creation and development of the tort of 'wrongful' or
'retaliatory' discharge.
3 Constitutional Limitations to At-Wifi Employment
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right
to free speech. The constitution can be used to rule unlawful legislation that
undermines the provisions of the constitution. It also provides an individual
cause of action against the State, allowing individuals to claim that an
action is unlawful if it infringes constitutional rights. In the employment
context this has been used by state employees in claiming that dismissal for
4Discussed in detail in Part Two, below.
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exercising the right to free speech is unconstitutional5 . 'Where successful,
such claims limit the usual rule of employment at will.
Until relatively recently, however, the right to free speech guaranteed by the
constitution was limited only to protecting speech, and could not be used
to provide job security, the courts taking the approach typified by Justice
Holmes in McAule v Mayor of New Bedforct: "[A policeman] may have
the constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to
be a policeman". The attitude was that if one wanted to speak, one would
not be prevented, but that one may need to be prepared to give up one's job
in the process. This approach is echoed in the European Court of Human
Rights decisions in Kosiek7 and Glasnapp8 where it was held that a denial
of access to employment did not infringe the right to free speech9.
Since the McAul(ffe decision, protection has been extended and it has been
ruled unconstitutional for the state to dismiss an employee for exercising the
right to free speech. In Pickering v Board of Education'°, a teacher was
5The exception to at-will employment based on constitutional rights was
developed in relation only to employees of the state. However, in Novosel
v Nationwide Insurance Co. 721 F 2d 894 (1983) the First Amendment
right to free speech was used by a private sector employee. The employee
claimed that the constitutional right gave a clear mandate of public policy
from which to claim wrongful discharge (See below)
629 NE 517 (1892)
(1986) 9 EHRR 328
8(1987) 9 EHRR 25
9Although this approach may no longer be taken following the decision
in Vogt (1996) 21 EHRR 205. See Chapter Six, and the discussion of
Jacubowski (1995) 19 EHRR 64 in which it is suggested that the
Convention offers less protection where the right to speak is not totally
restricted; and E v Switzerland (1984) 38 D&R 124 where it is pointed out
that some jobs entail valid restrictions on freedom of speech.
'°391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct 1731 (1968)
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dismissed for sending a letter to the local newspaper in connection with a
proposed tax increase, in which he was critical of certain current and past
funding policies of the Board of Education. The Supreme Court recognised
the public importance of speech on such issues remarking that "on such
questions [as the tax increase] free and open debate is vital to informed
decision making by the electorate".
The Court went on to hold that teachers should not be compelled to
relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as
citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the
operation of the public schools in which they work. Instead, the interests of
the employee in commenting on matters of public concern should be
balanced against the interests of the state as employer in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. In
undertaking this balancing exercise, the court could take into account
factors such as the effect of the speech on the employee's performance of
his job, the effect of the speech on discipline and hannony in the workplace
and the overall impact on the operation of the employer's enterprise. Since
Pickering's letter affected neither his own work nor the workplace, his
dismissal was ruled unconstitutional.
In the later case of Connick v Mvers the balancing test advocated in
Pickering was refined. Myers was an assistant district attorney, who was
informed that she was to be transferred to a different office, despite her
opposition to the move. She was dismissed after she had circulated a
questionnaire among staff, seeking their views on office transfer policy and
other matters. The Court applied the balancing test set out in Pickering, but
made it clear that the test only applied where the employee's speech
referred to a matter of public concern, such as matters of political, social
or other concern to the community. Employers could continue to enjoy wide
"61 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct 1684 (1983)
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discretion in dealing with employees speaking on other issues. While the
issue that Pickering wrote to the press about was clearly a matter of public
concern, the conduct of Myers was held not to relate to such a matter, and
her discharge was said to be lawful.
Further guidance on the application of the Pickering balancing test was
given in Rankin v McPherso&2, where a probationary clerical worker
employed by the county constable was dismissed for making a political
comment to a fellow employee. The Court held that even though a
probationary employee could be dismissed at will, she would be entitled to
reinstatement if the dismissal was for exercising her constitutional right to
free speech. In deciding whether the comment was a matter of public
concern, for the purposes of the tests in Pickering and Connick, the court
held that it should look at its content, form and context. In McPherson's
case, the statement was made in private and did not interfere with the
running of the office. It could therefore counterbalance the interest of the
employer in promoting the efficiency of its services.
Effectively the courts now apply a two stage test in deciding whether a
dismissal violates an employee's constitutional rights. The first question is
whether the speech addresses a matter of public concern, relating to social,
political or other community concerns. This is to be decided with reference
to the content, context and form of the speech. If the matter does not
address a matter of public concern, then the usual employment-at-will rule
will apply, and the employee can be dismissed without redress. If a matter
of public concern is addressed, the court should proceed to consider whether
the employee's interest in making the statement outweighs the interest of
the employer in suppressing it.
'483 U.s. 378 (1987)
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The protection provided by the First Amendment to state employees ought
to cover public interest whistleblowers. The requirement that matters relate
to a public concern should not prevent them using the protection. Those
raising concerns about wrongdoing, or risks to health and safety ought to
be able to show that the concern relates to social or community concerns'3.
The recognition in Pickering that the public interest is served by free debate
by the electorate on political questions, ought to enable those engaging in
protest whisfieblowing to be able to use the protection, where the protest
can be said to amount to political speech' 4. Once the matter has been
found to relate to a public concern, the court will consider whether the
employer's interest in suppressing the speech outweighs the interests of the
employee in speaking; given the public interest nature of the
whistleblower's speech, the balance should be in favour of providing
protection to the employee.
However, despite the ostensible benefits to whistleblowers of a
constitutional right to free speech, the protection does have its limitations,
and it is not necessarily the case that the existence of a written constitution
would provide superior protection to that currently available in the UK.
Most important, the protection only applies to state employees. Unless the
whistleblower is a state employee, the general employment-at-will rule
applies, allowing dismissal even though the speech relates to matters of
public importance (unless one of the exceptions discussed below applies)'5.
Secondly, as with the protection in the UK against dismissal for health and
safety reasons and against victimisation in race and sex discrimination
' 3They should also be able to use the protection offered under statute,
discussed in Part Two, below.
' 4See Chapter Two.
' 5See Novosel v Nationwide Insurance Co. 721 F 2d 894 (1983)
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cases, establishing a causal link between the speech and the dismissal can
present problems. The test of causation used in First Amendment cases is
that found in Mount Healthy Guy School District Board of Education v
Doyle' 6. It is formulated to try to balance fairly the needs of employees
to show causation, and those of the employer to avoid liability where
dismissal was for some legitimate reason. Under the Mount Healthy test,
where the exercise of free speech is a substantial cause of dismissal the
burden shifts to the employer to show that dismissal would have occurred
without the speech. This test is helpful to employees, although establishing
the causal link remains a substantial hurdle to many in showing that their
dismissals were unlawful17.
4 Common Law Exceptions to Employment At-Wifi
In addition to the constitutional protection afforded to free speech, US
courts have begun to recognise exceptions to the principle of at-will
employment, based in contract and tort. Both types of exception were
suggested by Lawrence Blades in an article written in 196718, and have
since been accepted in most states.
Blades argued that the increasing power of large corporations, and the
difficulties in defining the proper limits of employer power, meant that a
tort of wrongful discharge should be introduced to protect employees. He
pointed out that a large proportion of employees are employed by a
relatively small number of employers and that "large corporations ... pose
1697 S.Ct 568, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), discussed in more detail below.
' 7See discussion below; and in Part Two, where a more generous
approach to causation is adopted by the Whistleblower Protection Act.
' 8Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power [1967] Columbia Law Review 1404
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a threat to individual freedom comparable to that which would be posed if
governmental power were unchecked' 9". Although it would be difficult to
determine the exact limits of any controls that should be introduced to
check that power, Blades argued that controls should be introduced at least
to provide employees with protection against any excessive abuse of
employer power, such as where employer demands that an employee act in
breach of a code of ethics or even break the law, or face discharge with no
redress.
Although Blades suggested that legislation to curb the excesses of the "at-
will" employment rule was unlikely, his ideas on the introduction of the tort
of wrongful discharge have been taken up with most states now recognising
such an exception to the general rule 20. In addition, courts have used
implied contractual terms to lessen the impact of at will employment,
another device suggested by Blades. Although the presumption is that
employees who are not employed on fixed term contracts work on an at-
will basis, courts have been prepared in some cases to find an implied term
in the contract that there will be no discharge without good cause.
5 Exceptions to At-Wifi Employment Based on Contract
Various contractual exceptions to the "at-will" rule have been developed,
although their development has been hampered courts' unwillingness to
infer a promise of job security into contracts unless they can find that
additional consideration, beyond the usual 'work for wages' bargain, has
been given by the employee. However, courts are becoming increasingly
willing to imply terms into employment contracts that protect employees
' 9lbid at p. 1404
20Many courts refer to Blades' article when recognising the tort for the
first time. See Pierce v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation 417 A 2d 505
(1980) and Palmateer v International Harvester Co. 421 N.E. 2d 876
(1981)
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from arbitrary or retaliatory discharge and increased flexibility in finding
adequate consideration has led to the development of a more workable
exception to the general rule. Examples of actions that have been accepted
as additional consideration for this purpose include an employee turning
down another offer of employment21 , undertaking training paid for by the
employee22, and relying on the promise of job security by, for example,
selling his own business to the employer and becoming an employee
himself. Once additional consideration has been found, the right not to
be dismissed without cause can be implied into the contract and the
employee can claim damages if dismissed without good reason.
Some courts have implied terms into contracts without the requirement of
extra consideration. For example, where an employee had a long record of
service, with a good track record and no history of complaints, a court was
prepared to imply a right not to be arbitrarily discharged, even though no
specific consideration was offered by the employee24.
In some states, courts have also been prepared to imply terms into the
individual contract from written or oral statements of personnel policy. For
example, in Toussaint v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan25, the
plaintiff was told at a pre-employment interview that he would be employed
21Fulton v Tennesee Walking Horse Breeders Association of America
476 SW 2d 644 (1971)
22 Ward v Consolidated Foods Corp. (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) 480 SW 2d
483
Stauter v Walnut Grove Prod. (1971) 188 NW 2d 305
24Pugh V Sees Candies 171 Cal. Rptr.719 (Cal. App. 1981)
where the court implied a term of 'no arbitrary discharge' into the contract
of a worker who had a very long record of employment, with a good track
record, no criticism in the past etc.
25 292 NW 2d 880 (1980)
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as long as he did his job satisfactorily. In addition, the employer's personnel
manual set out the same policy and reinforced the oral assurances, stating
that the company did not discharge without cause. The court was prepared
to imply this assurance into his contract as a contractual term, despite the
absence of additional consideration. The court addressed the issue of extra
consideration but stated that the enforceability of terms should not be
limited to cases where there was consideration beyond the agreement to
work. The employee did not need to provide additional consideration in
order to rely on additional employer promises: the court was instead
interested in finding and upholding the intention of the parties as evidenced
by the features of the relationship. Although the approach in Toussaint has
been adopted in several states, it has not been universally followed. In
Valentine v General American Credit Inc 6 even the Michigan Supreme
Court limited Toussaint to its facts and stated that the case did not create
a right to be discharged only for just cause unless there is actual contractual
provision.
Courts have also recognised that the implied term of good faith between the
contracting parties prohibits dismissals motivated from malice or bad
faith27. The employee protection provided by such an interpretation does
not depend on finding additional consideration as it is part of the original
contract.
The extent to which whistleblowers can use this contractual protection if
dismissed is fairly uncertain and will depend on the state in which an action
is brought. Even where the exception is recognised, the employee will need
to show that there was a contractual right not to be dismissed without good
cause, and that the whistleblowing, being in the public interest did not
constitute a good cause. She will also need to show that additional
26420 Mich.256, 362 NW 2d 628 (1984)
21Monge v Beebe Rubber Company 316 A.2d 549 (1974)
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consideration was given, that the term may be implied from written or oral
statements of the employer, or that the discharge was motivated by malice.
The first two grounds are fairly easy for employers to avoid, as these
implied terms may be overridden by express terms in the contract pointing
out that the contract is one that is terminable at will. Even where a term
restricting discharge to cases of "good cause" can be implied, what will
count as "good cause" may be open to varying interpretations. The "bad
faith" exception may be less easy to exclude, and may in any event be the
most appropriate to use in whistleblowing cases. However, the uncertainty
of the protection, and the limitation of the remedies to damages for breach
of contract mean that the contractual protection is not adequate protection
for those discharged for whistleblowing.
6 Exceptions to At-Wifi Employment Based on Tort
In addition to recognising contractual limitations to the doctrine of at-will
employment, some states have recognised a tortious remedy for dismissal,
known as "retaliatory discharge" or "wrongful discharge", under which
employees can claim compensation for discharge in breach of public policy.
The tort, also referred to as the "public policy exception" to at-will
employment, has only been developed in the last forty years and has not
gained universal acceptance. Even where its existence is acknowledged, the
interpretation of "public policy" varies enormously. Although not developed
specifically to cover employees dismissed for blowing the whistle, where
it is accepted, the tort may provide them with a means of redress.
6.1 Early recognition of the "public policy exception"
The tort of retaliatory discharge was first recognised in the case of
Petermann v Teams ters' 8 . Petermann, an employee at will, was discharged
28Petermann v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (1959)
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from his employment with the Teamsters Union, which was undergoing an
investigation for labour racketeering. He claimed that the union had
instructed him to perjure himself before the investigative committee, and
that his discharge resulted from his refusal to do so. The Californian court
held that the general right to discharge may be limited by public policy.
Although the exact nature of public policy may be difficult to define, "it
would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contraty to public
policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any
employee.., on the ground that the employee declined to commit perjury, an
act specifically enjoined by the state"29.
From these beginnings has spnmg a whole range of cases testing the limits
of the tort of wrongful or retaliatory discharge based on public policy.
Although in its original context the new tort could be said to be merely an
extension of the court's contempt powers, it has since been used to protect
employees who have been discharged for enforcing their statutory rights. In
Frainpton v Central md. Gas Go. 30, an employee was dismissed after she
had filed a compensation claim following an injury at work where she lost
30% of the use of her arm. The court allowed a claim for a remedy in tort
on the grounds that when an employee is discharged "solely for exercising
a statutorily conferred right, an exception to the general rule must be
recognized"3t . Similarly, in Nees v Hocks32 a successful claim of
wrongful discharge was made where an employee was sacked for serving
on a jury against her employer's wishes.
29344 P.2d 25 at 27
°297 NE 2d 425 (1973)
31 Ibid. at p. 428
32536 P.2d 521 (1975)
177
In all these cases, the public policy at stake is very clear. To allow
employers to impose a requirement that the employee commit a crime,
forgo a statutory right or neglect a statutory duty, or else face dismissal
would not only be to sanction a major abuse of employer power but would
also undermine the working of the statutes creating the crimes, rights and
duties in the first place. It is thus not difficult to see that such employees
should be granted protection. In this context, it is interesting to note that
dismissal for asserting a statutory right only became automatically unfair in
the UK in 1993, and even now, the only statutory rights protected are
rights under the Employment Rights Act 1996.
The reaction to the wrongful discharge tort in the US has been varied. Some
states have accepted and broadened the tort, others have refused to accept
it at all. Where courts refuse to recognise the tort, it is on the grounds that
there is a greater public interest in allowing employers maximum freedom
to run their businesses in the most efficient way, which entails the freedom
to dismiss employees for any reason that the employer may choose, or
indeed no reason at all. It has also been said that the concept of a public
policy exception to the well established rule of "at-will" employment is too
nebulous to be left to courts to determine. The vague nature of the concept
means that in virtually every case the interpretation will be open to dispute.
The view of these courts is that the matter is best dealt with by legislation,
rather than individual courts34.
The majority of states, however, has accepted the tort to varying degrees.
In most cases courts require a "clear mandate" of public policy before
331t was introduced as s 60A EPCA 1978 by TURERA 1993. It is now
found in s 104 ERA 1996.
34See Hinrichs v Tranquilaire Hospital 352 So 2d 1130 (1977)
(Alabama) and Lampe v Presbyterian Medical Center 592 P 2d 513 (1978)
(Colorado). The tort of retaliatory discharge was later recognised to a
limited extent in Cronks v Intermountain Rural Electric Association in
1988, (see below).
178
allowing the exception, but there is still variation in what is accepted35.
Some limit its operation to discharge for refusal to violate the provisions of
a statute. In Cronks v Intermountain Rural Electric Association 36 the court
in Colorado37, accepted the existence of the public policy exception but
limited it to cases where the employee could show that the dismissal was
for a refusal to perform an action ordered by the employer, where to
comply with the order would have involved the breach of a specific statute
whose terms amount to more than a broad statement of policy. In Cronks
the employee's dismissal for refusing to take part in the awarding of work
without competitive bidding did not meet these restrictions and so his claim
was not allowed. Although the actions by the employer were illegal, the
mandate of public policy was insufficiently clear to allow the exception to
be used.
6.2 Development of a wider concept of "public policy exception"
In other cases, a broader concept of public policy has been recognised to
found a claim for retaliatoiy discharge. In Petermann38 the notion of
public policy was given a fairly wide formulation, but has since been
restricted in some cases to statutorily defined policies. Such restrictions
leave the employee who acts as a volunteer of information, acting as
""Few courts have flatly rejected the notion... where courts differ is in
determining where the line is to be drawn that separates a wrongful from
a legally permissible discharge." Adler v American Standard Corporation
432 A.2d 464 (1981)
36765 P 2d 619 (1988)
371n contrast to its approach 10 years earlier in Lampe v Presbyterian
Medical Center 592 P 2d 513 (1978), see below.
38344 P 2d 25 (1959)
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unofficial internal policeman, unprotected. However, it has been
increasingly recognised that the public policy exception, broadly defined,
could provide protection for employees who suffer retaliation for reporting
misconduct by an employer. Since to allow such conduct by an employer
is to condone the activity, some courts have been willing to use the tort to
protect employees, despite the fact that such conduct also entails disloyalty.
In Palmateer v International Harvester Co. 39 the employee brought a
retaliatory discharge claim following his dismissal for giving information
about a fellow employee to the local police. He intended to give further
information and to give evidence at the thai. Prior to this case, the state
involved (Illinois) had recognised cases based on clear, statutory policies,
such as a discharge for bringing a worker's compensation claim 40. In
Palmateer the court decided that although there was no statutory duty to
inform the police about crimes that have taken place, there was still a clear
public policy in favour of upholding the enforcement of the state's criminal
code and exposing criminal behaviour; on this basis, Palmateer's claim was
upheld.
The recognition that courts can determine the existence of a "clear
mandate" of public policy gives the tort a much greater potential to protect
those who blow the whistle on malpractice or misconduct at work, even
though in Palmateer the policy was still connected to the upholding of
criminal statutes. In Pierce v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation 41 , the
court in New Jersey accepted that a clear mandate of public policy could
421 N.E. 2d 876 (1981) (illinois)
40Kelsev v Motorola Inc 384 N.E. 2d 353 (1978)
41417 A 2d 505 (1980)
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be founded not only on legislation but on judicial and administrative
decisions, and ethical codes as well42.
Perhaps the widest mandate of public policy was found in the New
Hampshire case of Monge v Beebe Rubber Company43 , a case involving
dismissal following incidents of sexual harassment. The court was prepared
to find that "a termination ... of a contract of employment at will which is
motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not (sic) the best
interest of the economic system or the public good." The court recognised
that although employers have an interest in running their businesses as they
see fit, this must be balanced against the interest of the employee in job
security. The public interest, in the eyes of the court, would be served by
maintaining a proper balance between these two competing interests. The
case is significant in that it is one of the only decisions to recognise that the
public interest can be served by creating a degree of job security for
employees, rather than recognising only the public interest in allowing
employers unfettered freedom to hire and fire. If a mandate of public policy
in favour of creating job security were to be recognised then the potential
for employees, whether whistleblowers or not, to use the retaliatory
discharge tort would be greatly increased. However, the decision in Monge
42Dr Pierce was ultimately unsuccessful in her claim for retaliatory
discharge. She had refused to take part in experiments using drugs
containing saccharin even though they had been approved by the FDA for
tests on humans. The court decided that Dr Pierce was acting on a personal,
moral basis, since the tests were not harmful, and that there was, on the
facts, no clear mandate of public policy.
Despite the statement in Pierce that a code of ethics may provide a clear
mandate of public policy, in Suchodoiski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.
316 NW 2d 710 (1982) (Michigan) the code of ethics of the Institute of
Internal Auditors was not accepted as giving rise to a clear mandate of
public policy.
316 A 2d 549 (1974)
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has not been generally followed and even in New Hampshire it has been
restricted to its facts.
In Novosel v Nationwide Insurance Co. 45 the First Amendment right to
free speech which had been used as the basis of an exception to at-will
employment for state employees was used by a private sector employee in
a wrongful discharge case. Novosel claimed that he was dismissed for
refusing to participate in lobbying on behalf of his employer before the state
legislature. The court upheld his claim that his dismissal breached public
policy, stating that "the protection of an employee's freedom of political
expression would appear to involve no less compelling a societal interest
than the fulfilment of jury service or the filing of a worker's compensation
claim". On the issue of whether the first amendment could be used by
private sector employees the court argued that "[t]he protection of important
political freedoms ... goes well beyond the question whether the threat
comes from state or private bodies."47 Clearly, then, an individual's right
to freedom of speech can constitute a clear mandate of public policy for the
purposes of the wrongful discharge tort.
6.3 Additional Factors Considered by Courts in Retaliatory Discharge
Cases
The extent to which courts uphold cases of retaliatory discharge will depend
mainly on their view on public policy, and whether it requires a specific
statute or is open to judicial interpretation. However, additional factors can
Howard v Dorr Woolen Co. 414 A 2d 1273 (1980)
721 F 2d 894 (1983)
46At p. 899
47At p. 900
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also be relevant to the success or otherwise of a claim of 'public policy'
wrongful discharge. Many of these factors militate against the tort being
used by whistleblowers and highlight the limitations of the tort in providing
adequate protection in this context. It is interesting to note that some of the
factors coincide with those used in English law in determining whether the
public interest is served by particular disclosures. At times the US and UK
courts treat similar factors very differently.
6.3.1 Motive of Employer in Dismissing Employee.
In Geaiy v US Steel Corporation48 an action for wrongful discharge was
brought by a company salesman who had been dismissed after raising
concerns with his managers about the safety of some of their products. He
was told to continue working which he duly did, although he continued to
voice his concerns. The company subsequently withdrew the product from
the market, and Geaiy was dismissed. Geaiy brought an action in tort
claiming that the dismissal was "wrongful, malicious and abusive", the first
such action in Pennsylvania. The court recognised that in some
circumstances a public policy exception to at-will employment could be
recognised, but refused to accept it in this case. The main reason was that
no clear mandate of public policy was violated in the case, but the court
also referred to the fact that the employer had not dismissed Geary with
intent to violate a public policy 49 but for other reasons, such as the fact
that Geary was operating outside the usual chain of command in raising
concerns in the way that he did.
48319 A 2d 174 (1974) (Pennsylvania)
49"The novel theory of recovery which appellant advances must surely
involve specific intent on the part of the company to harm Geary or achieve
some other proscribed goal" Geaiy at p. 177
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The implication is that had the employer dismissed the employee
specifically in order to prevent health and safety concerns from being aired
and investigated, then the court may have taken a different view. To that
extent, then, employer motives can be a relevant factor in deciding whether
to allow a claim for retaliatory discharge50 . Such an approach risks
undermining the whole protection as it makes it easy for employers to avoid
any liability by arguing that discharge was for some other reason. Given the
problems that are always present for employees in establishing causation,
a requirement that the employer must intend to violate public policy before
protection is given makes it even harder for the employee to find protection
via the tort.
6.3.2 Approach of Employee.
In Petermann, the employee was effectively a "passive victim of
coercion" 5 ' in that his dismissal was the result of his refusal to comply
with his employer's demand that he act illegally in giving false testimony
before a legislative committee. This, coupled with clear legislative intent to
prohibit perjury, can be seen as relevant to the success of the case. In
Wagenseller v Scottsdale Memorial Hospital 52 , where the court recognised
the public policy exception to at-will employment, the employee was
dismissed after a river rafting trip with hospital staff in which she refused
to participate in activities which were contrary to various criminal statutes.
Again the criminal statute contained a clear mandate of public policy, but
50See Conway, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Emplo yee Who
"Blows the Whistle": A Cause ofAction Based Upon Determinants ofPublic
Policy, [1977] Wisconsin Law Review 777
5t Conway, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows
the Whistle": A Cause ofAction Based Upon Determinants ofPublic Policy,
[1977] Wisconsin Law Review 777
52710 P 2d 1025 (1985) (Arizona)
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also the employee played a passive role in the incidents leading to her
dismissal. Again, in Mon ge53 , dismissal followed the employee's refusal
to date the factoty foreman, and the dismissal was held to be wrongful
despite the absence of a statutorily defined public policy.
In contrast, employees have been less successful in cases where they have
taken the initiative in raising a concern or reporting illegal conduct.
Geary54 took the initiative in raising health and safety concerns and was
unsuccessful in his claim; in Adler v American Standard Corporation55,
the employee lost his claim for wrongful discharge after disclosing
illegalities and irregularities discovered during a review of the management
and operation of the division in which he worked.
However, this factor is not decisive: there are cases of employees who take
the initiative in reporting conduct and who succeed in their claims of
wrongful discharge. Palmateer56 acted on his own initiative when he
supplied information about a fellow employee to the police and yet he was
successful in claiming wrongful discharge because of the clear public policy
in enforcing the state's criminal code. In Sheets v Teddy's Frosted Foods
1nc57, the quality control director of the company notified the employer
that the labelling of some of the products was incorrect, and in breach of
a specific statute. The employee was dismissed, but succeeded in his claim
of wrongful discharge. Again, the mandate of public policy in the case was
very clear and based on statute.
316 A 2d 549 (1974)
54See above.
432 A 2d 464 (1981) (Maryland)
56421 NE 2d 876
427 A 2d 385 (1980) (Connecticut)
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These cases suggest that if the mandate of public policy is clear enough,
employees will be able to claim wrongful discharge even where they have
taken the first step in raising a concern. Where the mandate is less clear, the
question of whether the employee initiated the disclosure, or played a
passive role in refusing to comply with an illegal, or immoral command
may make a difference to the outcome of the case, with courts readier to
grant protection to the "passive victim of coercion" than to employees who
take their own decision to raise a concern.
This is likely to cause difficulties in whistleblowing cases as they usually
involve employees taking the initiative in raising concerns or disclosing
illegal conduct. Unless the mandate of public policy is extremely clear, such
employees may have difficulty in showing that discharge was wrongful.
However, this will also depend on how the remaining factors, are weighed
by the court in the individual case.
6.3.3 Motive
Employees who raise concerns or make disclosures of confidential
information maliciously, or in order to create difficulties for an employer,
rather than from a genuine concern about public policy may not be seen as
deserving of a remedy for any resulting dismissal 58 . On the other hand, the
converse is not always the case: the fact that a concern is raised in good
58"The court can insist on employee good faith. It can expect the
employee to have a genuine concern about the public policy in issue."
Holloway and Leech:Employment Termination: Rights and Remedies,
(1985) The Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, D.C., p 306.
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faith does not always mean that it is granted protection. In Geaiy59 the
court noted that the actions of the employee may be praiseworthy and in
good faith, but that this was not sufficient to found a claim in the absence
of a clear mandate of public policy.
The approach of the US courts on this issue can be contrasted with that of
the UK when considering motive in relation to the duty of confidence60.
In the UK, the motive of the employee was vety much secondaiy to the
issue of whether the information was in the public interest. However, this
difference in approach reflects the different bases of the two actions. The
duty of confidence cases in the UK are concerned with the question of
whether information should be disclosed or suppressed. Whether or not the
information deserves disclosure can, effectively, be judged objectively, and
the motive of the employee is not particularly relevant to that question. The
question in these US cases arises in the context of an individual
employment remedy, and therefore arguably should be affected by motive;
equally, in the UK cases, the remedy for breach of confidence, as opposed
to the decision of whether breach of confidence has occurred, can be
affected by the employee's motive.
6.3.4 Good Faith
The employee's belief in good faith that a violation of a statute has
occurred will not be sufficient of itself to found a claim even based on the
clear mandate of public policy contained in that statute. In Adler61 , the
employee reported what he believed to be illegalities and irregularities, for
example in the misuse of corporate funds by officers of the company for
personal benefit. He claimed that his subsequent dismissal was wrongful as
59See Geary above.
60See Chapter Three, para. 3.3.4 above.
6t See above.
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it was an attempt to conceal the illegal conduct. The court, in rejecting his
claim said that "Adler's undisclosed perception of what constitutes
'commercial bribery' is hardly adequate ground upon which to base a
decision that such activities violate the declared or undeclared policy of this
state."62
The UK cases take a more flexible approach on this question. Where
disclosure is made internally within the organisation, or to a relevant
external body, reasonable grounds for a suspicion will be sufficient to
prevent a finding that the employee is in breach of confidence in making
a report63.
The approach of the UK is preferable, as the US approach leaves the
employee in an uncertain position. Unless she can be absolutely sure that
her information is correct, which may be difficult unless she is in a senior
position with access even to internally confidential information, she risks
dismissal in reporting what may be genuine and serious concerns. Although
the desire to prevent unfounded allegations being raised by disaffected
employees is also understandable, restriction of the employee protection to
cases where the allegations are correct is rather severe. A fairer approach
would be to require that the employee act in good faith and with a
reasonable belief in the truth of information that is reported. It also allows
cases where there are reasonable grounds to suspect illegal conduct to be
investigated. If the allegation turns out to be incorrect, the good faith
employee should be satisfied, and the company will have cleared its name;
this does not seem to be good reason to allow the employee to be dismissed
without remedy.
62Adler v American Standard Corporation 432 A 2d 464 (1981)
(Maryland).
63 See Chapter Three, para. 3.3.5.
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6.3.5 Expertise of Employee.
A further factor that courts seem to take into account in deciding whether
to allow a claim of wrongful or retaliatory discharge is the status of the
employee. In Gea?y", the employee who raised a concern about the safety
of steel tubing for use in the oil and gas industry was a salesman, with no
specialist knowledge or responsibility for product safety. In raising his
concern he had gone outside the established chains of command65 . His
claim was unsuccessful. In contrast, in Sheets v Teddy 's Frosted Food,
the concern about mislabelling of food was raised by the company's quality
control director. In finding that his subsequent dismissal was wrongful, the
court contrasted the case with Gean' on the basis that Geary had no
expertise or responsibility for product safety, whereas Sheets was the person
who would be prosecuted for the mislabelling were the practice to be
discovered. A similar approach was taken when the public policy exception
was recognised in Harless v First National Bank67, the manager in the
bank's consumer credit department having been dismissed after raising with
his superior at the bank the fact the state consumer protection legislation
was being violated. Again, the employee had acted within the correct chain
of command, and had responsibility in relation to the issue about which the
concern was raised.
These cases indicate that unless the whistleblower raises concerns that are
within her remit at work, then she may have difficulty in succeeding in a
claim of wrongful discharge, and raises questions about the purpose of the
See above.
65Holloway and Leech, Employment Termination: Rights and Remedies,
(1985) The Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, D.C., at p. 556.
See above.
67246 SE 2d 270 (1978)
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tort. If the aim is to provide an element ofjob security, is it understandable
that it should be limited to cases where employees raise concerns linked to
their jobs. If the aim is to protect the public interest, the position of the
employee raising the concern should be irrelevant. The fact that the position
of the employee does seem to be important illustrates the difficulties of
using the tort to protect whistleblowers, a task it was not designed to do.
6.3.6 Internal or External Disclosure68
An additional factor that seems to affect courts' determination of whether
or not to allow the public policy exception to at-will employment is whether
information is reported internally or externally. In some cases, employees
have raised matters inside the organisation, within existing management
structures; alternatively some have disclosed matters to external authorities
whose responsibility is to investigate such issues, such as the police.
Employees may also consider reporting matters to the media. It might be
expected that since employers would prefer matters kept within the privacy
of the organisation, and since internal reporting carries no risk of breach of
confidence, that employees would be more sure of protection if disclosures
were kept internal. However, this does not appear to be the case.
In many cases of internal reporting, the dismissal has not been found to
give rise to a case of wrongful or retaliatory discharge, in contrast to where
reports have been made externally. In such cases the courts do not usually
refer specifically to the forum in which the concern was raised, instead the
68See generally, Dworkin and Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing:
Protecting the Interests of the Emplo.,vee, the Organization, and Society
(1991) 29 American Business Law Journal 267
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finding of a clear mandate of public policy coincides with cases of external
reporting and vice versa69.
However, in some cases the issue is addressed. In Zaniecki v P. A. Bergner
& Co. 70, an employee was dismissed for reporting theft internally to the
relevant supervisor, but was unsuccessful in his claim for wrongful
discharge. The court distinguished the Zaniecki case from the earlier case
of Palinateer71 on the basis that Zaniecki involved internal reporting; such
a case did not give rise to the same public policy concern as that in
Palinateer of allowing employees the right to turn to public officials without
fear of loss of livelihood. Wiltsie V Baby Grand C'orp. 72 was decided
similarly, with the reporting of illegal behaviour to a supervisor giving rise
to dismissal which the court found to be lawful. The court said that since
the report was made using internal channels, rather than appropriate,
external, law enforcement agencies, the employee was acting in a private
capacity, and on this basis was not eligible for the protection which is
available for those who act for a public purpose.
Perhaps even more surprising was the decision in House i' Carter-Wallace
Jnc. 73 , where a case arising from internal reporting of concerns about the
sale of contaminated tooth polish were said to amount to no more than a
management dispute. Such matters were not capable of providing grounds
69Contrast Palmateer, above, where wrongful discharge was found in a
case where fellow employees were reported to the police, and Gearv, above,
where concerns were raised via internal channels and the claim was not
allowed.
70493 N.E. 2d 419 (1986) (Illinois)
71 See above.
72774 P 2d 432 (1989) (Nevada). The employee was a poker room
manager, who reported illegal conduct by his supervisor to a more senior
manager.
556 A 2d 353 (1989)
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for a wrongful discharge case, and were not deserving of the protection
provided by the public policy exception.
Not only is the finding in House v Carter-Wallace difficult to justify
theoretically, but it also ignores that fact that there are several cases of
internal reporting in which claims of wrongful discharge have been
successful. In both Sheets v Teddy 's Frosted Foods74 and Harless v First
National Bank75 , the successful applicants had reported breaches of statute
to internal supervisors76. Again the issue of whether the report is made
internally or externally may be subordinate to the issue of whether there is
a clear mandate of public policy. Where public policy is clear enough, for
example based on statute, then internal reporting may be protected despite
the approach in House v Carter-Wallace. If, on the other hand, the public
policy is less clear cut then the whistleblower will run fewer risks by
reporting to a relevant external body.
This approach, of protecting external reports more readily than internal
ones, contrasts starkly with that taken under English law on the question of
whether the public interest in disclosure overrides the duty of confidence.
Under English law, where disclosure is made internally, it is easier to show
that it serves the public interest; and the public interest must be very strong
for external disclosure to be justified.
This US approach, preferring to protect external reporting is not illogical:
arguably, if a person has genuine public policy concerns, they should be
74See above.
75See above.
76Although in Sheets v Teddy 's Frosted Foods the point was made in
the dissenting judgment of Chief Justice Cotter that the statute was not
necessarily thwarted by dismissal of the employee: he could have made an
anonymous phone call to the relevant regulatory body and need not have
jeopardised his employment at all.
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raised publicly. Internal reporting allows companies to cover up any
wrongdoing, whereas reporting to a relevant agency may lead to proper
investigations and appropriate sanctions to be applied. However, to use
these arguments to deny employment protection when concerns are raised
via an accepted and appropriate internal channel is surely wrong. The main
justification of employee protection for making such disclosures is to enable
the particular public policy to be carried out. For example, if illegal
accounting procedures are stopped by internal reporting then the main
public policy objective has been attained. Alternatively, the public policy
is not advanced at all by the continuance of the illegal accounting
procedures accompanied by the dismissal without redress. Whilst the
involvement of an external agency, who may impose some form of penalty
for the illegal activity, may also be desirable, to deny any sort of protection
to the employee who advances the public policy to a lesser degree may be
to miss an opportunity of making that advance just because a way to
achieve a greater advance is known to exist.
6.4 Difficulties in the use of public policy exception
As has been seen above, courts look at a range of factors in deciding
whether a particular dismissal comes within the public policy exception to
at-will employment. However, two factors in particular are likely to
determine whether the employee is successful or not: the decision as to
whether a sufficiently clear public policy is served by the employee's
conduct, and the question of causation.
6.4.1 Public Policy or Private Concern?
The employment at-will doctrine is based on the recognition of an
employer's right to hire and fire at will. In the cases where the public
policy exception to the doctrine is not recognised the courts appear to give
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particular weight to the employer's right, regarding it to be in the public
interest that they have maximum unfettered freedom to take management
decisions in relation to their staff. Despite the recognition that this can
sometimes be abused and used to cover up malpractice by the employer,
many courts believe that the public interest is better served by allowing
maximum freedom to employers in all cases, rather than by fettering their
discretion in a few. This is because of a belief that the threat of legal
proceedings can prevent employers from making correct judgements about
staff as well as preventing wrongful decisions.
However, most courts do now accept the notion of a public policy
exception. "['W]here courts differ is in determining where the line is to be
drawn that separates a wrongful from a legally permissible discharge."78
The main factor that is used in determining where that line should be drawn
is the clarity of the public policy on which the wrongful or retaliatoty
discharge claim is to be based. If there is a veiy clear, statutoiy mandate of
public policy, courts may be willing to allow a claim of wrongful discharge
even where reports are made internally, or where the employee took the
initiative in raising the concern. Conversely, even where the mandate is less
clear, the employee may succeed in a claim for retaliatory discharge if the
employer put her in the position of having to choose whether to act illegally
or be dismissed, or if the employee made reports externally to an
appropriate body.
Undoubtedly, whether or not there is a clear mandate of public policy
should be important in deciding whether to grant employee protection.
However, a clear definition of public policy is lacking. In Wagenseller v
77"The ever present threat of suit might well inhibit the making of
critical judgements by employers concerning employee qualifications."
Gearv v United States Steel Corporation 319 A 2d 174 at 179 (1974)
(Pennsylvania).
78Adler v American Standard Corporation 432 A.2d 464 (1981)
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Scottsdale Memorial Hospital79, the court said that "only those [policies]
which have a singularly public purpose" would provide a basis of wrongful
discharge and that "a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social
rights, duties and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed." In
practice these statements do not provide much help in discerning whether
a particular concern will involve an appropriate public policy. As is seen by
the contradictory case law, it is very difficult to predict from the type of
concern how it will be classified by a court. For example, it might be
expected that the reporting of a risk to the health and safety of the public
would be a prime social responsibility of citizens and that such activity,
involving a clear public purpose, would be protected. However, Geaiy8°
lost his case for wrongful discharge after having raised concerns over the
safety of tubular casing designed for use under high pressure in the oil and
gas industry; the court did not view the matter as raising an issue of public
policy.
A series of cases involving the health care sector illustrate inconsistencies
in the approaches of courts on this issue. In Lampe v Presbyterian Medical
Center81 a nurse was dismissed for refusing to reduce the overtime worked
by staff. She argued that to do so would jeopardise the safety of patients
and would undermine declarations of policy contained in legislation which
imposed on her a duty to safeguard life, health and public welfare. The
court refused to recognise the public policy exception to at-will employment
in this case. Similarly in Hinrichs v Tranquilaire Hospital82 the court
refused to recognise the exception where an employee was dismissed for
her refusal to falsify certain medical records. However, in 0 'Sullivan v
710 P 2d 1025 (1985) (Arizona)
80Gearv v United States Steel Coiporation 319 A 2d 174 (Pennsylvania)
81592 P 2d 513 (1978) (Colorado)
82352 So 2d 1130 (1977) (Alabama)
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Mallon83 an X-ray technician was successful in a claim of wrongful
discharge; she was dismissed for her refusal to cany out catheterisations as
to do so would breach state laws. Whilst Lampe can be distinguished on the
grounds that the statutoiy basis of her claim was not clear cut84, the
second two cases pose greater problems. It is not clear why the public
policy in preventing operations being performed by unqualified staff is
greater than in preventing the falsification of medical records. In both cases
the conduct is clearly highly undesirable; employees who reveal such
conduct uphold important public policies and should be protected.
The difficulties in identifying whether a clear mandate of public policy
exists are not dissimilar to the difficulties faced in the UK courts in
identifying which types of conduct are in the public interest. In the UK the
courts have oscillated between a wide approach verging on a view that there
is a public interest is in knowing the tmth85, and a more restrictive
approach, taking the view that the public interest is served only by
disclosure of illegal conduct 86. The extent to which the law can be used
by whistleblowers can depend on which approach is taken by the courts on
this issue.
In addition to the general uncertainties in the US law on the approach of
courts to deciding 'whether an issue raises a public concern or not, a
particular problem can also be identified. Courts differ in the extent to
83390 A 2d 149 (1978) (New Jersey)
84Also, the extent to which the cutting of overtime may have
jeopardised safety may be a matter of opinion. Even if the statutory basis
of the claim was clear, it may not be clear that the statute was breached in
this case.
85 Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760. See Chapter Three para.
3.3.1.
86Beloffv Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241. See Chapter three para
3.3.1.
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which they view the right of an employee to job security as a matter of
public policy or a matter of a private interest, and yet this can be vital to
the outcome of a case.
In Campbell v Ford Industries87, the employee, who was also a
stockholder in the company, was dismissed after he had asked for
information about the value of stock and whether the company was
involved in corporate misdealing. Campbell claimed wrongful discharge on
the basis that his dismissal undermined the public policy in the statute
which grants stockholders the right to such information. Despite the fact
that his claim had a statutory basis, the court held that the interest of a
stockholder was proprietary and private, and that there was no compelling
public policy to be upheld. Furthermore, Campbell's "demand to inspect
corporate books and records was an attempt to exercise his rights as a
stockholder, and had no direct relation to his rights as an employee"88.
Whilst a demand to see corporate books may have no inherent relation to
employee rights, one might expect that the relation to employee rights
would arise once an employee is dismissed for making that request.
Presumably, the employer, in deciding to dismiss saw some connection
between the two.
The identification of the concern as merely a private matter can be fatal to
the success of the case, as it affects the way in which the court weighs the
interest alongside the other interests. In any particular case, a number of
interests exist, and where they conflict, the court must decide which interest
will be given precedence. In wrongfttl discharge cases the interests are
threefold: "an at will employee's interest in job security, ... is deserving of
recognition. Equally to be considered is that the employer has an important
interest in being able to discharge an at will employee whenever it would
87546 P 2d 141 (1976) (Oregon)
88At p 146
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be beneficial to his business. Finally, society as a whole has an interest in
ensuring that its laws and important public policies are not contravened."89
In weighing these competing interests, courts will usually allow public
interests to outweigh private ones. The interests of society and of the
employer are both viewed as public interests, and can counterbalance each
other. The employee's interest in job security may tip the balance in favour
of granting employee protection, but this can depend on whether it is seen
as a public interest or a private one. If it is merely a private interest, then
it will not usually be given precedence over a public interest90: where it
is viewed as a public interest, then courts compare like with like and the
public interest in job security, added to society's interest in a public policy
not being contravened, may outweigh the employer's interest in carrying on
business unfettered.
The approach of the courts in Campbell91 and Mon ge92 can be contrasted
on this point. In Campbell the employee's interest in seeing company
records was said to be merely a private interest, and could not outweigh the
89Adler v American Standard Corporation 432 A.2d 464 (1981) at
p.470. Interestingly, although the case involved the disclosure by the
employee of potential fraud, the court was still prepared to find that the
public policy in allowing employers to discharge employees when beneficial
to business (presumably defined in terms of profit?) outweighed the public
policy of uncovering fraud. This second public interest could not be allowed
to override the company's interest in operating free from disruption.
90Although there is nothing inherent in the nature of a private interest
that makes it subordinate to a public interest, as the law on human rights
makes clear, the courts do not usually regard the private interest in job
security as sufficiently fundamental to warrant protection in the face of the
public interest in allowing employers maximum discretion in the running of
their businesses.
91 Campbell v Ford Industries 546 P 2d 141 (1976) (Oregon)
9,Monge v Beebe Rubber Company 316 A.2d 549 (1974)
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well established public policy of allowing maximum discretion to employers
in the running of business, via the at-will doctrine. A much broader
definition of public policy was adopted in Monge. Again the interest of the
employer in being able to operate his business efficiently and profitably was
recognised but it was said to be subject to other interests, such as the
interests of the employee in maintaining his employment. In addition the
court recognised the interest of the public in maintaining a proper balance
between the two competing interests, and went as far as to recognise that
unfair discharge in any event is not in the general public interest.
The acceptance in Monge that the interest in job security is more than just
a private interest of the employee was important in the recognition of the
tort of wrongful discharge. If more courts were prepared to recognise that
the public interest is served by granting a degree of job security to
employees, then the scope of the public policy exception would be greatly
enhanced. Instead, "the courts' methodology reveals the discretionary,
indeed arbitrary nature of their preferences for one set of interests over
another" and it lacks "a principled basis for deciding which firings implicate
the interests of the public"93.
The uncertainty in the area greatly reduces the ability of the public policy
exception to protect employees who blow the whistle on malpractice or
wrongdoing at work, as even those who could succeed may be deterred
from bringing claims. Instead all courts need to recognise that job security
is not merely a private matter, and that the public interest is better served
by protecting against abuses of employer power than by refusing to curb
that power.
93Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 1931
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6.4.2 Causation
As is the case in the UK cases on victimisation for raising concerns about
discrimination, the protection of employees is limited by the difficulty in
showing a causal link between the raising of a concern and dismissal. Thus,
even where the tort of wrongful or retaliatory discharge is recognised,
employees have difficulty in using it, particularly if employers are able to
argue that the dismissal was not linked to the disclosure of information or
raising of a concern. If employers can show that there was some other
reason for the dismissal, then the employee's case will fail on the grounds
that there was no causal link between the protected conduct and the
dismissal. For example, the employer may argue that the employee was
dismissed not because of the disclosure, but because other employees are
unwilling to work with the discharged employee. In Gear the court said
in justification of its refusal to grant a wrongful discharge claim, "even an
unusually gifted person may be of no use to his employer if he cannot work
effectively with fellow employees"95.
A second reason employers may use to explain the dismissal is that the
employee's conduct breached internal rules and that this gave rise to the
dismissal. In Mudd v Hoffman Homes for Youth Inc., a social worker
raised with the board of directors her concerns that two colleagues were
involved in substance and child abuse. The court concluded that Mudd was
discharged for disrupting the chain of command and not in retaliation for
raising the concern. Clearly these alternative reasons may play a part in a
decision to dismiss, but they should not allow employers to avoid liability
where the main reason for dismissal undermines a clear public policy.
Gearv v United States Steel Corporation 319 A 2d 174 (1974)
95 Gearv at p. 179
%543 A 2d 1092 (1988)
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The issue of causation was raised in Mount Healthy City School District
Board of Education v Doyle97, a case based on the First Amendment
exception to at-will employment. The Mount Health.v test, if adopted in
wrongful discharge tort cases would go some way towards improving the
position of employees trying to show a causal link between their conduct
and dismissal. In Mount Healthy, the employee claimed he was discharged
for comments made on a radio show and that this breached his
constitutional right to free speech. The employer argued that dismissal was
also due to various other incidents including one where he made obscene
gestures to female students. The District Court held that as long as the
protected conduct was a substantial reason for the dismissal, then the
dismissal was unlawful. However, the Supreme Court felt that the employer
should be allowed the chance to show that dismissal would have taken
place in any event, without the protected conduct. It advocated the use of
a twofold test: first, was the protected conduct a substantial reason for the
decision to dismiss; second, if so, could the employer show that the
employee would have been dismissed if it had not been for the protected
conduct? If the protected conduct was a substantial reason for the dismissal,
and the employee would not have been dismissed but for the protected
conduct then causation is made out.
Where the employee has been involved in separate incidents, some
protected and some not, it may not be unjust to dismiss her for the
unprotected acts. To allow protected acts to make her immune from
dismissal for any other acts would be to put the employee in a better
position as regards employment protection for having taken the protected
action than if she had done nothing. This could be open to abuse by a
manipulative employee who, facing legitimate dismissal, could decide to
claim immunity by making a protected disclosure.
9797 S.Ct 568, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
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The Mount Healthy test avoids this problem, whilst overcoming the
problems faced by employees like Mudd, above. In Mudd, the fact that the
concern about colleagues was raised through the wrong channel broke the
chain of causation between the raising of the concern and the dismissal.
However, applying the Mount Healthy test, Mudd could have established
causation; the raising of the concern was one of the substantial causes of
the dismissal and if it had not been for that conduct she would not have
been dismissed. Thus, the second stage of the test will not allow an
employer to escape liability by relying on the manner in which the concern
was raised9 . The employer's defence in relation to causation will only
work where a completely separate incident is relied to explain the dismissal.
Such an approach seems fair to both employee and employer and should be
adopted in tort as well as first amendment cases.
7 Remedies
The remedies for retaliatoiy discharge, dismissal in breach of contract and
dismissal in breach of the employee's constitutional rights are limited to
financial remedies, with reinstatement an option for First Amendment cases
only. Whilst these may go some way to compensating the employee for the
loss of the job, they are limited in two ways. First, where only damages are
available, it is difficult to fully compensate for loss of a job, given that
future employers may be unwilling to employ someone previously
dismissed for blowing the whistle. Secondly, although compensation may
go part of the way towards punishing the employer for the wrong reported,
98Unless this amounts to insubordination, in which case that in itself
may give cause to discharge. In Chambliss v Board of Fire and Police
Commissioners 312 NE 2d 842 a policeman was dismissed after exercising
his right to silence under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in an
enquiry into his involvement in a rape case. This refusal to speak was said
to amount to insubordination and provided separate and legal grounds for
dismissal even though dismissal for the constitutionally protected 'conduct'
of refUsing to speak would, alone, not have been lawful.
202
it does not always do so in full. Furthermore, even where reinstatement is
available, the remedies remain private remedies for the individual dismissed
and cannot have employer orders attached. For example, a requirement that
an employer desist from falsif'ing medical records or stop producing faulty
tubular casing cannot be added to an order for compensation to be paid to
the emp1oyee.
8 Conclusions on the common law protection
The harshness of the employment-at-will doctrine is mitigated considerably
by the exceptions that have been introduced by developments at common
law. However, the exceptions are limited by being set against a general rule
which upholds the employer's prerogative to hire and fire with a minimum
of interference. In particular this is reflected in the somewhat restrictive
approach of courts to the question of whether there is a mandate of public
policy which justifies interfering with the employer's rights. This limitation
is not dissimilar to that in the English law on breach of confidence and the
public interest concept, where courts are sometimes slow to recognise the
public interest served by speech, and instead uphold the employer's right
to confidence in its place'°°.
In both cases, the common law position has long been to uphold employer
prerogative. Although exceptions to this now exist, they are limited, and full
employee protection will be a long way off if it is reliant purely on the
development of the common law. This is the case in both the UK and the
US. In both jurisdictions, it is possible to use the general employment
protection that already exists, (wrongful discharge in the US and breach of
Contrast this with the remedies available under the statutory
whistleblower protection.
'°°See British Steel v Granada Television [1981] AC 1097, and Chapter
Three, above.
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confidence and unfair dismissal protection in the UK) to obtain some
limited protection for those who blow the whistle at work. However, the use
of this protection is limited, not least because it has not developed with the
problems faced by whistleblowers in mind. Instead, the USA has provided
additional protection via the creation of specific statutory protection, both
federal and state, for employees who blow the whistle. It is worth
considering this protection in detail to see the extent to which specific
legislative protection for whistleblowers can solve the various problems
already identified.
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PART TWO - Statutory Protection
1 Introduction
Various statutoiy provisions exist to grant protection to employees who are
penalised at work for blowing the whistle on illegal or other wrongful
conduct. Some statutes provide that employees are not to suffer retaliation
for disclosing any breach of the regulations or offences they create. Other
statutes, both federal and state, provide more generalised protection for
employees who have action taken against them for whistleblowing. The
details of the protection granted by these whistleblower protection acts
varies from statute to statute and state to state. The workings of the federal
Whistleblower Protection Act will be examined, followed by Michigan's
Whisfieblowers' Protection Act, the first of the state statutes. Other states'
acts will be referred to by way of comparison.
2 Protection in statutes other than Whistleblower Protection Acts
Many statutes provide protection for employees who file complaints
suggesting that the terms of the statute have been breached. For example
the Occupational Safety and Health Act provides that "No person shall
discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such
employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceedings under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to
testify in any such proceedings or because of the exercise by such employee
on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter".
Similar provisions can be found in many statutes including the Employment
'29 U.S.C. section 660(c)(1)
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Retirement Income Security Act2, the Water Pollution Control Act3 , and
the National Labor Relations Act4.
The equivalent provision in Title VII Civil Rights Act 5 (which covers race
and sex discrimination) provides that it is not only unlawful to discriminate
against those who bring charges, testify or assist in proceedings under the
act, but also to discriminate against those who oppose any practice made
unlawful under the act6 . This suggests that protection is available for those
who act as protest whistleblowers in relation to sex or race discrimination,
in addition to the protection provided to those who actually report breaches
of legislation to appropriate bodies as under the other statutes.
Protection from retaliation for those who blow the whistle is also provided
by the False Claims Act7, which covers the disclosure of fraud perpetrated
against government departments. Not only does this Act require that
whistleblowers should not be penalised for initiating, or for giving
testimony or assistance in proceedings 8, it also allows them a share in the
proceeds of the action, providing a strong incentive to blow the whistle. The
aim of the Act is to encourage the discovery of fraud by contractors against
government departments by the disclosure of, for example, the making of
false claims for payment, the falsifying of records of payment, and the
giving of receipts for payments without checking that the information on the
229 U.S.C. 1001-1381 at section 1140
333 U.S.C. 1251 at section 1367a.
29 U.S.C. 151 at section 158(a)(4)
42 U.S.C. sections 2000e - 2000e-17
6Section 2000e - 3a.
'31 U.S.C. 3729 -3731.
831 U.S.C. 3730(h)
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receipt is true9. 'Where such fraud is revealed, the person responsible is
liable for a fine of between $5,000 and $10,000 plus three times the amount
of the fraud'°. A person will be liable if she takes part in the fraud
knowingly, or being reckless as to the truth or falsity of the information; no
intent to defraud is needed 11 . Where such fraud is disclosed, the Attorney
General may bring an action against the perpetrator' 2, or the person who
discovered the fraud may start the action in the name of the government,
which may then decide whether to take the action over' 3 . Where the action
is successful, the person who disclosed the fraud is eligible to be paid
between 15% and 25% of the proceeds (plus costs) if the government brings
the claim, and between 25% and 30% (plus costs) where the claim is
brought personally'4.
The False Claims Act has been successful in encouraging whistlebIowing5
although the method of providing financial incentives to do so may be
31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)-(7)
'°This is reduced to 2 times the amount of the fraud where the person
committing the fraud cooperates fully with the investigation, section 3739
(a) (A)-(C).
"31 U.S.C. 3729 (b)
1231 U.S.C. 3730 (a)
'3l U.S.C. 3730 (b) and (c)
'31 U.S.C. 3730 (d) (1) and (2). Where the fraudulent conduct
disclosed by has previously been disclosed in a court hearing or via the
news media, the amount that the person bringing the action can claim is
limited to 10% of the proceeds, section 3730 (d) (1).
' 5After introducing amendments to the False Claims Act in 1986 to
encourage its use (including guaranteeing a minimum reward, and clarifying
that no intent to defraud need be shown), the number of claims rose from
around six per year to 280 in 1990. Callahan and Dworkin report in 1992
that almost $70,000,000 had been recovered by the government as a result
of the Act. Callahan and Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial
Incentives for Wliistleblowing and the False Claims Act (1992) 37 Villanova
Law Review 273
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questionable. It is also of fairly limited application, restricted to the
disclosure of fraud against the government. In contrast the Whistleblower
Protection Act 1989 provides employment protection to federal employees
who disclose a range of wrongdoing.
3 Whistleblower Protection Act 1989 U.S.C. Title 5
3.1 History
In 1978 the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) introduced a merit system
covering the federal civil service and providing for a system whereby
employees' job prospects and promotion would be judged on merit only,
and would not be affected by arbitrary action. Part of this system works by
specifying that certain "personnel actions" (including appointment,
promotion, disciplinary action, transfer, reinstatement, performance
evaluation, a decision relating to pay or benefits, or a significant change in
duties) may not be carried out for particular prohibited reasons. These
prohibited reasons include discrimination on grounds of race, sex or
handicap, the coercion of political activity, and retaliation for disclosure of
the violation of laws, or disclosure of gross mismanagement or abuse of
authority' 6. This last category was included because of a recognition that
federal employees who make such disclosures serve the public interest by
assisting in the elimination of fraud, waste, abuse, and unnecessary
Government expenditure' 7. Where personnel action is taken for a
prohibited reason, corrective action can be ordered.
The CSRA was amended in 1989 as the system of protection was not
working effectively. Prior to that the protection was enforced by the Merit
165 U.S.C. 2302
' 7Section 2 of Pub.L. 101-12
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Systems Protection Board (MSPB), with allegations being investigated by
the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), a branch of the MSPB. Employees
had limited individual rights of appeal. The CSRA as originally enacted was
unsuccessful in fulfilling its purpose, with the Office of Special Counsel
bringing no corrective action cases between 1979 and 198918. The reason
for the small number of cases brought may have been that few deserving
cases arose, though this is unlikely given that in some cases where the OSC
turned the case down, successful appeals to the MSPB were made. Instead
it seems that the role of the OSC, as a branch of the MSPB, was unclear
and the protection only as strong as the will of the incumbent to pursue a
case19.
The Whistleblower Protection Act 1989 (WPA 1989) amended the CSRA
in several ways including separating the OSC from the MSPB, introducing
an individual right of action and changing the burden of proof in order to
help employees show that a prohibited personnel action had taken place.
The changes have worked: since 1989 the OSC has received an increased
number of cases, and brought 97 corrective actions between 1989 and
199420.
3.2 The Workings of the Whistleblower Protection Act 1989
3.2.1 Who is Protected?
The Act covers employees of the federal civil service, although there are a
number of exceptions. Employees of various agencies, such as the Federal
' 8See 1994 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News p. 3550
19Devin and Aplin, Whistleblower Protection - The Gap Between the
Law and Reality [ 1988] Howard Law Journal 223
20See 1994 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News p. 3550
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Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency and National Security Agency are excluded from the protection of
the Act, as are employees whose jobs are excepted from the competitive
civil service because of their confidential or policy-making characters. The
President may also exclude positions for the purposes of good
administration21.
Taken together the exclusions are fairly extensive. In a survey of 19
covered agencies in 1 992, it was found that out of around 2 million
employees in the agencies, 220,000 were not covered by the Whistleblower
Statutes. Exceptions on grounds of national security are understandable, but
it is not clear why those disclosing wrongdoing in their departments should
automatically be excluded from protection against retaliatoiy action just
because they are employed in confidential or policy making positions. If the
aim of the legislation is to uncover fraud, there seems no reason to exclude
such employees from protection for helping in this, especially since in many
cases it will be those in more senior positions who have access to
information that reveals the most serious wrongdoing. According to the
survey, the Department of Defense, an agency which may need some
exclusions on the grounds of national security, had the greatest number of
excluded employees. Yet it is worth noting that the sector with the greatest
number of fraudulent claims against the government under the False Claims
Act is the defence contractor industr?, suggesting that Department of
2I 2302 (a)(2)(B) and (C). Other exceptions include employees in a
Government corporation, the General Accounting Office. See Van Werrv v
MSPB 995 F 2d 1048 (1993) U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
Military staff are also excluded, but covered by a separate Military
Whistleblower Protection Act 10 U.S.C. 1034.
22 Whistleblower Protection: Agencies' Implementation of the
Whistleblower Statutes Has Been Mixed. March 1993, U.S. General
Accounting Office.
Strada, Counterclaims Against Whistleblowers: Should Counterclaims
Against Qui Tam Plaint jffs Be Allowed In False Claims Act Cases?, (1993)
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Defense employees have the potential to play a major role in revealing
relevant information and should be given full protection under the WPA.
3.2.2 What is Protected?
The WPA 1989 provides that a person may not take or fail to take, or
threaten to take or fail to take, personnel actions in relation to another
employee because of her actions in making any disclosure which she
reasonably believes evidences "a violation of any law, rule or regulation",
or which evidences "gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety"24 . Employees are not only protected against dismissal but also
action short of dismissal, such as demotion, disciplinary action, performance
evaluation, actions concerning pay, benefits, or any significant change in
duties25.
The meanings of gross mismanagement 26 and abuse of authority have been
considered by the MSPB, and the terms fairly strictly interpreted. In Ellison
62 University of Cincinnati Law Review 713.
245 U.S.C. section 2302(b)(8). The words "or threaten to take or fail to
take" were added to the section by the 1989 Act.
Section 2302(b)(8)(A) covers any disclosure of such information except
where the disclosure is specifically prohibited by law or required by
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defence or the
conduct of foreign affairs. Section 2302(b)(8)(B) covers any disclosure,
even of such information as long as it is made to the Office of Special
Counsel or the Inspector General of the appropriate government agency or
to any employee designated by the head of the agency involved.
251d section 2302(a)(2)(A)(i)-(x)
26Prior to the 1989 Amendments, the CSRA covered disclosures to
mismanagement. In 1989 this was limited to disclosures of "gross"
mismanagement.
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v MSPB27 the Board pointed out that merely disclosing an adverse
personnel action and alleging that it indicates gross mismanagement is not
sufficient to base a claim28. Otherwise, any employee who has a personnel
action taken against him would be able to claim that it evidences
mismanagement and appeal the action under the WPA. Similarly, in Carey
v MSPB29 the employee claimed that when the agency for which he
worked had closed down, he and other workers had not been redeployed in
accordance with agreed procedures. This was not accepted as the basis of
a WPA claim because it was not supported by specific information, apart
from generalised grievances about agency management.
Whilst it is only fair to employees to allow an appeal system for contested
personnel actions, to allow the WPA to be used for this purpose would be
a misuse. It is designed to provide protection for employees who have
retaliatory action taken against them for disclosing wrongdoing and its
ability to do this would be undermined by allowing it to be used as an
additional appeals procedure. Instead, the term "gross mismanagement" has,
rightly, been limited to action or inaction which creates a substantial risk
of significant adverse impact upon the agency's ability to carry out its
duties30.
The term "abuse of authority" is similarly strictly interpreted. A report by
an employee that a supervisor spent time playing computer games on
government computer equipment did not amount to a report of an abuse of
277 F 3d 1031(1993) U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
28 "An employee does not necessarily make a section 2302 (b)(8)
disclosure merely by informing the [Inspector General of an agency] of an
adverse personnel action and alleging that it evidences mismanagement or
the like" Id at p. 1035
29768 F 2d 1338 (1985)
30See Geyer v Department of Justice 63 MSPR 13, MSPB 1994
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authority in D 'Elia v Department of Treasur y31 . Instead it was said that an
abuse of authority for the purposes of the WPA had to result in personal
gain or advantage to the official exercising power or to some other person.
Again, given that the purpose of the WPA is to protect those who act in the
public interest from retaliatory action, its protection should be limited to
cases where serious issues that impact upon that public interest are
disclosed. To allow the raising of more minor complaints to be protected
would be to risk trivialising the Act32.
On the other hand, where the employee believes on reasonable grounds that
she is disclosing serious misconduct covered by the act, (a violation of law,
gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds etc.) she is protected from
retaliation for doing so. In Carter v Department of Army33 , the employee
disclosed in a criminal investigation that his supervisor had accepted a
washing machine in exchange for a telephone line. The MSPB accepted that
this could be a protected disclosure as long as the employee reasonably
believed that it evidenced gross mismanagement or an abuse of authority.
Thus the determination of whether or not the disclosure is protected was
based on the employee's belief about that fact, although such belief must
be based on reasonable grounds. The WPA has also been used successfully
to protect an employee who was outspoken in raising general concerns
within the agency and with the public, about practices which he believed
were wasteful. Despite the agency's contention that there was no relevant
disclosure involved, the employee was able to use the Act to argue that the
disciplinary action taken against him was retaliatory, and so unlawful34.
'6O MSPR 226, MSPB 1993
32These cases, where employees are dismissed for making fairly trivial
complaints at work, highlight the lack of any generalised protection against
Unjust dismissal. Such dismissals in the UK would probably be unfair.
62 MSPR 393, MSPB 1994
34Sowers v Dept. ofAgriculture 24 MSPR 942, MSPB 1984
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The approach of the WPA on this point contrasts with the common law
protection where a reasonable belief in wrongdoing is not sufficient to gain
a remedy for retaliatory discharge. It comes closer to the approach in the
UK where reasonable grounds for a suspicion can prevent a finding that a
disclosure is in breach of confidence where it is made internally 35 . This
approach provides increased protection for the employee and is therefore
more likely to encourage use of the WPA by employees.
3.2.2.1 The relevance of motive
In Fiorello v U.S. Department of Justice36 the court held that disclosures
by a prison guard of alleged improprieties and corruption in the prison
where he worked were made for personal reasons, and not from a desire to
inform the public of issues of general concern. For this reason, he could not
rely on the WPA to challenge the demotion and suspension that followed
his disclosures. However, in 1988 the case was overruled by Congressional
action, on the basis that barriers should not be made that limit the flow of
information from employees about government wrongdoing37. After this
amendment, the motive of the employee in raising a concern is not relevant.
If the employee has a reasonable belief in the wrongdoing disclosed, then
she will be protected38 . On this, the WPA takes the same position as the
courts in the UK3
35See Chapter Seven, para. 6.3.4.
36Fiorello v US. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons 795 F 2d
1544 (1986) U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
"See report in Horton v Department of Navy 66 F. 3d 279 (1995), and
legislative history: S. Rep. No 413, 100th Congress., 2d Sess 12-13 (1988).
38Horton v Department of Navy 66 F. 3d 279 (1995)
39See Chapter Three, para. 3.3.4, and Chapter Seven, para 6.6.3. above.
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The motive of the employer in taking retaliatory action is also unimportant.
Although there needs to be a causal link between the disclosure and any
contested personnel action, the disclosure need not be the main motivation
for the employer. Clearly, where the motive is one of retaliation, or where
there is an intention on the part of the employer to use, for example,
dismissal to cover up illegal or wrongful activity, this will provide the
strongest evidence that the disclosure and the dismissal were causally
linked. However, such a motive is not essential to the success of the
case41.
3.2.2.2 Internal or external reporting?
Those employees who make disclosures specifically prohibited by law, or
required to be kept secret in the interests of national defence or the conduct
of foreign affairs, may only be protected under the WPA if the disclosure
is made via the Office of Special Counsel, or other person designated under
the Act42 . However, employees who disclose other appropriate information,
not relating to such issues, will qualify for WPA protection whether they
disclose the information internally or externally. Thus, most employees who
raise concerns about gross mismanagement, abuse of authority, waste of
funds or violation of law will be protected from retaliation regardless of the
identity of the recipient of the information.
40See below.
41Marano v Department of Justice 2 F 3d 1137 (1993) U.S. Court of
Appeals, Federal Circuit
42Section 1213 (a)(l) and (2). Those designated by the Act to receive
disclosures of restricted information, in addition to the Special Counsel, are
the Inspector General of an agency or another employee designated by the
head of the agency (Section 1213 (a)(2).
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The protection can be compared here with the approach taken in breach of
confidence actions under English law, where the identity of the recipient of
information is of some importance. Although wide disclosure can be
acceptable, this depends on the type of information disclosed. Disclosure on
a wider basis than necessary risks a fmding that the disclosure is in breach
of confidence. In contrast, the WPA approach provides greater protection
to the whistleblower and reflects that fact that the WPA is designed for the
purpose of encouraging the disclosure of wrongdoing. The protection under
English law is not designed for whistleblowers, but consists of exceptions
to a general rule designed to prevent disclosures.
3.2.2.3 The need to show causation
Before an employee can succeed in a claim for protection under the Act it
is obviously essential that there be a causal link between the protected
conduct43 and the alleged retaliatory personnel action. However, proving
the existence of a causal link can be difficult.
Prior to the 1989 amendments to the CSRA the whistleblowing had to be
a significant or motivating factor in the decision to take action against the
employer. The MSPB used the Mount Healtht test of causation (from the
First Amendment protection case) in deciding whether there was sufficient
causal link45, the initial burden of proof being on the employee to show
that the protected disclosure was a substantial or motivating factor in the
personnel action, and then shifting to the employing agency, who could
43Disclosing mismanagement, violation of laws etc.
Mount Healthy Guy School District Board of Education v Do yle 97
S. Ct 568, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
43The Mount Healthy test was adopted by the MSPB in Gerlach v FTC
8 MSPB 599, 9 MSPR 268 (1981) and is discussed in Part One above.
216
escape liability if it could show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
same action would have been taken even if the protected disclosure had not
been made. The disadvantage of this is that it allows employers to escape
liability where a second reason for dismissal or discipline can be found,
even though the employee is also being penalised for legitimate
whistleblowing activity; it can thus be seen to undermine the ability of the
Act to protect such activity.
In 1989 the Act was changed in order to help employees overcome the
causation hurdle in proving their claims; the difficulties presented by the
earlier test had been noticed in a Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs report47. The new test requires only that the employee show, by
preponderance of the evidence, that the whistleblowing was a "contributing
factor", in the personnel action taken, before corrective action can be
ordered48. This can be shown by pointing to circumstantial evidence such
as that the official taking the action knew of the disclosure and the action
was taken within a period of time after the disclosure such that it is
reasonable to conclude that the disclosure contributed to the personnel
action49.
Once the employee has shown that the whistleblowing contributed to the
adverse personnel action, the burden of proof shifts to the employer. Rather
46Fisher, Whistleblower Protection Act: A False Hope for
Whistleblowers (1991) 43 Rutgers Law Review 355 at p. 378.
47Whistleblower Protection Act 1988, Report of the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Report No. 100-413, July 6
1988, cited in Whistleblower Protection: Determining Whether Reprisal
OccurredRemains DfJIcult, October 1992. U.S. General Accounting Office.
48Section 1214 (b)(4)(B)(i) and section 1221 (e)(1)
49Section 1221 (e)(1)(A) and (B).
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than just show by a preponderance of the evidence that there was another
reason for the action, the employer must now show by "clear and
convincing" evidence that the same action would have been taken in the
absence of the whistleblowing activity by the employee, a much stricter
test50 . Although the employer is still protected against the bad faith
employee who blows the whistle in order to gain protection against
legitimate disciplinary action, the burden of proof is shifted; whereas any
doubt would, under the earlier test, have been settled in the employer's
favour, under the new tests the benefit of the doubt is given to the
employee.
Clearly, some causal link must be shown between whistleblowing and
retaliatory action; if there is no causal link at all, there is no need for
protection. Equally obviously, employers should not be penalised for taking
legitimate disciplinary action against employees. Yet, proving causation
remains difficult for employees seeking protection for whistleblowing. It is
always open for employers to try to show some other reason for the
dismissal; unless an employee has an unblemished record at work,
employers can often, over time, find some credible reason for dismissal or
disciplinary action and can then argue that the whistleblowing was not even
a contributory factor in the action51.
Again the position can be compared with that in the UK in sex and race
discrimination cases, where similar difficulties in establishing causation are
experienced, and where courts have been cautioned about accepting the
discriminator's explanation for conduct too easily, because of the difficulties
complainants have in proving their cases. Instead, the Court of Appeal has
suggested that tribunals draw the inference that there has been
50Sections 1214 (b)(4)(B)(ii) and 1221 (e)(2)
51Fisher, Whistleblower Protection Act: A False Hope for
Whistleblowers (1991) 43 Rutgers Law Review 355 at p 410
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discrimination where the circumstances are consistent with discrimination,
unless the alleged discriminator can show otherwise52.
Such a suggestion may help employees, but is weaker than the approach in
the USA where the position on causation is set out in the legislation and
provides very different standards of proof for employer and employee. The
employee can use circumstantial evidence to show &vpreponderance of the
evidence that a disclosure contributed to a reprisal; the employer can only
refute that by clear and convincing evidence that the action would have
been taken in any event.
However, it seems that even providing a generous test for employees by
legislation has not solved the problem of causation, and has not had a
significant effect on the success rate of whistleblower claims. Lack of
evidence of a causal link between personnel actions and disclosures remains
a principal reason for the Office of Special Counsel not to pursue claims on
behalf of employees 53 . Yet, beyond creating a low burden of proof for the
employee, allowing the employee to rely on circumstantial evidence, and
imposing high burden of proof on the employer, it is difficult to see what
more can be done by legislation to help overcome the problem.
3.2.3 Remedies
Where an employee does overcome the problem of establishing causation
and can show that retaliatory action has been taken against her for
disclosing information, or raising concerns about what she reasonably
52Baker v Cornwall County Council [1990] IRLR 194
53 whistleblower Protection: Determining Whether Reprisal Occurred
Remains DffIcult, October 1992. U.S. General Accounting Office.
219
believes to be a violation of law, or a serious case of gross mismanagement,
waste of funds, or abuse of authority she is then eligible for the full
protection of the WPA. The protection provided is fairly extensive. First,
the MSPB can grant the employee a stay of the contested personnel
action54, while the case is investigated. If the personnel action was
retaliatory and is not corrected, then corrective action can be ordered55.
The employee will be placed as close as possible to the position she would
have been in prior to the contested action, and will be reimbursed for lost
pay and benefits, legal fees, travel or medical expenses and any foreseeable
consequential losses56.
The level of compensation provided by the WPA, covering future and past
losses, can give employees the confidence to blow the whistle where they
believe there is wrongdoing at work. Such remedies can also influence the
employing agencies. Remedies that are limited to past losses and
reinstatement impose little burden on employers who may take the view that
it is worth the risk of incurring the expense in order to remove a
troublesome employee; more extensive remedies that include consequential
losses can make that a risk that is less worth taking. To this extent, the
remedies available under the WPA are superior to those available to
employees successful in unfair dismissal cases under English law.
Perhaps even more significant, the Special Counsel and MSPB have other
powers as well as the power of awarding compensation and corrective
action to the individual whistleblower. If the employe&s disclosure
indicates that a criminal offence has been committed by the agency, then
54Section 121 4(b)( I )(A)(i)
55Section 1214 (b)(4)(B)(i). This is subject to the employee showing that
the personnel action was caused by the disclosure; see below.
56Section 1214 (g)
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the case can be referred to the Attorney General to consider prosecution57;
other violations are reported to the head of the relevant agency58 . The
MSPB can also take disciplinaiy action including dismissal, demotion,
suspension or a civil fine, against the person who took the prohibited
personnel action, or who committed the violation of any law, rule or
regulation59.
These powers provide an extra dimension to the protection of the WPA
over those available under the English law, where remedies are limited to
private remedies for the discharged employee. Employees who blow the
whistle in good faith, motivated by the desire to inform the public on
matters of general concern, do so in the hope that the wrong disclosed will
be put right. The additional powers under the WPA could act as added
incentive to such employees to disclose wrongdoing, as they allow steps to
be taken which are likely to do more to prevent further abuses than any
private remedy for the employee. Employers who are willing to risk
financial penalties by way of compensation to employees are unlikely to be
as willing to risk disciplinary action, or even prosecution, against
themselves; the existence of these more extensive remedies should provide
greater protection and redress to the whistleblowing employee.
3.2.4 Procedure under the Whistleblower Protection Act.
The usual procedure for bringing a claim under the WPA is to refer the
matter to the Office of Special Counsel. The OSC then investigates the
allegation; where it relates to the disclosure of a violation of law or gross
mismanagement, abuse of authority etc., the OSC refers the matter for
57Section 1214 (d)(1)
58Section 1214 (e)
59Section 1215 (a)
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investigation by the relevant agency who then reports back to the OSC with
details of any evidence obtained, and outlining corrective action to be
taken60 . If the OSC refuses to investigate a claim, or to seek corrective
action on the employee's behalf, the employee has an individual right of
action and can bring a claim direct to the MSPB61.
Case law suggests that employees must exhaust other remedies before
bringing a WPA claim, and that the Act provides an exclusive remedy for
employees who are retaliated against for blowing the whistle at work 62. On
the other hand, the WPA it is not necessarily the exclusive remedy for
personnel practices prohibited for other reasons, such as sex
discrimination63 . In Spruill v MSPB the court stated that the jurisdiction
of the MSPB over protected whistleblowing activities did not cover
60Section 1213 (b), (c), (d), (e). Details of the report are also sent to the
President and relevant Congressional committees.
61 Section 1214 (a)(3) and section 1221. See also Ellison vMSPB 7 F 3d
1031
62Spagnola v Mathis 859 F 2d 223 (1988) U.S. Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit, involved a claim for damages for breach of
the constitutionally protected right to free speech, where an employee was
denied promotion, in the employee's view, for speaking to the press during
an investigation into the use of narcotics by employees and members of
congress. The court held that the correct avenue of redress was via the
whistleblower provisions of the CSRA, and so denied the employee's claim.
In Steele v US. 19 F 3d 531 (1994) U.S. Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit,
the court refused a claim for damages for wrongful termination, breach of
the covenant of good faith and emotional distress after a dismissal,
allegedly for whistleblowing activities, on the basis that the correct avenue
for such cases was the WPA. See also Daly v Dept. of Energy 741 F. Supp
202 (1990) U.S. District Court, District of Colorado, where the court held
that the WPA provides an exclusive remedy for retaliation for
whistleblowing..
63Kent v Howard 801 F. Supp 329 (1992) U.S. District Court, S.D.
California
"978 F 2d 679 (1992) U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
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retaliation for employees filing discrimination claims with the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission. Thus where employees blow the
whistle on matters such as discrimination in the work place, the remedy
under the WPA supplements remedies available elsewhere; where matters
disclosed by federal employees relate to violation of law, mismanagement
etc., the WPA appears to offer an exclusive remedy.
3.3 The effectiveness of the Whistleblower Protection Act
Before the amendments, a major limitation to the effectiveness of the Act
was the fact that the OSC seemed to view the MSPB, rather than the
employee, as its client65 and tended not to bring claims for corrective or
disciplinary action. The amended 1989 Act separated the MSPB and
OSC and set out the role of the OSC, more clearly: it was to "protect
employees ... from prohibited personnel practices" 67. The reviews of the
General Accounting Office which are carried out on a regular basis indicate
that allowing employees to bring an individual claim after the OSC has
65see Devin and Aplin, Whistleblower Protection - The Gap Between the
Law and Reality [ 1988] Howard Law Journal 223, who report that one of
the holders of the post of Special Counsel taught a course to federal
managers on how to fire employees without OSC interference, and that
another holder of the post stated that his job was to serve the system and
not individuals.
In 1984, OSC closed 99% of whistleblower reprisal complaints
without seeking corrective or disciplinary action ( Whistleblower Protection:
Emplo,vees ' Awareness and Impact of the Whistleblower Protection Act of
1989. March 311993. U.S. General Accounting Office).
67Section 1212. The establishment of the OSC is provided for by section
1211; the Special Counsel, a lawyer is appointed by the President to serve
for a period of 5 years.
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decided not to take action has had some impact, with about a third of
employees obtaining relief after bringing a case to the MSPB68.
However, even after the 1989 amendments the Act is not a total success.
There are several problems including employees' lack of knowledge of the
protection available and difficulties in proving causation. Many employees
are aware that there is some legal protection for whistleblowers, but are not
aware of the details of the procedure, and it has been suggested that more
needs to be done to keep employees informed, possibly by imposing a
statutory duty on agencies to notify employees of their rights under the
Act69.
However, even those employees who are aware of the protection seem to
remain fearful that blowing the whistle may lead to reprisal, and more
important than being seen to protect employees from reprisal in order to
overcome this fear, is the need to be seen to be taking action in those cases
where wrongdoing is reported. In one survey by the General Accounting
Office, where four factors were identified by employees as likely to
encourage the reporting of misconduct, two factors came out higher that the
fact that protection from reprisal was available: that something would be
done to correct the problem reported, and that the problem was serious70.
Whistleblower Protection: Determining Whether Reprisal Occurred
Remains Dfficult. October 1992. U.S. General Accounting Office.
69 Whistleblower Protection: Agencies' Implementation of the
Whistleblower Statutes Has Been Mixed. March 1993, U.S. General
Accounting Office.
70 Whistleblower Protection: Survey of Federal Employees on
Misconduct and Protection from Reprisal. July 1992, U.S. General
Accounting Office. 90% stated the belief that the knowledge that something
would be done about the misconduct would encourage them to report. 88%
believed that the seriousness of the conduct would influence reporting and
84% would be encouraged by knowledge that protection from reprisal was
available. The fourth factor was that the employee could remain anonymous
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This suggests that employees blow the whistle from a genuine desire to
serve the public interest and may be prepared to so even with a risk to job
security if the issue is serious enough and can be corrected. The MSPB and
OSC have powers to take disciplinary action against wrongdoers and to
report cases of violation of criminal laws to the Attorney General. If these
powers were seen to be used, this could provide more powerful incentives
to speak out. Without action to remedy the wrong disclosed, whistleblowing
in the public interest remains an empty gesture and attracts few participants.
Another practical problem for employees is the need for legal advice before
bringing a claim. The OSC role is to act as an ombudsman, investigating
and prosecuting violations of the Act, rather than as the employee's
advocate71 , and employees may therefore feel the need to instruct their
own advocate. Although legal expenses are recoverable in the event of
success, the risk of losing a case may make employees unwilling to bring
a claim.
However, the main obstacle to the success of the Act in protecting the
whistleblower from reprisal remains the difficulty in proving causation. The
changes to the burden of proof in the 1989 Act seem to have had little
effect on the success rate of cases, suggesting that the only way to improve
protection on this front is to change the attitudes of those investigating and
hearing cases, to make them especially aware of the problems involved, and
wary of accepting what could be bogus defences by employers. Otherwise,
employers will be able to continue to take retaliatory action against
whistleblowing employees, which it is the whole purpose of the Act to
prevent.
(68%).
71Frazier v MSPB 672 F 2d 150 (1982)
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4 Michigan's Whistle-blowers' Protection Act72
The 'WPA only covers employees of the federal civil service. Other
employees have to rely on the protection provided by individual states. The
first state to enact legislative protection for whistleblowers was Michigan,
whose Whistle-blower Protection Act was introduced in 1981. The
provisions of this Act will be examined, and other state acts discussed by
way of comparison.
4.1 History
Michigan's 'Whistle-blowers' Protection Act was enacted in response to a
specific incident in the 1970's in which a poisonous chemical fire retardant
was shipped to state feed-grain cooperatives, instead of a nutritional
supplement, causing livestock losses and having serious effects on the
health of those who ate contaminated food. It was later discovered that
some employees had been threatened with dismissal if they volunteered
information about the chemical at the ensuing inquily, and this discovery
led to the introduction of the Michigan Act.
4.2 The workings of the Michigan Act
4.2.1 Who is protected?
The Michigan Act applies to all employees, public and private, although it
does not cover independent contractors 73 . To this extent it gives wider
coverage than the federal WPA and the Whistleblower Protection Acts of
many other states74. However, the type of whistleblowing to which
7)-Michigan Compiled Statutes Annotated 15.361-369
73 Chilingirian v City of Fraser 486 NW 2d 347 (1992)
74For example, the equivalent statutes in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Texas, protect
only public sector employees.
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protection is extended is limited. An employee is protected only where a
violation of law, regulation or rule is reported or about to be reported.
Unlike the Federal WPA, and other state protection such as that in Maine
and New Jersey, reports of concerns about matters such as gross
mismanagement, abuse of authority, waste of funds, or threats to public
health and safety are not protected75. The violation of law reported must
be that of the employer or other employees76, and does not extend to the
reporting of illegal activity by others, so that an airline ticket agent
dismissed for 'over-zealous' reporting of suspected drug traffickers could
not use the Michigan Act.
The Act provides that employees are not to be dismissed, threatened with
dismissal or otherwise discriminated against in respect of pay and
conditions of employment because of a relevant disclosure 78 . Protection
against discrimination has been held to extend to a denial of an expectation
of promotion to an employee, where in the employee's view, he was not
given alternative employment following redundancy because he had
reported safety violations at the employer's water plant79.
75See federal Whistleblower Protection Act section 2302. See also
Maine's Whistleblowers' Protection Act 1983, Title 26, 833 (the Maine
Act) and New Jersey's Conscientious Employee Protection Act 1986, Title
34 section 34:19-3 (the New Jersey Act).
76See Dudewicz v Norris - Schmid Inc. 503 NW 2d 645 (1993) where
an employee was dismissed after filing with the employer and the local
county prosecutor, a complaint against a fellow employee for assault.
Dolan v ContinentalAirlines 526 NW 2d 922 (1995) Court of Appeals
of Michigan. The employee was required only to contact the Drugs
Enforcement Agency (DEA) via her supervisor, and was discharged for
contacting the DEA direct.
78Section 15.362
79Hopkins v City of Midland (1987) 404 NW 2d 744 Court of Appeals
of Michigan.
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Protection covers those who can show by clear and convincing evidence
that they have reported or are about to report violations, or suspected
violations80. Thus, where an employee filed a complaint after her
dismissal, this did not preclude her use of the Act, as it was still open to
her to show that the dismissal was caused by the employer's belief that she
was about to report the violation 81 . On the other hand, where an employee
resigned after a dispute over unlawful billing practices in a law firm, and
subsequently filed complaints with the Attorney Grievance Commission, she
could not claim the protection of the Michigan Act because there was no
evidence that the employer knew that she would make the report, only that
the employer may have feared that she might82. However, the dissenting
judge in the case took the view that the Act rightly covers those who are
about to report violations since "[e]mployers should not be allowed to
peremptorily retaliate against employees with impunity"83 . This approach
is preferable; where there is evidence that an employer has dismissed an
employee because of a suspicion that she might disclose a violation, the
employee should be able to bring a case within the Act.
4.2.2 Internal or external reporting?
The Michigan Act is further limited by restricting protection to external
whistleblowing. Protection is only provided where reports are made to a
public body84, although the term is given fairly wide interpretation and can
80Section 15.363 (4)
81Lvnd v Adapt Inc. 503 NW 2d 766 (1993) Court of Appeals of
Michigan
82Kaufinan and Pavton v Nikkila (1993) 503 NW 2d 728 Court of
Appeals of Michigan
831d. at p. 733
84Section 15.362
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include state employees85 . Thus, where a report was made to a social
worker by an employee in an adult residential foster care home about the
circumstances of a resident's death, that report was protected under the
Michigan Act on the basis that the social worker, a state employee, could
be a "public body" for the purposes of the Act86. However, where
complaints are raised internally, no protection is available87.
In contrast some states protect internal and external reports88, and other
states, such as Maine and New Jersey protect reports to external bodies only
after internal channels have been exhausted89. New Jersey provides that
protection for disclosure to a public body is only available where the
employee has first notified the employer of the concern in writing, and has
given an opportunity for the employer to respond. The exceptions to this
rule are limited to where the employee is reasonably certain that the
employer knows of the matter of concern, or where there is an emergency
situation and the employee reasonably fears that physical harm may result
from the disclosure9°. Where an employee believes that internal disclosure
would not be worthwhile she will not be protected from retaliation for
disclosure to a public body if a court finds that her belief was not based on
reasonable grounds.
85Section 15.361
86Branch v Azalea/ Epps Home Ltd. 472 NW 2d 73 (1991)
87Chandler v Schiumberger 542 N.W. 2d. 310 (Mich. App. 1995)
88For example, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
West Virginia. Some states do not specify to whom reports should be made,
for example, Illinois, Missouri and Nevada.
89Others include, Indiana, Maine, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New
York
9°New Jersey Act section 34:19-4
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The Maine Act is perhaps a little more generous, limiting protection to
where an employee has first raised the issue internally and given the
employer a chance to respond, but allowing an exception where the
employee "has specific reason to believe that reports to the employer will
not result in promptly correcting the violation, condition or practice91".
The approach of the Michigan Act in refusing protection for internal
reporting is perhaps not surprising given that this is the approach of some
states in relation to retaliatoiy discharge, where internal reports are viewed
as internal management disputes, and not as raising issues of public policy.
However, as observed above, such a restriction is unwarranted. If the aim
of the protection is to uncover wrongdoing, employees should be protected
against reprisal for so doing. The only reason to restrict protection on the
basis of the means by which this is done is where it involves wider
disclosure than necessary. Where disclosure is internal, there seems no
reason to restrict the protection.
4.2.3 The need for a genuine belief in the violation
The Michigan Act provides protection for employees who disclose
violations or suspected violations to a relevant body. The employee only
loses this protection if she knows that the disclosure is false92 . The
employee can be protected both where she mistakenly believes that illegal
conduct has taken place, and where she mistakenly believes that legal
conduct is illegal. Thus in Meichi v Burns International Security Services
Inc. 93 the employee believed that the destruction and falsification of
91 Michigan Act section 833 (2)
92Section 15.362
93597 F. Supp 575 (1984)
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documents in a highly regulated industry such as the nuclear power industry
was illegal and so his disclosures of this practice were protected.
The Michigan Act can be contrasted on this issue with the protection under
the federal WPA94 and that offered by other states such as Maine and New
Jersey95 where the employee is only protected if she has reasonable
grounds for believing that she is disclosing a violation. The Michigan
approach is more generous than that of the other jurisdictions. A
requirement that disclosures be made on reasonable grounds before
protection is granted can leave the individual employee in an uncertain
position. She may be unsure whether or not her opinion will later be found
to have been formed on reasonable grounds. Yet she needs to know that her
disclosure will be protected at the time that she is contemplating the
disclosure. The uncertainty may prevent the employee from making the
disclosure, and illegal activity may then continue.
However, dispensing with the need for any belief in illegal conduct to be
based on reasonable grounds can leave the employer in a vulnerable
position, forced into defending itself against unfounded attacks. In the case
of the Michigan Act, this is compensated for by the fact that protection is
only given where disclosure is to a public body. Wider disclosure does not
come within the protection.
The real danger posed to employers by an unfounded allegation is where it
is raised in the media. If disclosures are made to a public body charged
with responsibility for investigating any allegations, fewer risks are posed
by false allegations. This is the approach under English law, as in Re a
945 U.S.C. 2302 (A)(8)(A) and (B)
95Maine Revised Statutes Annotated 26.833.A and Bard v Bath Iron
Works Corp. 590 A 2d 152 (1991); New Jersey Statutes Annotated 34:19-3
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company 's application96, where Scott refused to consider whether the
allegations of breaches of FIMBRA regulations and tax irregularities were
true, on the basis that the disclosures were to be made to the relevant
authorities who could investigate them. He drew a distinction between such
a case and where disclosure was made on a wider scale, when a reasonable
belief in the truth of the disclosure would be necessary. Such an approach
seems to represent an appropriate compromise between the employee's need
for certainty and the employer's interest in avoiding the disclosure of
unfounded allegations.
4.2.4 The relevance of motive
Protecting disclosures that are not based on reasonable grounds may still
seem generous to the employee, but it is also tempered by a requirement
that the employee act with a proper motive. In Wolcott v Champion
International Corporation97 the dismissed employee had reported that there
was insufficient ventilation at the employer's workshop and that oil and
solvents had been dumped in the ground in violation of public health and
environmental legislation. However, it transpired that the employee had only
made the disclosures once redundancy looked likely, had himself taken part
in the dumping of toxic materials and had exacerbated the fumes in the
workshop by closing the doors prior to an inspection by health and safety
officials. The court, in denying him protection, said that the "...Act was not
intended to serve as a tool for extortion. Those availing themselves of its
protection should be motivated, at least in part, by a desire to inform the
public about violations of laws and statutes, as a service to the public as a
whole98."
[1989] 2 All ER 248
691 F. Supp 1052 U.S. District Court, W.D. Michigan, N.D.
981d. at p. 1059
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Wolcott's motive in making his disclosures was to gain protection against
redundancy where none was otherwise available; at times an employee may
be motivated partially by the public interest and partially by personal or
even malicious reasons. In such a case some protection may still be
available, although an impure motive can affect the level of remedy
available to the emp1oyee. This approach is understandable, although it
does not solve an underlying conflict: where an illegal action is discovered
as a result of a disclosure, a guilty employer should not be able to retaliate
against an employee without some sanction being imposed, even if the
employee is partly motivated by seffish reasons; on the other hand, where
an employee acts purely for personal gain in making a disclosure, she may
not be worthy of protection, especially since to do so would be to put
employees in a better position by blowing the whistle than they would
otherwise be given that there is no general protection against dismissal in
common law. Employees fearful of legal dismissal should not be able to
disclose wrongdoing purely to gain employment protection they are
otherwise not entitled to.
This problem could be avoided, not on the basis that some motives preclude
protection, but on the basis that there is no causal link between disclosure
and dismissal where the employee is dismissed because of the malicious
motive. However, given the difficulties in establishing causation, such a
resolution would not be advisable. In fact, given the difficulties faced by all
employees, good motive or bad, in establishing causation, it is preferable
to have generous test on causation, with malicious employees losing
protection because of bad motive, rather than a rule in which motive is
irrelevant, but malicious employees fall on causation.
Melchi v Burns International Security Services Inc. 597 F. Supp 575
(1984). The remedy was limited to financial damages without reinstatement
because there was evidence that Melchi had malicious motives for his
disclosure.
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Causation may be relevant in relation to the employer's motive for
dismissal. Although there is no requirement that an employer have
retaliatory motives before protection is granted100, the absence of such
motives may mean that it is more difficult to establish the necessary causal
link between disclosure and retaliation.
4.2.5 The need to show causation
As already mentioned, establishing the essential causal link between
whistleblowing and retaliation can cause difficulty. However, the difficulties
under the Michigan Act may be even greater than those under the federal
WPA, as the test of causation remains essentially that of Mount Healthy v
Doyle101, with the employee's initial burden of proving a causal link
between the protected activity and a dismissal shifting to the employer, who
can escape liability if a legitimate reason for the dismissal can be shown.
However, an extra stage to the test is allowed where the employee can show
that the reason given by the employer for the dismissal is merely a pretext
for what was in reality a retaliatory dismissaV°2.
Employees may argue that a prima facie case of retaliation is made out by
drawing inferences from employer behaviour such as that the employer took
no action over an internal report of unsafe working conditions and then
discharged the employee once it became known that she had disclosed the
position to external authorities' 03 . Similarly, the fact that an employee's
work received no criticism prior to the reporting of illegal behaviour, and
'°°Melchi v Burns International Security Services Inc. 597 F. Supp 575
(1984)
10197 S. Ct 568, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
'°2Eckstein v Kuhn 408 NW 2d 131 (1987)
'°3 Tvrna v Adamo, Inc. 407 NW 2d 47 (1987)
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much criticism afterwards, may be used to infer that dismissal or
discrimination in employment is retaliatory'04.
Once the employer has shown that there was a legitimate reason for the
dismissal, the burden returns to the employee to show that the reason is a
mere pretext, by persuading the court that retaliation was the most likely
motivation for the discharge, or that the reason put forward by the employer
is not worthy of credence'° 5. For example, in James v HRP Inc.'°6 the
employer claimed that the employee was dismissed for bringing video
recording equipment into the rabbit breeding facility in which she worked.
The employee was able to argue that this reason was a mere pretext as
similar conduct by other employees had not resulted in dismissal. Instead,
she argued that she was dismissed because she had been going to use the
video to back up reports of animal abuse in the facility that bred rabbits for
medical research.
The test under the Michigan Act is more protective of the whistleblower
than the straight Mount Healthv test (which does not have the option for the
employee to show that the employer's reason was a pretext). However, it
is less protective than the federal WPA, where retaliation only need be a
contributing factor for the dismissal. If there are multiple reasons for the
dismissal, the Michigan Act will only protect those for whom the additional
reasons are merely pretexts for what is really as retaliatory dismissal; the
WPA, on the other hand, would protect the employee as long as retaliation
contributed to the dismissal, even if it did so alongside the other reasons.
However, as with the WPA, it is debatable whether the details of the
' 04McLemore v Detroit Receiving Hospital and University Medical
Center 493 NW 2d 441 (1992) Court of Appeals of Michigan
'°5Hopkins v Cit-v of Midland 404 NW 2d 744 (1987) Court of Appeals
of Michigan
'°852 F. Supp 620 (1994) United States District Court, W.D. Michigan
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causation test have much impact on the extent to which employees are
successful in claiming the protection of the Act; the willingness of courts
to believe that retaliation can take place may be more relevant.
4.2.6 Remedies available under the Michigan Act
An employee who alleges that she has been dismissed or discriminated
against in breach of the Michigan Act can bring an action for injunctive
relief as well as for damages 107 . Orders that the court can make include
reinstatement, back pay, reinstatement of fringe benefits, legal fees and
actual damages' 08 . Damages for loss of employment are not limited to the
level of damages available under the contract of employment (which will
be very little for "at-will" employees), but can cover full compensation for
actual losses, as well as for emotional distress'°9. The level of damages
and type of remedy awarded may be affected by factors such as the motive
of the employee in making the disclosure. Thus, in Meichi the employee
was not awarded reinstatement because of his malicious motives in making
the disclosure'10.
As with the federal WPA, the full measure of damages available can act as
an incentive for employees to blow the whistle as they can act in the
knowledge that any losses will be compensated. However, the provision that
any person who breaches its terms is liable to a civil fine of up to only
$500, coupled with the absence of any procedure within the Act for illegal
conduct to be investigated or for action to be taken against employers who
'°7Section 15.363
'°8 Section 15.364
'°9Teresa Philips 531 NW 2d 144 (1995)
"°Melchi v Burns International Security Services Inc. 597 F. Supp 575
(1984)
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take retaliatory action, mean that the Act lacks some of the deterrent
elements for employers present in the WPA.
4.2.7 Does the Michigan Act provide an exclusive remedy for
whistleblowers?
The Michigan courts have not always taken a consistent line on the question
of whether the Whistle-blower's Protection Act provides an exclusive
remedy for retaliation by employers, or whether it coexists with the tortious
remedy for retaliatory discharge recognised in Michigan in Suchodoiski v
Michigan Consol. Gas Co.". However, the position now seems to be that
where the employee is dismissed for raising a concern based on a statutorily
defined public policy, an exclusive remedy is provided by the Act. Where
the employee relies on a public policy not defined by statute, or where the
employee otherwise cannot use the Act, a tort of retaliatory discharge may
be used"2. Thus, whereas under Suchodoiski employees could use the
tortious remedy for retaliatory discharge where a dismissal resulted from
any disclosure as long as it was backed by a clear mandate of public policy,
the tortious remedy is now preempted by the Act in cases where the
employee discloses a violation of law.
111316 NW 2d 710 (1982). For cases that indicate that the Michigan
WPA provides an exclusive remedy see Cove!! v Spengler 366 NW 2d 76
(1985), Dudewicz v Norris-Schmid 503 NW 2d 645 (1993), Driver v Hanley
523 NW 2d 815 (1994) and Shuttleworth v Riverside Osteopathic Hospital
477 NW 2d 453 (1991). For cases to the contrary see Faulkner v Flowers
522 NW 2d 700 (1994) Court of Appeals, Michigan, Watassek v Michigan
Department of Mental Health 372 NW 2d 617 (1985) and Tyrna v Adamo,
Inc. 407 NW 2d 47 (1987).
U2See Vagts v Perry Drug Stores 516 NW 2d 102 (1994) Court of
Appeals of Michigan, and Dolan v Continental Airlines 526 NW 2d 922
(1995) Court of Appeals of Michigan, where the employee could not use
the Act because she was not reporting the violations of an employer or
employee, but of third parties.
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5 Conclusions on statutory and common law protection
As pointed out above, the legal protection available in the USA can be
contrasted sharply with that available under English law. Here no positive
right to free speech is recognised, although there is a general protection
against dismissal without a fair reason. In the USA there is no general
protection against dismissal (although exceptions exist which can be used
by the whistleblower) yet the right to freedom of speech is recognised and
specific legislation protects those who blow the whistle on certain issues.
However, as has been seen, the advantages of protection in the USA, the
WPA and First Amendment rights, although significant, are not as great as
might have been expected.
What becomes clear from an examination of the experience of the USA is
that the recognition of freedom of speech as a fundamental right is not
sufficient alone to provide whistleblower protection. Even though freedom
of speech is protected by the First Amendment to the US Constitution,
courts have been slow to recognise the extent to which the threat of losing
one's job acts as a deterrent to exercising the right. Instead, the right of
employers to hire and fire at will has been recognised as having enough
weight to counterbalance the right to free speech when exercised in the
private sector workplace. Although dismissal of state employees for
exercising freedom of speech is unconstitutional, in order to protect the
right of all employees to free speech, courts need to recognise that the
workplace, public or private sector, is an appropriate forum in which speech
should be protected.
Extension of the First Amendment rights to the private workplace remains
important despite the legislative protection for whistleblowers, as it is only
under the First Amendment that protection is provided for protest
whistleblowing. The legislative protection only covers disclosure of
wrongdoing, and does not extend to the raising of more general concerns
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about work, or participation in public debate by employees providing an
insider's view on issues of public importance. Moreover, the common law
protection against retaliatory discharge only covers disclosures of illegal or
wrongful conduct. In the absence of any generalised unfair dismissal
protection, the protester in the USA is dependent on the recognition of her
First Amendment rights.
The consideration of the position in the USA also illustrates the benefits of
drafting specific whistleblower protection. The aims of the protection can
then be clear, and it can be interpreted and developed to provide the best
protection for whistleblowers. The alternative, allowing common law to
develop to provide protection, has various drawbacks: it can be a slow
process, and can be hampered by protection having developed without
whistleblowers in mind. For example, under the US common law, and in
the UK, causation presents a formidable hurdle to employees. In response,
the federal WPA has a test that is designed to be lenient on employees and
stringent on the employers, to reflect the fact that causation is very difficult
to establish.
Similarly, designed with whistleblowers in mind, the WPA takes an open
approach to the recipient of the information disclosed. The important thing
is for the wrongdoing to be stopped; whether this is achieved by internal or
external reporting is not relevant. In contrast, the protection of the
retaliatory discharge protection is restricted for whistleblowers in some
states by the need for disclosure to be external. This reflects the fact that
the protection has arisen out of a culture that sees internal complaints as
outside the remit of court interference, rather than being designed to offer
maximum protection for the whistleblower.
An additional benefit of protection designed for whistleblowers is that
remedies can be included that are particularly appropriate. Under the WPA
the court has the chance to order some action to end the wrongdoing
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reported. This additional remedy may be as great an incentive to employees
to report concerns as financial compensation. Protection in the UK could be
improved by including some additional remedies beyond those of
compensation or reinstatement, which are directed only at the employee.
A further lesson that can be learnt from the USA is that however
generously legislative protection is drafted, the protection is only as strong
as those who apply it. The appointment of a specific government
department to investigate and prosecute cases under the protective
legislation, which may at first seem a positive step toward whistleblower
protection, has not been totally successful. The OSC investigates only a tiny
proportion of the cases raised before it, even though some of these are then
successfully appealed. Any equivalent system that could be set up for
whistleblowers in this country, such as the appointment of an ombudsman,
would need to be subject to veiy careful monitoring to ensure that it worked
to safeguard the interests of whistleblowers rather than of employers. Any
ombudsman would also need to have, and use, powers to investigate the
wrong reported, or to refer it to relevant authorities, as well as to investigate
the treatment of the employee, since the US experience indicates that this
is a greater motivator to public interest whistleblowing than employment
protection.
The major shortcomings within the system currently operating in the USA
are ones that are inherent in any system of protection, such as that of
finding sufficient evidence in support of the employee to convince those
hearing the case, and encouraging employees who are aware of illegal or
unsafe conduct to trust the protection provided. Ultimately these problems
do not have legal solutions, and are best tackled by publicity and education
of both employers and employees. Despite these inherent difficulties in
providing comprehensive protection for whistleblowers, there are evident
benefits, in terms of clarity and certainty, in having specific recognition of
the public interest served by whistleblowing and statutorily defined
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protection. Detailed proposals for such protection in the UK will be
discussed in the concluding chapter.
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Eight
A Case Study -
Whistleblowing in the NHS
In order to view the implications of blowing the whistle in context, the
position of employees in the National Health Service will be considered.
There are various reasons for choosing the NHS as an example. A number
of well publicised whistleblower dismissals have involved employees within
the health care sector', and this has led to a raised profile for NHS
whistleblowers. The example of the NHS is a useful one because, as part
of the public sector, there are strong arguments in favour of allowing its
employees to take part in protest as well as watchdog whistleblowing, not
least because the service is used and funded by the public, who therefore
have a right to know how it is run.
The general arguments in favour of allowing public sector employees a
degree of freedom of speech at work2 are reinforced in the case of the
NETS because of the recent changes introduced to the way that the Service
is run, and the political sensitivity of the debate that surrounds any
discussion of the effectiveness of these changes. The argument in favour of
protecting the speech of those employed in the NHS will be considered in
detail, followed by an examination of the contractual and other
'For example Helen Zeitlin and Graham Pink.
2See Chapter Two for detailed arguments on this point.
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considerations faced by NIHS employees who contemplate blowing the
whistle at work.
1 The value of protecting the freedom of speech of NHS staff
The justification for encouraging employees to act as watchdog
whistleblowers is as clear in relation to the NHS as it is in relation to any
other sector of employment3 . If an employee has information which, if
known, can help prevent personal injury or financial loss, it is clearly in the
public interest that the information be disclosed. In the NHS, it is likely that
employees may have access to information that could cause danger to health
and safety, and where that risk is serious, the information should be
disclosed4. Similarly, especially given new funding arrangements 5, there
is potential for large amounts of public money to be misspent, or wasted,
and it is in the public interest that such losses be prevented.
In addition, there are strong arguments in favour of allowing protest speech
by employees in the NETS. These can be based on the general philosophical
justifications explored earlier6. Both the argument from truth and the
argument from democracy can be used. Applying Mill's argument from
truth (that free speech allows the truth to be discovered), free discussion
should enable the best way to run the NETS to be determined and thus the
best health care possible to be provided for the public. Given that the NIHS
provides health care to the vast majority of the population, it is important
3 See Chapter Two, Whistleblowing and Freedom of Speech.
4For example, the disclosure in the summer of 1995 of the fear that
bags of donated blood may have been contaminated and were not safe to
use.
5Under the internal market, discussed below.
6See Chapter Two, Whistleblowing and Freedom of Speech.
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that it operates as well as possible; if discussion and debate can contribute
to this in any way then it is to be encouraged. If the NHS can be improved
by public debate about treatment or about standards of care, then this
should also be encouraged.
However, as noted when considering Mill above, the argument from truth
does not always work, as right answers do not necessarily exist. The
example of staffing levels has already been given; the truth about staff
numbers can be known but not the truth about whether such levels are
adequate. The truth about many other issues raised by staff within the NTiS
is similarly difficult to determine, but equally important to discuss.
One obvious example is the issue of the rationing of health care. Since the
inception of the NTiS, as medical science has continued to develop, the
number of treatments available, and the costs, have expanded. This has led
to increased demands on the system, demands that probably cannot be met
without increasing funding beyond limits that are acceptable to the vely
public that makes the demands. The need for some sort of rationing of
health care is well recognised, and debate about its scope does take place,
but usually behind closed doors. The public are rarely allowed to take part
in such debate despite their interest in the outcome. Yet discussion of
"medical inflation" and rationing cannot lead to the "truth" about any
outcome, as no right answer exists. Instead, any justification for public
involvement must come from the argument from democracy (the argument
that a democratic system requires the participation of an informed
electorate). The public uses and funds the system and should have some say
in its future direction even if only indirectly via the election of the
politicians who take policy decisions.
A second important issue for discussion relates to the effectiveness of the
recent changes in the running of the NTiS. In 1990 the National Health
Service and Community Care Act introduced wide ranging changes to the
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organisation of the NHS, changes that had been proposed in the 1989
Government White Paper "Working for Patients" 7. The Act introduced an
internal market for the provision of health care, and provided for the
creation of trust hospitals and fund-holding GP practices. Trust hospitals
and District Health Authority hospitals now provide hospital services, and
fund-holding GP practices and District Health Authorities buy those services
for their patients. The idea is to enable funding to follow patients more
directly, increase efficiency, and encourage a higher quality service as a
result of the ensuing competition between hospitals. The proposals were
implemented after little consultation with the Health care professions, and
despite a vigorous (though ultimately unsuccessful) campaign against them
by, among others, the British Medical Association.
Now that the changes are in place, it is important to know whether they are
working successfully in order to ascertain whether the policy should be
continued, modified or abandoned altogether. Again, any absolute truth will
be impossible to determine, but discussion involving those working within
the Service must help in deciding its future direction.
Li The "argument from democracy" and the NHS
The need for debate on the recent changes in the NHS also highlights the
democratic importance of speech in a more direct sense since the state of
the NHS has become a party political issue.
Even before the recent changes, the NHS was an institution of key political
significance. The principle of good quality health care, free at the point of
delivery, is very dear to the public; to be seen to fail in upholding this
7Working for Patients, HMSO 1989
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principle is probably to court electoral doom8 . Each political party needs
to be seen to be capable of safeguarding the NHS. It is thus clearly in the
government's interests that the changes to the MiS are seen to work
successfully.
Moreover, an additional factor in the changes introduced by "Working for
Patients" was the government's desire to deal with the public perception
that the NHS was receiving insufficient funding. The aim was to shift
attention away from ministerial decision making and focus instead on the
responsibilities of health managers, so that unpopular decisions would be
of less direct political significance9. When this aim is taken into account
the party political significance of public debate on the state of the NHS
becomes veiy evident. The political significance of the debate brings any
argument about its importance firmly within the scope of the most basic
argument from democracy. If a political party seeks election based in part
on its record in dealing with the NHS, then the public is entitled to as much
information about this record as possible, in order to make an informed
choice when voting.
1.2 Restrictions on freedom of speech in the NHS
Despite its importance to the electoral process, there does not appear to be
acceptance by management of the value of free discussion or debate on the
NHS. Evidence of this is provided by the introduction by many Trust
8This was recognised in a paper by Mr John Maples, then Conservative
Party deputy chairman, leaked to the Financial Times in 1994, setting out
tactics for avoiding a Conservative defeat at the next election. On the NTiS
he says "The best result for the next 12 months would be zero media
coverage". Financial Times 21 November 1994, p 10.
9Para 1.17 Working for Patients states that one of the aims of the
changes is "to secure a clearer distinction at national level between the
policy responsibilities of Ministers and the operational responsibilities of the
Chief Executive and top management."
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hospitals of confidentiality clauses in the contracts of employment of their
staff, in exercise of their rights to introduce new terms and conditions of
employment' 0. These clauses make clear that disclosure of confidential
information can lead to disciplinaiy action, and define confidential
information very widely, beyond information relating to patients, to include
commercially sensitive information. As a result of the introduction of the
internal market and competition within the NHS, this category of
'protected' information has grown and it can be construed to cover virtually
anything from financial details of purchases to cleanliness of facilities. This
is because if a purchaser of treatments hears criticisms about a particular
hospital, it may decide to purchase treatment elsewhere. In effect, the
reputation of a particular hospital or consultant now has commercial value.
Thus, much wider categories of information, such as information about
staffing levels, waiting lists or standards of treatment, in fact virtually
anything that may injure the reputation of the Trust, have become
commercially sensitive, and can be added to the list of confidential topics
about which staff may not speak.
Not only has more information become commercially sensitive since the
introduction of the internal market, but since the recent NHS reforms,
Trusts themselves have been allowed to operate more secretively. Trust
Boards can meet in private; although they must hold open meetings in
which each year's performance is presented' 1 , they are not obliged to
allow public access to other meetings. Non-executive directors of the new
Trusts are appointed by the Secretary of State. The members of the Board
'°The scope and validity of some of these confidentiality clauses is
discussed below.
"Para 7(2) Schedule 2 National Health Service and Community Care
Act 1990
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are thus less accountable to the people they serve and who are affected by
decisions made'2.
A degree of accountability to the public is provided by the NETS
Executive's Code of Practice on Openness in the N}IS' 3 . This Code sets
out in detail the obligations on general practitioners and hospitals to provide
infonriation to the public on request. Although the Code allows for
extensive disclosure of information it does include several exceptions, some
of which could be construed fairly widely' 4. The information it envisages
disclosing is mainly factual information, including information relating to
services provided, targets set and achieved, and details of public meetings
and complaints procedures. Provision is made for disclosure of information
about policy proposals. However, the Code does not refer to any
compulsoiy procedures for public consultation about these issues. The
version of accountability evidenced in the new NHS thus appears to be one
of financial and economic accountability rather than any broader concept of
political accountability in relation to wider aspects of health care provision
and policy'5.
' 2Prior to the 1990 changes, a degree of accountability was provided by
the presence of local authority appointed members of the district health
authorities and Community Health Councils. Since 1990 the CHC's no
longer have to be consulted whenever health authorities intend to make a
change to local services, and local authorities no longer appoint members
of district health authorities.
' 3NHS Executive, April 1995.
' 4Exceptions include confidential patient information, information
relating to internal discussion and advice, and management information.
These categories are not defined, and if broadly interpreted, could extend
widely. The Code also recommends charging for time spent providing
information where this takes more than an hour.
' 5See Longley, Diagnostic Dilemmas: Accountability in the National
Health Service [1990] Public Law 527
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A further example of the lack of open discussion within the NHS is
provided by considering the use of positive publicity about the NHS by the
government. As part of the new marketing arrangements that are
necessitated by the internal market, many Trusts and health authorities have
professional public relations departments, and the Department of Health has
requested that health authorities and trusts publicise good news stories about
their work' 6. Whilst there is no harm in the health authorities and trusts
generating publicity for their work, the political context of such information
means that it is important that this is not coupled with a stifling of dissent
amongst those who have first hand experience of the reforms in practice'7.
However, dissent does seem to be stifled. Many of those working in the
health service are scared to express their views according to the union
MSF' 8 whose research indicates that in 1993 85% of nurses were less
likely to speak to journalists than they were two years before, and 93%
were less likely to speak on the record. Reasons given for this reticence
include fear of losing a job or fear of repercussions from management'9.
' 6The need to place good news stories in the media is also recognised
by John Maples in his paper leaked to the Financial Times (see above).
' 7Although some adverse publicity is received by trust hospitals, much
of this has been disclosed after investigations by the National Audit Office,
or district auditors, for example, publicity in relation to financial
impropriety such as the £100,000 removal expenses of one manager (The
Guardian, 15/4/94), and the £70,000 paid to a manager who left the health
service after presiding over large losses (The Guardian 27/5/94) etc.
Disclosures by the National Auditor has often come after the event, and yet
some employee must have been aware of such payments at the time they
were made.
' 8Manufacturing Science Finance
'9MSF Media Survey on Freedom of Speech in the NETS, in Freedom
of Speech in the NHS. A guide for negotiators, MSF, July 1993.
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The political sensitivity of information relating to the NHS means that any
restriction on freedom of speech for those working within it has adverse
implications for the proper working of democracy. However, before
concluding that such speech therefore requires the fullest possible
protection, arguments for restricting free speech in this area need to be
considered.
1.3 Reasons to uphold confidentiality in the NHS
The most obvious check on free speech that applies to employees within the
NHS is that of patient confidentiality. The right of patients to confidence
in respect of medical matters is well established, and is most famously
traced to the Hippocratic Oath. More recently it is confirmed in the United
Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifeiy and Health Visiting
(UKCC) Code of Practice and binds all those who work within the NHS.
There are two main reasons for upholding patient confidence: a respect for
patient autonomy; and the need to ensure that patients are not deterred from
seeking medical treatment because of a fear that confidence will be
breached. For both these reasons, information relating to patient information
is, rightly, strictly observed. Even so, patient confidentiality is not an
absolute right and where the public interest demands, the right to
confidence can be outweighed. In W v Egdell2° the public interest in
disclosure of a psychiatric report was said to override any breach of
confidence. The report had been obtained in connection with proceedings
before a mental health review tribunal, and had been held back by the
patient's solicitors as it was not favourable to the patient's case. The doctor
had reported that the patient was still dangerous, and the public interest in
the hospital involved in his treatment knowing of the contents of this report
was found to override any breach of confidence involved.
20[1990] 2 WLR 471
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However, because of the strength of the right to confidence, in terms of
personal autonomy in particular, circumstances where patient confidence is
overridden by the public interest will be rare. Even the strong democratic
interest in free speech regarding the NHS is unlikely to justify a breach of
confidence, especially where the individual and treatment can be identified
by the general public.
On the other hand, a breach of a patient's confidence may be partial rather
than total; for instance the disclosure may be of the fact a treatment was
carried out without disclosure of the name of the patient, such that the
general public do not know who is referred to but the patient and her
relatives do. 'Where this is all that is disclosed, it is arguable that the public
interest may more easily justify the disclosure than where confidence is
totally breached. Discussion of incidents occurring in day to day medical
practice may be necessary to add weight to any general discussion on
standards of care; such disclosures will serve the general public interest in
the ways discussed above, and if this involves a partial breach of
confidence, this may be justified.
The second justification for restricting freedom of speech within the N}IS
is the need for commercial secrecy. Clearly businesses need to be able to
conduct their affairs with a degree of privacy, and the new internal market
of the NHS is no exception. Similarly, employers are entitled to expect a
degree of loyalty from their employees and this again may give good cause
for restricting free speech. A degree of restriction on freedom of speech is
legitimate to serve these ends. However, in both cases, these interests are
not absolute. Whilst they require some protection, they do not outweigh the
interest in knowing what is occurring within the NHS once that interest is
viewed as of public and political importance. Employee loyalty and
commercial secrecy should not be able to silence speech which serves such
important interests.
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A final reason to limit free discussion within the NHS is put forward in the
NHS Management Executive Guidance for Staff on Relations with the
Public and the Media: the need to uphold public confidence in the Service,
and prevent unnecessary anxiety about standards of care 21 . However,
whilst public confidence may be an important concern, it is of no benefit
if it is misplaced. Members of the public have a right to be given enough
information about the state of the Service to make up their minds about
whether they should have confidence in the Service. If they do not, they
may want to take some action, if only via the ballot box. Moreover, the
need to maintain confidence in the service does not survive comparison
with the democratic interest in free speech. In Hector v Attorney General
of Antigua and Barbuda' it was recognised that the democratic process
depends upon the ability of the opposition to undermine public confidence
in the government. Whilst the penalty for speech was more severe in that
case, some comparison is still valid. Given the electoral importance of
the public confidence in the NHS, where there is no other reason for
preventing speech, such as patient confidentiality, employees should not be
prevented from participating in public debate on grounds that confidence in
the NHS may be undermined.
21 Paragraph 7 of the Guidance states: "[Local management in
consultation with staff and local staff representatives] will wish to consider
how best to promote a culture of openness and dialogue which at the same
time upholds patient confidentiality, does not unreasonably undermine
confidence in the service and meets the obligations of staff to their
employer." The Guidance is discussed in greater detail in separate section.
22[199o] 2 AC 312. See Chapter two, para 2.2.
23A newspaper editor had been given a criminal conviction for printing
a false statement likely to undermine public confidence in the conduct of
public affairs.
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1.4 Conclusion
Each of these reasons for restricting the freedom of speech of NHS staff has
some validity. However, where employees act as watchdogs, raising
concerns about health and safety issues, or financial impropriety, it is clear
that the public interest in allowing their disclosures outweighs the various
interests served by maintaining confidence. In addition, if speech about the
state of the NHS is seen as a form of political speech, then the speech of
employees who wish to raise more general concerns about their experiences
of working within the NHS should also be protected.
Despite strong arguments in favour of allowing employees to participate in
public debate on the health service, a consideration of the contractual duties
of employees indicates that freedom of speech does not seem to enjoy much
protection.
2 The Contractual Position of NHS Staff
The contracts of employment of health care employees contain a number of
terms from various sources that impact upon freedom of speech. At times
these contractual terms conflict with each other, leading to some confusion
about the exact duties of those who contemplate blowing the whistle, either
as watchdogs or protesters. Staff are subject to the general implied duty of
confidence as well as duties contained in professional codes of conduct.
Many NHS Trusts also impose express confidentiality clauses on
employees, which in turn are supposed to accord with the NHS Executive's
Guidance For Staff on Relations with the Public and Media. The example
of terms governing nurses conduct will be used to illustrate the conflicting
and confusing situation faced by many staff working within the NHS.
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2.1 Contracts of Employment
The general implied temis of trust and confidence apply to nursing staff as
they do to all employees. The extent of these duties have been examined in
detail in Chapter three. In addition, many NETS Trusts have taken advantage
of their new powers to introduce new terms and conditions of employment,
and have included in them express confidentiality clauses. At times these
confidentiality clauses are extremely widely drafted and go beyond the level
of confidence required by the common law.
The confidentiality clauses of two Oxford hospitals, the Oxford Radcliffe
Hospital NHS Trust and the Nuffleld Orthopaedic Centre NHS Trust, may
be used to illustrate the new confidentiality clauses.
Oxford Radcliffe Hospital
"You shall not, except as authorised by the TRUST or required by
your duties under your employment contract, use for your own
benefit or gain or divulge to any persons, firm, company or other
organisation whatsoever any confidential information belonging to
the employer or relating to his affairs or dealings which may come
to your knowledge during your employment. This restriction shall
cease to apply to any information or knowledge which may
subsequently come into the public domain other than in breach of
this clause......'Confidential information' shall include all
information which has been specifically designated as confidential
by the employer and any information which relates to the
commercial and financial activities of the employer, the
unauthorised disclosure of which would embarrass harm or prejudice
the employer."
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Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre
"Any matters of a confidential nature, including relating to the
diagnosis and treatment of patients, individual staff records and
details of contract prices and terms, must under no circumstances be
divulged to any unauthorised person or persons.... Disciplinaiy
action will be taken for any breach of confidentiality..."
These clauses are both fairly typical of new confidentiality clauses used in
NHS Trust hospitals. They are very wide ranging, potentially covering a
broad sweep of information, both commercial and personal and can be
criticised on a number of fronts.
Neither clause mentions the role of the public interest in determining
whether information is confidential or not, with no mention made of the
public interest "defence", known to exist in the common law. Legally this
is of little significance as the express term is read in the light of implied
terms and can therefore be interpreted so as to accord with the common law
duty of confidence, to include a public interest defence 24. Any employer
seeking to rely on it will find that it is only upheld to the extent that it does
not conflict with the common law. If a disclosure is in the public interest
there will be no breach of contract despite the inclusion of the express term.
In practical terms, the omission may be more serious, as staff are unlikely
to know of the existence of implied public interest defence.
The clauses themselves contain possible ambiguities. They refer to
"unauthorised" disclosures, and disclosures to "unauthorised persons",
without reference to who would be capable of giving authorisation or being
authorised. Given the need to interpret the clauses to correspond with the
common law, one could interpret these phrases to mean that disclosures that
are in the public interest are automatically authorised and so may be made
24Johnstone v Bloomsbuiy Health Authority [1991] IRLR 118 CA
255
regardless of authorisation from management. Effectively this would mean
that disclosures could be seif-authorised by staff where disclosure is in the
public interest. Although this might be the meaning that a court would
ascribe, such an interpretation is not evident in the wording of the clause.
Instead, an employee is likely to assume that authorisation must come from
a person in senior management of the Trust.
The clauses cover all types of confidential information with the same
blanket ban on disclosure. No distinction is made between commercial and
personal information. However, the public interest in protecting information
will depend on the type of information involved. The public interest will
need to be extremely strong to justify any disclosure which threatens patient
confidentiality. The need to protect the privacy of the patient will outweigh
any interest in disclosure in all but the most serious of cases. Yet the same
cannot be said of commercial or financial information. The extent to which
the public interest may justify disclosure varies according to a number of
different factors including the type of information, recipient of information
and timing of the disclosure. Unless the employee is familiar with the
intricacies of this area of common law, she will assume that the same
degree of protection is needed for all categories of information and may be
deterred from making a valid disclosure as a result of the drafting of the
clause in this respect.
The definition of confidential information is at times extremely wide. In the
Oxford Radcliffe Hospital contract, the first part of the clause includes all
information "designated as confidential by the employer"; this appears to
apply regardless of whether such a designation is justified. Again, the
requirement that the clause be interpreted to accord with the common law
where possible26 means that where it is in the public interest for particular
25Discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
26Johnstone v Bloomsbuiy Health Authority, ibid
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information to be disclosed, any designation of that information as
confidential should be invalid.
The clause also includes a category of confidential information that is
potentially wider. It refers to information relating to the commercial and
financial activities of the employer the unauthorised disclosure of which
would 'embarrass, harm or prejudice the employer'. The use of the word
'embarrass' here is difficult to justify. Given that the employer is a trust,
and not a human person, it is hard to see how it can suffer embarrassment.
Even if that theoretical problem is overcome, it is not clear why mere
embarrassment is a reason to prevent disclosure of information relating to
a publicly flmded body. If the embarrassment is also harmful, or prejudicial
that is already covered by the clause. Mere embarrassment (to an
incorporeal entity) without any harm is an inadequate reason to prevent
freedom of speech by staff.
The inclusion of embarrassing information as confidential information could
cause particular difficulties for protest whistleblowers. Watchdog
whistleblowers are probably safer as where wrongdoing is disclosed the
public interest means that the information will be incapable of being
designated confidential, and any ambiguity in the meaning of
embarrassment will be resolved to include the public interest defence.
However, where employees exercise their rights to free speech to protest,
for example, about shortcomings in the service provided by a trust, they
may be said to disclose information that embarrasses the trust (if it is
capable of such an emotion). They will then be in breach of contract, even
if the information could not otherwise be said to be confidential. The only
defence open to the speaker is to argue that the wider, democratic public
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interest is served by the speech27, and that this public interest overrides the
duty of confidence created by the express term28.
The fact that common law implied terms can be used to mitigate any
excesses in the express confidentiality clauses may mean that these
criticisms are of minor importance. It is, after all, common for employers
to draft contracts in terms most favourable to them, without mentioning the
extent to which the terms may be modified by the operation of the common
law. For example, despite the fact that post-contractual restrictive covenants
can be void for being in restraint of trade, it is not usually suggested that
employers should only include them in employment contracts with the
caveat that they can only be relied upon to the extent that they are
reasonable29. Similarly, there is no requirement that all contracts specifying
hours of work need to contain a reference to fact that this is subject to the
need to safeguard the employee's health30.
However, it is arguable that the inclusion of a very restrictive
confidentiality clause in a contract of employment is prejudicial to the
public interest in a way that an overly restrictive post-employment covenant
is not. In the case of a restrictive covenant, the interests that are balanced
against each other are private: the employer's interest in being free of
competition versus the employee's right to work. There is a public policy
in favour of upholding the right of the employee to ply her trade, which
allows the strict wording of the contract of employment to be overridden,
27An argument that has not been recognised by courts so far. See
discussion on public interest above.
28Where an express term conflicts with the public interest or public
policy, courts will not enforce it. See discussion above.
29Spafax Ltd v Harrison [1980] IRLR 442
30Johnstone v Bloornsburv Health Authority [1991] IRLR 118 CA
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but the employee's interest is still essentially private, albeit a private
interest that is upheld by public policy.
In confidentiality cases also there is a public policy of restricting the use of
confidentiality clauses where disclosures are in the public interest. But in
contrast to the restrictive covenant cases, the interest in allowing disclosure
is truly a public one. As argued above, the interest in allowing disclosure
in the public interest is not that it upholds the personal autonomy of the
individual, but that it upholds the interests of the audience in hearing what
is said. The fact that the public interest defence is not referred to in the
confidentiality clauses governing NHS staff may deter staff from raising
valid concerns in the mistaken belief that to do so would be in breach of
contract. This may mean that information that ought in the public interest
to be made known remains undisclosed, and the clauses can be justifiably
criticised on this basis31.
2.2 The IJKCC Code of Professional Conduct
The United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifeiy and Health
Visiting is the body that governs the professional conduct of the nursing
profession32 . Its Code of Professional Conduct sets out the standards
31 1n its second report, the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life
recommends that confidentiality clauses should expressly remind staff that
legitimate concerns about malpractice may be raised with an appropriate
body where it is in the public interest. Recommendation 8, The Second
Report of the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life 1996 HMSO
Cm 3270 I-Il
32The UKCC was established by the Nurses, Midwives and Health
Visitors Acts of 1979 and 1992. It is the regulatory body for nurses and is
charged with establishing and improving standards of education, training
and professional conduct. It governs, by way of its register, who can
practise and when the right to practise should be removed from an
individual.
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expected of nursing staff; breach of the Code could lead to loss of
registration with the EJKCC, which in turn could lead to loss of employment
as NHS employers require staff to be registered with their respective
governing body33.
The third edition of the UKCC Code of Professional Conduct was published
in 1992. It sets out the standards expected of nursing, midwifery and health
visiting staff in relation to professional practice and covers issues such as
the need to work cooperatively with other staff, to maintain professional
competence, and to respect the dignity of patients. On confidentiality, the
Code states that staff must:
"protect all confidential information concerning patients and clients
obtained in the course of professional practice and make disclosures
only with consent, where required by the order of a court or where
you can justify disclosure in the wider public interest" (Clause 10)
and
"report to an appropriate person or authority any circumstances in
which safe and appropriate care for patients and clients cannot be
provided." (Clause 12).
Several matters are worth noting in relation to these clauses. Most obvious
is the reference in clause 10 to the public interest, something that many
contractual terms lack. The importance of protecting patient confidence is
clear in the clause, but the possibility of the public interest overriding that
confidence is acknowledged and provided for. Significantly, the clause also
addresses the issue of who is to be the judge of the public interest in
relation to such information: the individual nurse. In this respect again the
33 E.G. the UKCC for nursing staff, and the General Medical Council for
doctors.
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clause compares favourably with the express terms that do not identify who
can authorise disclosures.
The designation of the nurse as the judge of the public interest may be
helpful in cases of whistleblowing. The nurse who breaches confidence in
the genuine belief that the public interest is served by the disclosure can be
confident that she is not in breach of the UKCC Code. She may also be
able to argue that this part of the UKCC Code is incorporated into her
contract of employment, and can be used to resolve any ambiguity in the
contract over who may authorise disclosure and, perhaps, what may
lawfully be disclosed.
A second point that is made clear from the Code and from explanatory
notes that accompany it, is the extent to which nurses are expected by their
professional body to raise concerns and not to tolerate low standards of
care. This is made clear in Clause 12, and in an accompanying document
"Exercising Accountability"34, which states that it is "clearly wrong for any
practitioner to pretend to be coping with the workload, to delude herself
into the conviction that things are better than they really are.., to tolerate
in silence an,v matters in her work setting that place patients at risk
jeopardise standards of practice or deny patients privacy and dignity"35
(emphasis added). This advice clearly envisages that matters such as the
standards of care offered by the NEtS are the legitimate concern of nursing
staff.
On the other hand, it appears that the advice to nursing staff tends towards
encouraging staff to report concerns, rather than with ensuring that the
34Exercising Accountability: A framework to assist nurses, midwives and
health visitors to consider ethical aspects ofprofessional practice. UKCC,
March 1989.
"Exercising Accountability, ibid. p.9
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concern is dealt with 36 . It seems that the responsibility of the nurse ends
once the concern has been raised. This tends to undermine the emphasis in
the Code on encouraging nurses to take the initiative in safeguarding the
public interest in good standards of care.
2.3 Guidance for Staff on Relations with the Public and the Media
Guidance was published in June 1993, by the NHS Management
Executive37, and circulated to all managers in the NHS, setting out the
principles that should be applied in dealing with those who wish to raise
concerns at work. Although it has no legal effect, and does not replace
contractual duties or local procedures, it does state that confidentiality
clauses in individual contracts should not conflict with its terms.
Prior to the publication of the 1993 Guidance, draft guidance called
Freedom of Speech for NHS Staff was published38 . It suggested that staff
raise concerns internally and made it clear that speaking publicly could lead
to disciplinaiy action. No mention was made of the fact that disclosure in
the public interest is not a breach of contract, making the draft guidance
inconsistent with the UKCC Code and the common law. The draft did state
36For example, nurses are advised, having raised their with appropriate
persons, to ensure that they make a record of the consequences for patients
if they have not been given the care they need. Exercising Accountability,
ibid. p.9
In a nursing textbook discussing hypothetical situations in which a nurse
may consider breaching confidence, nurses are advised in difficult cases to
give information to a consultant who can refer the matter to his or her
professional body. See Dimond, Legal Aspects of Nursing (1995) 2nd
Edition, Prentice Hall, London.
3'Now the NHS Executive.
381n November 1992.
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that those who raised bona fide concerns in accordance with locally agreed
procedures would not be penalised 39, but it was not clear who would judge
that the concern was bona fide, nor would it be likely that a local procedure
would cover disclosure to the press in any circumstances. In any event, it
might have been presumed so self evident that bona fide concerns raised in
accordance with procedure should not lead to penalties, as not to need
stating. Whilst the aim of the guidance was said to be to make plain that
staff had the right to raise concerns, its tone was such that the freedom of
speech of N}{S staff was left in some doubt.
The final version of the Guidance, renamed "Guidance for Staff on
Relations with the Public and the Media", was published in June 1993°,
and included some improvements, such as the recognition that the public
interest can sometimes be served by disclosure. It confirms that NHS staff
have a right and duty to raise matters of concern41 , that management must
create systems that allow that to be done easily42, and that the working
culture of the NES should be one of openness where staff are encouraged
to contribute their views on all aspects of health care 43 . It also recognises
that free expression of views can lead to an improvement in the service.
The procedure envisaged by the Guidance, by which this aim can be
achieved, is an internal one. Staff should raise matters informally with their
line manager first. Only if the informal procedure is ineffective should the
matter be raised formally through the management line, or through a senior
officer designated to hear such matters. Finally, the Guidance refers to
39Para 5. of the Draft Guidance
4 NHS Executive, Leeds. See Appendix One.
41 Para 3 (1)
42Para 3(u)
43Para 5
"Para 5
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disclosures to the media, and states that these will give rise to disciplinary
action if unjustified.
To the extent that the revised Guidance recognises the role of the public
interest in disclosures, and reasserts that staff may have something to
contribute to improving the service of the NHS, it is an improvement on the
original draft. However, the final draft has its shortcomings too.
The recognition that the duty of confidence owed to an employer is not
absolute but subject to the public interest 45 is not consistent throughout the
document. Clause 3(iv) states that individual members of staff in the NHS
have an obligation to safeguard confidential information, "particularly
information about individual patients and clients, which is under all
circumstances strictly confidential" (emphasis added). Although the
circumstances will be rare, it is possible for the public interest to be served
by disclosure in extreme cases, a fact that is recognised both in common
law and in the UKCC Code.
The Guidance conflicts with the UKCC Code again in Clause 8 which
provides that "unauthorised disclosure of personal information about any
patient or client will be regarded as a most serious matter which will always
warrant disciplinary action. This applies even where a member of staff
believes that she is acting in the best interests of a patient or client by
disclosing person information". This directly contradicts Clause 10 of the
UKCC Code which provides that it is for the nurse to decide for herself
whether the public interest is served by a disclosure.
The preferred procedure suggested by the Guidance is for matters to be
raised informally with the immediate line manager, with formal procedures
45Clause 10
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only being used if informal channels are ineffective". In many cases, this
will be the most appropriate way to raise concerns. It has the advantage of
simplicity and speed and can avoid individual managers becoming defensive
and so unwilling to change. However, where concerns relate to the
managers themselves47, internal and informal procedures are inappropriate.
The formal procedure, raising the concern via each level of management in
turn, suggested in clause 17, produces problems of its own. It is time
consuming, and the chances of the more senior manager overturning the
decision of a lower manager may become more remote with each layer of
appeal, with senior managers unwilling to undermine the authority of junior
colleagues. Instead, if internal procedures are inappropriate, the streamlined
procedure suggested in the Guidance48, using a designated officer, is to be
preferred.
Despite the reference in its title to relations with the media and public, most
of the Guidance is taken up with detail on the need to establish local
procedures for raising concerns. Reference is only made to the media at the
very end, and even then it does not warrant its own clause but is included
in a clause that also addresses disclosure to MIP's. This clause is one of the
most unsatisfactory in the Guidance. It states that:
"an employee who has exhausted all the locally established
procedures... might wish to consult his or her Member of
Parliament in confidence. He or she might also, as a last
resort, contemplate the possibility of disclosing his or her
"'The need for an internal reporting mechanism for NHS employers is
also recognised by the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life, and
accepted by the government. Government Response to the First Report of
the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1995 HMSO Cm 2931.
47See first and second reports of Public Concern at Work and
Whistleblow, a report on the work of the RCN Whistleblow Scheme (1992),
which suggest that concerns often do relate to management.
48 see clause 21
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concerns to the media. Such action, if entered into
unjustifiably, could result in disciplinary action and might
unreasonably undermine public confidence in the
Service" .(Clause 27)
The clause appears to suggest that staff who seek guidance and advice from
their MP could be penalised for doing so, and that reference to an MP can
only be made after exhausting all local procedures. If this is the case, this
would constitute a restriction on the constitutional rights of NHS staff. In
a letter to Health Service managers49, Sir Duncan Nichol, then head of the
NHS Management Executive, confirmed that the reference to the
disciplinary action refers only to "unjustified" disclosures to the media and
that the constitutional right to contact one's MP is not affected by the
guidance. It was perhaps unfortunate that in a document of 28 paragraphs
only one paragraph was used to cover reporting to MP's and disclosure to
the press, on the face of it totally separate matters50.
A literal reading of the clause suggests that even the contemplation of
contacting the media can warrant disciplinary action. Assuming that this is
not its meaning, a more serious concern about the clause is the lack of
clarity as to when a disclosure will be justified, and therefore protected.
49Dated 7 September 1993
50lndeed in his letter, Sir Duncan Nichol states that the aim of paragraph
27 was to "positively suggest reference to an MP". However, since similar
wording is used for the suggestion that staff contact an MP ("might wish
to consult") as for the suggestion that staff contact the press ("might...
contemplate disclosing"), the second suggestion clearly not being one that
the guidance encourages, the reader of the paragraph will be unlikely to
know that the first suggestion is "positive". If the aim of the Guidance was
to encourage staff to raise concerns with MP's, this should be made clearer,
and certainly not be included in a paragraph that aims to discourage the
raising of concerns with the media.
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The clause also refers to the fact that disclosures to the media may damage
public confidence in the NHS. The point has been made above that although
public confidence may be desirable, it is not of paramount importance and
does not survive comparison with the democratic interest in free speech.
Given the electoral importance of the public confidence in the MiS, that
confidence should be based on full information. Employees should therefore
not be prevented from participating in public debate on grounds only that
confidence in the NHS may be undermined. Indeed it may be important for
the democratic process for the opportunity to be given to undermine the
public's confidence in the ability of any political party to run the NTiS.
It is perhaps not surprising that having been hailed by the government as
a "whistleblower's charter", the Guidance for Staff on Relations with the
Public and the Media was quickly dubbed a "gagger's charter" once it had
been published. On the face of it, the Guidance appears to encourage free
speech for NHS staff, but does little to do so in reality. Indeed research
indicates that it has had very little impact51 . Most staff have not heard of
it and in workplaces where it has been publicised., levels of fear about
raising concerns at work have risen. This may in part be because the
Guidance, by its very existence, gives the impression that the issues and
procedures are very complex. Staff may be left with the impression that the
consequences of making a mistake in the way in which they raise a concern
are so serious that it is best not to try. The Guidance certainly does little to
clarify how courts and staff should view the issues of the public interest and
only adds to the conflict that already existed between the duty to speak and
the duty to remain silent.
51 Contained in an unpublished survey conducted by MSF, the
Manufacturing, Science Finance Union, London.
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3 The contractual position of whistleblowers in the NHS
Regardless of any apparent conflict between express and implied terms, the
UKCC Code of Conduct and the NHS Executive's Guidance, if the public
interest is served by a disclosure, then it will involve no breach of contract.
Ambiguities in the express or incorporated terms will be interpreted so as
not to conflict with the common law which allows disclosure, even to the
media, where justified in the public interest. Thus, requirements that
disclosure be made to appropriate persons only cannot be said to require
internal reporting in all cases. Clearly, where reports are internal and
amount to disclosures of illegalities or present dangers, all the
circumstances will combine to prevent the disclosure being in breach of
contract52. However, where the concern is such that it is not appropriate
for the employee to raise it internally a court may be persuaded to interpret
the term "appropriate person" so as to allow wider disclosure.
It seems likely that an employee who acts as a watchdog on her employer
will not be in breach of contract as the public interest is usually served by
disclosure of illegality or irregularity, whether that disclosure is made
internally or externally. However, the concerns of the protester, typically
raising issues such as funding levels, staffing levels, managerial support
etc.53 clearly do not relate to illegalities or irregularities. Any accusations
arguably amount to no more than "mismanagement" and as such may not,
in the view of the courts, justify any breach of confidence involved in their
disclosure54. Although the Guidance recognises that contributions from
staff to any debate on the NTIS may help improve the service, protesters
may not find its emphasis on internal reporting encouraging, especially
52See Chapter Three.
53 Whistleblow, Report on the Work of the RCN Whistleblow Scheme
(1992)
54See BSC v Granada [1981] AC 1097
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since effective protest usually requires a degree of publicity. The failure of
courts to recognise the public interest in publicity and the resulting
informed public debate means that the protester is less likely to be protected
than the watchdog.
4 Practical issues affecting NHS staff
Despite the impression created by a reading of the UKCC Code of Conduct
and accompanying material, and the opening paragraphs of the Guidance,
of a profession working in an atmosphere where teamwork and concern for
patients mean that concerns are discussed and addressed openly, in reality,
the freedom of discussion of staff, and openness to debate of the
management, is questionable 55. The introduction of new contracts of
employment have added to the fear of speaking publicly about matters at
work, but many other factors also impact on an employee's decision to raise
a concern.
Providing proper care with in any health care system requires good levels
of team work. Care is provided twenty four hours a day, by a number of
professional workers including senior and junior doctors, nurses,
physiotherapists etc. Such care clearly demands a level of cooperation and
teamwork above that of other work settings. Many staff have trained
together and continue to work and even socialise within the same hospital
circles56 . The working culture that this produces can be fairly closed and
tight knit, with strong loyalties to the institution and colleagues. In any
workplace, it can be difficult to raise concerns about standards without
55MSF Media Survey on Freedom of Speech in the NHS, in Freedom
of Speech in the NHS: A guide for negotiators, MSF, July 1993.
56For discussion of NHS culture and its implications for whistleblowing
see Winfield, Self Regulation through Employee Vigilance in Hunt (ed),
Whistleblowing in the Health Service, 1995, Edward Arnold, London.
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seeming to criticise colleagues: this is likely to be compounded in a
workplace such as the NETS, which is so reliant on team working57.
Additional tensions have been created for staff since the introduction of the
internal market to the service. To the inherent loyalty of staff to the NETS
and patient care has been added the requirement of loyalty to the particular
hospital as its reputation in the eyes of treatment purchasers has taken on
commercial value. The result can be that those who raise concerns are
viewed as a threat to the reputation of the hospital, rather than as team
members who are concerned to maintain or even to raise standards of care.
This process has not been helped by the fact that the medical professions
were in general hostile to the introduction of the changes to the running of
the NETS, and in many cases remain hostile to the introduction of new
layers of management into the service, often staffed by non-medical staff.
This new style of management means that managers concerned with the
smooth operation of the internal market can often come into conflict with
medical staff, professionally committed to putting patient care above
commercial considerations.
Although the creation of the internal market has led to increased
competition between hospitals, the NETS still remains a closed system, with
most medical staff working within it. The private health sector does not yet
provide major competition in terms of size, and the market within the NIHS
remains an internal one. This means that staff who are viewed as
troublemakers in one hospital may find it more difficult to find new
employment than employees in some other sectors. Medical skills are highly
transferable within the NETS but not so much outside; if dismissed from one
"The same could be said for many other areas of work, for example the
police and armed services.
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hospital for whistleblowing, it may be very hard to find comparable work
again58.
In recent years NHS employees have been dismissed for blowing the
whistle59 and their cases have received wide publicity. This fact, together
with the existence of a working culture that militates against open
discussion means that health service staff are likely to be very reluctant to
raise concerns about workplace issues, either internally or externally.
This reluctance will be compounded where the employee does not enjoy job
security, and yet there has been a move recently towards employing more
nursing staff on short term contracts60 . Although an employee who has
worked for more than two years on a series of short term contracts may
enjoy the same protection as permanent staff in terms of protection against
unfair dismissal, the staff may not feel as secure, knowing that their
contracts need to be renegotiated at regular intervals. Moreover, where
contracts are for a fixed term for periods of over a year, it is possible to
contract out of the protection against unfair refusal to renew the contract61.
Staff employed on temporary contracts are therefore likely to feel more
insecure than their permanent counterparts. A further result of the increased
use of short term contracts can be the demotivation of staff. Staff who
know that they are only temporarily employed may feel less concerned with
improving the environment of care. Of course, the converse may also be
"Of course this argument applies to many other sectors, where the close
culture and specialised nature of the work mean that although different
employers exist, most of these employers know each other, for example the
police or the defence industry. This can make it hard for staff to find new
work using their expertise and training.
59Such as Graham Pink and Helen Zeitlin
60J Buchan, Further Flexing? NHS Trusts and Changing Working
Patterns in NHS Nursing (1994) RCN
61 s 197 ERA 1996 (previously s 142 EP(C)A 1978).
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true, with temporaly staff feeling that they have less to lose by making their
concerns public.
Another group of employees who may feel insecure are the large numbers
of staff who are training within the NHS. Nursing staff and junior doctors
spend much of their training moving between specialist departments.
Although these employees may have a contractual right to be provided with
work and training, this is often provided on a rotation basis. The exact
location and content of the jobs can vaiy and staff may feel that their
training and promotion prospects will be adversely affected by gaining a
reputation as a troublemaker.
Any one of these factors, especially the closed culture and increased use of
short term contracts, can exist within a workplace to create an atmosphere
where staff are reluctant to raise concerns for fear of reprisals. The
cumulative effect of all these factors combined within the NHS mean that
its staff are particularly likely to be fearful of speaking out.
5 Are the fears of NIIS staff justified?
Given the culture in which they work and the introduction of new
confidentiality clauses to their contracts, it is not surprising that NHS staff
have become more fearful of speaking publicly about matters relating to
work in recent years62 . This is increased by the introduction of a new
commercial ethos into the workplace by the managers who can exercise
control over job prospects, against the wishes of most medical staff.
62Documented by MSF whose research shows that 85% of nurses were
less likely to speak to journalists in 1993 than they were two years before,
and 93% were less likely to speak on the record. See Freedom of Speech
in the NHS: A guide for Negotiators, July 1993, MSF, London.
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The professional standards of staff are based on the assumption that staff
will reflect on their practice and feed any observations into the system
where they can be considered and acted upon as appropriate. Indeed the
confidentiality clause of the UKCC Code of Practice depends for its proper
operation on a workplace managed by open and receptive staff, who are
ready to listen to the views of those who provide the core service of the
sector. Where this openness to discussion is perceived by staff to be
lacking, they will not be prepared to take any risks in raising concerns.
The lack of satisfactoty protection for whistleblowers under the general law
means that there are inevitably risks attached to blowing the whistle in any
sector. The recent changes in the NETS, together with the introduction of
new confidentiality clauses and the Guidance is likely to fuel any inherent
reluctance on the part of staff to speak out. This is particularly the case for
protest whistleblowers whose disclosures are less likely to be held to be in
the public interest.
The NHS provides a good example of the issues facing whistleblowers,
because of the variety of interests present, such as patient confidentiality
and public interest in the running of the public sector. However, as has
already been pointed out, watchdog whistleblowers can operate in any
sector, such as the transport sector and the finance sector, to raise the alarm
before damage is done. Similarly, protesters may legitimately wish to raise
concerns about many other areas of the public sector beyond the NHS.
There is a danger, not least because of the publicity attracted by NETS cases,
that whistleblowing has come to be seen first and foremost as an NHS
issue. In 1992, a National Health Service (Freedom of Speech) Bill was
introduced to the House of Commons 63 . The fact that it did not make it
63lntroduced by Derek Fatchett, and sponsored by MSF.
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through the parliamentaiy process was probably good for whistleblowers in
other sectors. If legislation is to be introduced to improve the protection
available to whistleblowers, it should apply to employees, regardless of the
sector in which they work. This support for the introduction of protection
for employees in the N}IS would be best used to give impetus to the
introduction of such protection all whistleblowers.
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Nine
Conclusions and Proposals for
Reform
The inadequacies of the current legal protection for those who make public
interest disclosures at work are abundantly clear. Employees risk
disciplinary action or dismissal for their actions, and the law provides little
redress. The definition of the public interest in the common law is too
imprecise for anyone to be certain in advance that any breach of confidence
involved in a disclosure will be said to be justified. Where the employee is
dismissed as a result of the disclosure, that dismissal may well be fair if the
employer believed at the time that the disclosure involved a breach of
confidence, and if it can be shown that the average employer would also
have dismissed an employee for similar conduct.
The failure of the law to provide protection for employees who raise public
interest concerns, coupled with the fact that most employers view such
conduct as a breach of loyalty, if not of confidence, means that employees
are fearful of raising concerns. The result is that a useful early warning
system goes unused. If health and safely warnings, and concerns about
financial misconduct were given and acted on, many accidents and much
financial loss could be prevented. In addition, valuable public debate is
stifled where employees are prevented from participating for fear of
victimisation.
In considering the protection currently available both in the UK and in the
USA, various difficulties have been highlighted, such as that of establishing
a causal link between the employee's disclosure and any adverse action by
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the employer. In addition, other questions have been raised, such as whether
protection should be limited to those who raise concerns internally, and
whether the employee should be protected only if concerns raised are based
on a reasonable belief as to their accuracy. In considering various options
for legal reform, these issues will be addressed.
1 Incorporation of ECI-IR
There are many arguments for and against incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights, and various ways in which this might be
achieved. Full consideration of these issues is outside the scope of this
study. What is worth considering here, is whether giving individuals a right
of action under the Convention exercisable in domestic courts would
provide useful support for legitimate whistleblowing.
Although courts in the UK have been keen to point out that the protection
provided for freedom of speech under the common law does not differ
substantially from that under the European Convention on Human Rights',
it is probably the case that the whistleblower would be better protected
under the Convention, as the case law of the Commission and Court
demonstrates a clear commitment to the principle that free speech and
public debate are vital to a democratic society. Arguably, then, some form
of incorporation of the Convention into domestic law would enhance the
rights of whistleblowers. It would enable courts to use the Convention to
override the common law, rather than being limited as they are currently,
to using it only to solve ambiguities or to shape the exercise of discretion
provided for in the law.
'See for example Derkvshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd
[1993] 2 WLR 449.
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Examination of the case law on article 10 of the ECHR indicates that the
protection provided by the Convention has at times been limited where the
penalty for exercising the right to free speech is dismissal2. It may still be
the case where the penalty for speech is action short of dismissal. Unless
and until the relevant courts recognise that the threat of dismissal inhibits
disclosure, then employees who are dismissed or disciplined for public
interest disclosure will not find the protection they need from the
Convention. The decision in Vogt v German? and other cases4 suggests
that the court do now recognise that the threat of dismissal can have an
inhibiting effect on free speech. If this development in the case law is
followed, and developed to protect action short of dismissal too, then
incorporation of the Convention could provide improved protection to
whistleblowing employees.
2 Encouraging internal procedures and expanding the use of external
regulatory bodies as channels for raising concerns.
One method of protecting whistleblowers at work is to encourage the
introduction of internal reporting mechanisms to each workplace. As well
as grievance and disciplinary procedures, employers could be encouraged
or required to introduce procedures allowing employees to raise concerns
about illegal, improper or unsafe practices. Indeed this is the system
provided for by the NETS Executive's Guidance for staff on relations with
2Kosiek V Germany (1986) 9 EHRR 328, Glasenapp v Germany (1987)
9 EHRR 25.
(1996) 21 EHRR 205
4Lingens (1986) 8 EHRR 407 and Van Der HeUden v the Netherlands
11002/84 (1985) decision of 8 March
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the public and media. It is also advocated by the Nolan Committee on
Standards In Public Life5.
Internal procedures should be encouraged as they can allow for concerns to
be acted upon swiftly and without damaging publicity. Once the concern is
made public, employers can become defensive and attempt to deny that
there is a problem rather than deal with it and correct it. However, they
should not be the only route by which employees can raise concerns.
2.1 Limitations of internal procedures
First, the use of internal procedures is only appropriate where the concern
raised does not relate to those involved in operating the internal procedure.
In the NHS, many of the concerns relate to the managers themselves 6, and
in such cases internal and informal procedures are inappropriate. Second,
the use of internal procedures will only work where the person operating
the procedure has a correct understanding of the public interest. The person
within the internal procedure who will determine whether the public interest
is served by the disclosure will usually be a manager, who will also owe
loyalty to the employer, and may find it difficult to arbitrate fairly between
the public interest and the employer's interest. Third, although the use of
internal mechanisms can encourage disclosure because concerns can be
acted on without publicity, this is also a weakness of such mechanisms.
Particularly if illegal conduct has occurred, it is arguable that action should
5See the Government Response to the First Report of the Committee on
Standards in Public Life, 1995, HMSO Cm 2931 and the Second Report of
the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1996, HMSO Cm 3270 I - II.
6See first and second reports of Public Concern at Work and
Whistleblow, a report on the work of the RCN Whistleblow Scheme (1992),
which suggest that concerns often do relate to management.
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be taken to punish the conduct; if reports are kept in house, matters that
ought to be made known in the public interest remain secret. 'While internal
reporting procedures are to be encouraged, therefore, it is clear that they
should not constitute the only protected method of raising concerns at work.
2.2 Reporting to a regulatory body
In addition to encouraging the use of internal procedures, increased use of
external regulatoiy bodies could also be encouraged, with disclosures to the
Inland Revenue, FIMBRA etc as appropriate7. If concerns relate to matters
where there is regulatory body which can take action, disclosure to that
body is likely to be protected as involving no breach of confidence8.
However, although disclosure via such channels is suitable in some cases,
protection should not be dependant on it. The experience of the USA
illustrates the problems of such an approach.
The protection offered to federal employee whistleblowers under the
Whistleblower Protection Act in the USA is mediated via the Office of
Special Counsel (OSC), an individual appointed under the legislation to
receive and investigate allegations made by federal employees. The OSC
reviews any reports made to decide whether there is a substantial likelihood
that behaviour of a type covered by the legislation9 is disclosed. If there is
7Note the creation of the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority
in the Pensions Act 1995. s 48 creates a duty on auditors and actuaries to
report certain breaches of the law to the Authority. Auditors in other sectors
are also under a duty to report concerns to their respective regulators, see
for example, Auditors (Insurance Companies Act 1982) Regulations 1994
SI 1994/449; Auditors (Financial Services Act 1986) Rules 1994 SI
1994/526; Accountants (Banking Act 1987) Regulations 1994 SI 1994/ 524;
Building Societies (Auditors) Order 1994 SI 1994/ 525.
8See In re a company's application [1989] 2 All ER 248
9Such as illegal conduct or gross waste of funds.
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such a likelihood, the OSC refers the matter to the department concerned
and can order corrective action on the part of the employee.
In the USA, the Office of Special Counsel turned down 99% of cases
brought before in its first eight years of operation'°. It is possible that this
was because few deserving cases arose, but this is unlikely as successful
appeals were made in some of the cases rejected by the OSC. Instead it
seems that the role of the OSC, to operate as whistleblowers' champion, or
as government department was unclear". As a result, the rights of
individual employees to claim the protection of the legislation in their own
right was strengthened in the 1989 amendments to the CSRA.
The second problem with the OSC system is that the whistleblower, who
may be raising concerns about the abuse of government power, is forced to
operate via a further government official in order to be sure of
1'	 .protection -. Again, this will operate satisfactonly only where that official
has a correct understanding of the public interest'3.
Essentially, the problem with designating a particular organisation to whom
employees may report concerns is that the protection provided is only as
'°Devin and Aplin, Whistleblower Protection - The Gap Between the
Law and Realii-v [1988] Howard Law Journal 223
"Devin and Aplin, Wizistleblower Protection - The Gap Between the
Law and Reality [ 1988] Howard Law Journal 223
' 2Devin and Aplin, ibid
' 3M example of a concern being raised with the proper authority which
was then not acted upon came to light in the Scott enquiry. A member of
staff of Matrix Churchill sent a letter to the Foreign Secretary warning him
that arms were being exported to Iraq. No action was taken in relation to
the letter; neither the Foreign Secretary nor any other minister was shown
the letter or informed of its existence. Scott enquiry, para D2.3 18
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strong as the people who staff the organisation, and the powers that these
persons have by law. Although it is useful for employees to know that a
suitable external channel exists through which they can raise a concern, this
should not be the sole route through which protection can be gained for
public interest disclosures. This puts too much power in the hands of the
regulatory bodies to determine the public interest. Employees who have
reasonable grounds to believe that valid concerns have not been taken up
by those charged with doing so, should be able to raise concerns via a
different channel without fear of retaliation.
Moreover, not all areas of business are governed by a relevant regulatory
body. If whistleblowers are only protected by regulatory bodies, this will
lead to an arbitraty distinction between the protection available to regulated
areas of business and that available to those who work in an unregulated
sector. On the other hand, there are specialist bodies to whom reports on
specific issues can be made, regardless of whether there is a specific sector
regulator. For example, health and safety concerns can be reported to the
Health and Safety Executive, and certain concerns about financial
impropriety can be reported to the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise or
the police.
2.3 Improving the availability of internal procedures
Although the use of internal procedures can encourage the reporting of
public interest issues, it seems that they are not yet common' 4. One way
of encouraging firms to set up internal procedures through which employees
"In a survey of the 1996 'Times' Top 500 UK finns 83% of the 109
firms that responded stated that they neither had a whistleblowing procedure
nor planned to introduce one within the next twelve months. David Lewis,
Report on Whistleblowing Procedures in 'The Times' Top 500 UK firms
(1996) (unpublished)
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could raise concerns would be to introduce a system of contract compliance
whereby employers would require each other to have adequate internal
procedures in place before any contracts are awarded. This system could
provide a cheap and effective incentive to employers to adopt good practice
in relation to whistleblowers, based on market forces rather than on external
penalties. Given the importance of the issue to public sector workers it
would be an appropriate area in which government could set an example to
the private sector'5.
However, such a solution would currently be illegal with respect to local
authority and other public bodies under the Local Government Act 198816,
which prohibits reference to non-commercial matters in awarding contracts.
Without a lead from public sector employers it is unlikely that any other
employers would impose such requirements on their contractors.
A lead to other employers may be provided if the recommendations of the
two reports of the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life are
implemented. The Committee has considered various areas of public life,
including the NHS and local public spending bodies as well as civil
servants and MP's' 7. It recommends that employers nominate someone
within the organisation to be charged with investigating any employee
concerns about propriety that are raised confidentially. Employees should
be informed about the role of the person nominated, and should also be told
of a person or body external to the organisation who can be approached if
' 5Contract compliance used to be legal; see the House of Commons Fair
Wages Resolutions from 1946 to 1983.
' 6s 17 Local Government Act 1988
' 7Government Response to the First Report of the Committee on
Standards in Public Life, 1995 HMSO Cm 2931. The Second Report of the
Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life 1996 HMSO Cm 3270 I -II
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no satisfactory conclusion is reached. The recommendation in relation to the
NHS has been accepted by the government'8.
Such a system could be enforced legally using the mechanism of the
Statement of Terms of Employment required by s 1 ERA 1996. This
statement has to provide details of grievance procedures and could also be
required to include information about internal reporting mechanisms and the
other information identified by the Nolan Committee.
Employers in certain sectors may finally be prompted to introduce internal
reporting procedures by the introduction of a new type of corporate
manslaughter. The Law Commission proposes'9 to overcome the
difficulties of finding mens rea on the part of companies by providing that
companies be held liable for deaths in cases of management failure, where
the way in which a company's activities are managed or organised fails to
ensure the safety of those employed in or affected by those activities. This
would have implications for employers whose employees or clients are
exposed to any type of physical danger, or threat to health and safety, and
may encourage the setting up of internal mechanisms for the reporting of
concerns. However, it would obviously be of limited significance for
employers whose wrongdoing is likely to be in other areas, such as finance
impropriety or maladministration, yet such concerns still need to be raised.
Clearly, it is unrealistic to expect the voluntary introduction of internal
reporting procedures to solve the problems of employees who wish to raise
public interest concerns at work. Additional protection is also necessary.
' 800vernment Response to the First Report of the Committee on
Standards in Public Life, 1995 HMSO Cm 2931.
' 9Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter, Law Corn.
No.239 (1996)
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2.4 A commission for ethics in the workplace?
An additional way of ensuring that internal reporting mechanisms are
available to employees would be to create a body charged with overseeing
their implementation and use, along the lines of the Equal Opportunities
Commission and the Commission for Racial Equality. Such a body could
also provide support to employees using the unfair dismissal protection
suggested below. The work of the charity Public Concern at Work indicates
that there would be work for such a body to do. It provides advice and
support for individuals, gives education and training for employers,
disseminates good practice and undertakes research.
However, the creation of such a body is veiy unlikely. Despite the support
from the Nolan Committee for the use of internal reporting mechanisms, it
was not suggested that a new body be created. The fact that the 1995
Disability Discrimination Act does not create an equivalent to the E.O.C.
and the C.R.E. indicates that the government is no longer willing to commit
funds to such bodies 20. The difficulties experienced in flying to create even
an individual right not to be dismissed for blowing the whistle in the public
'I	 .	 .	 -interesr suggest that the extra support of a commission will not be
provided.
3 Creation of new automatically unfair reason for dismissal
Given that the mechanisms for protecting against unfair dismissal are
already well established, the simplest way to protect the whistleblower
20Despite the creation of a Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union
Members in the Employment Act 1988, and a Commissioner for Protection
against Unlawful Industrial Action in Trade Union Reform and Employment
Rights Act 1993!
21 For example, the failed Whistleblower Protection Bill 1995 and Public
Interest Disclosure Bill 1996.
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would be to provide that it is automatically unfair to dismiss an employee
for making a public interest disclosure. The scope of this protection would
need to be carefully defined to balance both the interests of employers to
take action where disclosures are unwarranted, and the interests of the
employee in speaking.
3.1 Defining the scope of the protection
The interests of the employee in making her concerns known have been
examined in full earlier, as have the interests of the public in having access
to the information disclosed. In considering the scope of any employee
protection against dismissal for making public interest disclosures these
interests must be weighed against the interests of the employer. As has been
discussed above, the employer's right to confidence and loyalty is subject
to the public interest; if misconduct or illegal practice is revealed no
confidence is owed, and where legitimate opinion is voiced the employer's
interest should be subject to the public interest in free debate.
In addition, the employer has other legitimate interests that need to be
considered in framing any legislative protection for the whistleblower. Thus
far the discussion has focused on disclosures that are in the public interest,
but any legislative protection will need also to ensure that the employer's
right to take action against true breaches of confidence and loyalty remains.
Employers need protection against vindictive or misguided employees who
might otherwise be able to manipulate the employer by threatening to
disclose information that is legitimately confidential, or cause loss to the
employer, for example by reporting invalid safety concerns. However, it is
submitted that the spectre of the vindictive employee should not be used to
make otherwise desirable protection fail22.
In the debates on the Public Interest Disclosure Bill the opposition to
the Bill was mostly on the basis that protection for employees would leave
employers vulnerable to such problems. see H.C. Deb., 1st March 1996,
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As well as considering who should determine where the public interest lies,
and the role of the employee's motive, the following issues also need to be
determined: whether the employee must raise the matter internally before
being given the protection; whether the employee is protected even where
she has based the allegation of misconduct on incorrect information; where
the burden of proof that any dismissal was linked to disclosure should lie;
whether all employees deserve the same protection; and what remedies
should be available.
3.1.1 Judging the public interest
The key to providing proper protection for employees who make public
interest disclosures is in correctly determining where the public interest lies
in any given case. The choice of who should decide where the public
interest lies in a particular case is between the employee, the court, and
legislative determination. Each option has its advantages and disadvantages.
3.1.1.1 The employee
The UKCC code of professional conduct for nursing staff, whilst of limited
legal authority, provides that staff should raise concerns where they are of
the view that to do so would serve the public interest. Allowing
protection where, in the employee's view, the public interest is served by
the disclosure, would allow maximum protection to the whistleblower. The
employee can then make a disclosure safe in the knowledge that her belief
that the public interest is served gives her protection against reprisal. The
benefit of making the employee the arbiter of the public interest in this way
is that it gives certainty to the person contemplating blowing the whistle,
cols. 1108- 1175
23 Clause 10, UKCC Code of Professional Conduct.
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and thereby encourages public interest disclosures, and the exercise of free
speech.
However, legislation drafted in this way would give employers too little
protection from misguided employees. Protection should be limited to cases
where the employee's belief that the public interest is served is based on
reasonable grounds; this would provide some protection for the employer.
However, even with such a restriction on the protection, the employee
would still be protected where she had a reasonable but mistaken belief that
the public interest was served by a disclosure. In such cases, the employer
would have confidential or sensitive information disclosed, but would have
no redress.
3.1.1.2 The courts24
If the public interest is not to be judged by the employee at the time of
disclosure, the most obvious alternative is for the issue to be determined
once it reaches court. Arguably courts are in the best position to determine
the public interest, as they are experienced in arbitrating between conflicting
interests. Although employment disputes are not usually determined by
considering the public interest per se, there is plenty of case law within the
common law on the public interest in disclosure 25 which can be drawn on
in looking at the issue in relation to a dismissal case. The effect would be
that, subject to the other factors below, where a court decides that a
disclosure is in the public interest, the employee would be protected from
reprisal. Where the public interest was not served by the disclosure, there
would be no such protection.
240r industrial tribunal
25See Chapter Three, Whistleblowing and the Contract of Employment.
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There are various disadvantages to such an approach. First, the employee
is left in an uncertain position, pending judgment, and may decide against
disclosure where in fact the public interest would have been served.
However, it is hard to escape this problem. Even if the employee were to
be allowed to be judge of the public interest this would still leave the
uncertainty as to whether the court would decide that there were reasonable
grounds for the employee's belief. Unless the public interest question is left
totally to the employee, the employee will have some level of uncertainty.
Yet to reverse this would be to leave the employer in too vulnerable a
position.
Second, the protection of employees is dependent on the court's perception
of the public interest. Although the courts are currently more prepared than
ever to challenge the establishment 26, this has not always been the case,
and may not be in the future. Furthermore, where employees disclose
wrongdoing on the part of an employer courts are likely to find that the
public interest is served, but courts have not always recognised the public
interest in informed public debate of the type enhanced by protest
whistleblowing. Thus, mismanagement in the public sector steel industry
was not said to be of sufficient public interest to justify maintaining the
confidentiality of the source of leaked information 27. If a restrictive view
of the public interest in informed debate is taken, then leaving the question
of the public interest to be determined by courts may weaken any employee
protection, particularly for the protester.
26For example, the successful legal challenges to some areas of
government policy including the financing of the Pergau Dam from ODA
money, the removal of benefit from asylum seekers, etc.
27B,itish Steel v Granada Television [1981] AC 1097
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3.1.1.3 Legislation on the public interest
One final option is to include in any employment protection legislation a
list of matters that it will be in the public interest to disclose. In the USA,
the Whistleblower Protection Act 1989 provides that employees are
protected if they disclose information evidencing a violation of any law,
rule or regulation, or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety. Clearly, the court must still consider whether, for example, the waste
of funds disclosed is a gross waste, or whether a risk to health is
substantial, but at least such a list shows that matters such as an abuse of
authority or mismanagement, where serious enough, can be disclosed. Under
English common law, it is not even clear whether such matters, however
substantial, would be seen as public interest matters28.
The difficulty in framing any list of matters that can be disclosed in the
public interest is that the public interest is not static. For example, harm to
the environment would probably not have been included in any list drawn
up in previous decades, but now would be one of the areas of public
interest that is least contentious 29 . In order to allow for changing concepts
of the public interest, any list should not be exclusive, but include provision
for the court to find disclosure of matters not included in the list to be in
the public interest. The advantage of including a non-exclusive list of
matters that can be disclosed is that it introduces some guidance for the
employee, whilst leaving the ultimate decision to the court.
28British Steel v Granada Television [1981] AC 1097
29Danger to the environment is one of the categories of public interest
matters that survived in the Public Interest Disclosure Bill 1996 after its
amendment in Committee. Maladministration and abuse of authority were
removed from the list in the original bill.
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Such an approach could be very useful for watchdog whistleblowers,
providing guidance on the issues that should be disclosed in the public
interest. However it may be less beneficial for protesters. It remains difficult
to provide legislative support for the contention that protest whistleblowing
is also in the public interest. To an extent, this can be overcome by careful
drafting of the list of public interest issues covered, for example by
providing that disclosures of gross mismanagement or abuse of authority are
included. The list of public interest matters could distinguish between public
and private sector employers, with disclosure of mismanagement and abuse
of authority being covered in respect of the public sector onl?°. Given the
recent privatisation of monopoly industries and the contracting out of many
public services, the distinction between public and private sector is no
longer as clear as it once was31 . In order to reflect the public interest in
the running of these areas of the private sector, this could be extended to
cover "emanations of the state"32.
In addition, a final provision allowing the court to find that a disclosure was
in the public interest, although not relating to a listed matter, would also be
of particular benefit to protest whistleblowers. Such a catch-all provision
provides for the changing concepts of the public interest overtime, and this
may benefit watchdog whistleblowers. But it also means that the court
should not be prevented from finding that protest speech about the effects
of particular policies is in the public interest. It is very difficult to provide
for this in any list of public interest matters. Instead, a general provision
could be included stating that in deciding whether a disclosure is in the
public interest or not, regard should be had for the importance of free
debate on matters of public importance.
30Note that the USA Whistleblower Protection Act, which covers abuse
of authority and gross mismanagement, only covers state employees.
31 Discussed in Chapter Two, para 1.4.
32Foster v British Gas PLC [1991] ICR 84
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3.1.2 The need for a reasonable belief in the truth of an allegation
The main argument against providing protection for the whistleblower is
that it would create unacceptable difficulties for employers. The fear is that
not only would employers be subject to vindictive employees blackmailing
them with the threat of false allegations, but they may also have employees
who are misguided, but acting in good faith in raising a concern, for
example because they have misunderstood a situation and mistakenly
believe that they are disclosing misconduct. Although where an employee
is mistaken in her understanding the employer should easily be able to set
the record straight, the time and costs involved in dealing with such cases
is said to create an intolerable burden on business. Any protection therefore
needs to ensure that vindictive employees are not given the power to hold
businesses to ransom, and that misguided employees are dealt with fairly.
3.1.2.1 The vindictive employee and the relevance of motive
If an employee discloses confidential information out of malice, no
protection will be available. Such conduct would remain a disciplinary
offence by the employee and would warrant dismissal. The difficulty arises
where the information disclosed is not confidential because it is in the
public interest. Here the public has an interest in hearing the information
and that interest is not lessened by the bad faith of the employee.
The answer is to separate the issue of employment protection from that of
the right of the public to hear what the employee says. The fact that an
employee was motivated by bad faith is not a reason to prevent her from
speaking, if the public interest is served by the speech. In re a company 's
application33 , the employee's malicious motivation did not prevent a
1989 2 All ER 248
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finding that there was no breach of confidence in reporting irregularities to
the Inland Revenue and FIMBRA; thus an injunction to prevent the
disclosure was not allowed.
On the other hand, a malicious motivation may be a reason to deny personal
remedies, such as compensation, to the employee34. The conduct of the
employee in acting vindictively against the employer gives a separate reason
for dismissal apart from the public interest disclosure. The fact that the
employee has felt driven to such vindictive behaviour presumably means
that there is no trust and confidence remaining between the parties, and this
can give rise to a fair dismissal. This position can be contrasted with that
of the good faith whistleblower, where trust and confidence may otherwise
be unaffected and who wishes to continue in employment.
3.1.2.2 The genuine but misguided employee
More problematic than the vindictive employee is the employee whose
belief that she is disclosing misconduct or wrongdoing is based on incorrect
information. Here there is no malice, just misunderstanding. The damage
done to the employer may lead to dismissal, yet the lack of malice means
that dismissal may be unjust.
The best protection for employees would be to provide protection where
disclosure is based on a genuine belief as to the accuracy of the allegation,
whether or not it turns out to be correct. This approach has some support.
34This is already an option under current unfair dismissal legislation. s
123 ERA 1996 (previously s 74 EP(C)A 1978) provides that the amount of
compensation shall be an amount that the tribunal considers just and
equitable in all the circumstances. Circumstances such as a malicious
motive on the part of the employee could therefore be taken into account.
Alternatively, where the employee has acted out of an impure motive the
compensation can be limited on the grounds of contributory fault. See
Chapter four, Whistleblowing and Unfair Dismissal para 9.2.1.
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In its Termination of Employment Recommendations 1963 (No. 119) the
ILO recommended that the making in good faith of a complaint that the
employer had violated laws or regulations should not constitute a valid
reason for dismissal. According to this formulation, watchdog
whistleblowers acting out of a genuine belief in the truth of the facts
disclosed would be protected35 . Similarly, protection against dismissal for
asserting a statutory right 36 does not depend on the employee being correct
in her belief that her rights have been infringed; her claim only needs to be
made in good faith37. Protection against victimisation under the Sex
Discrimination Act, Race Relations Act and Disability Discrimination Act
only requires that an allegation of discrimination be made in good faith38.
Again, in Michigan protection for disclosure to a relevant body is only lost
if the employee knows that the disclosure is false 39 . The employee can be
protected both where she mistakenly believes that illegal conduct has taken
place, and where she mistakenly believes that legal conduct is illegal.
However, such protection based only on the good faith of the employee
does leave the employer very susceptible to false allegations, which may
take time to refute and can cause unacceptable losses in the mean time.
35The 1963 Recommendations were superseded by the Termination of
Employment Convention 1982 and Termination of Employment
Recommendations 1982. The later version is even wider, and removes the
requirement that the disclosure be in good faith. Article 5 of the Convention
now reads: "The filing of a complaint or the participation in proceedings
against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or
recourse to competent administrative authorities" shall not constitute a valid
reason for dismissal.
36s 104 ERA 1996 (previously s 60A EP(C)A 1978, introduced by
TURERA 1993)
37s 104 (2) ERA 1996 (previously s 60A (2) EP(C)A 1978)
38 s 2(2) RRA 1976, s 4(2) SDA 1975 and s 55(4) Disability
Discrimination Act 1995.
39Michigan's Whistle-blowers' Protection Act section 15.362
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Instead, where the employee's allegation turns out to be wrong, protection
should usually be available only where there were reasonable grounds for
the belief in misconduct. Where disclosure is made internally, or to an
appropriate external regulatory body, however, a genuine belief should be
sufficient40 . if the allegation is correct, protection should be provided even
though the employee was acting on a suspicion that would have been
difficult to substantiate at the time of disclosure41.
This will deny employees certainty of protection if they suspect wrongdoing
but are unsure whether they have what will be later held to be reasonable
grounds for the suspicion. if such employees make disclosures, they will be
taking a risk that they will be unprotected if the allegation turns out to be
untrue and not based on reasonable grounds. As a result, some public
interest disclosures may not be made. However, the alternative subjects
employers to unacceptable risks from misguided employees, and so this
compromise is necessary.
A slightly different problem is posed by the employee who raises a concern,
but who remains dissatisfied with any action taken to put the matter right.
If such an employee continues to raise the concern, she will be protected
if her concern turns out to be valid. However, if a court later agrees that the
matter was adequately dealt with, she will have difficulty in showing that
the concern was reasonable, given that the employer had taken action to
remedy the situation. Similarly, if a concern is raised with a regulatory body
which does not take the matter up, it will be difficult to show that any
further disclosure was based on a reasonable belief in misconduct.
Protection will then depend on a finding that the allegation was correct.
40This is discussed further below.
41 This represents the current position in relation to breach of confidence
and the public interest defence; see Re a company's application [1989] 2
All ER 248 and Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1988]
3 WLR 776.
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Such an approach, whilst leaving the employee with some uncertainty and
risk, should deal with the fear that protection of whistleblowers will allow
misguided employees repeatedly to make unfounded allegations, and involve
employers in the expense of refuting theni.
3.1.3 Proof that a dismissal was linked to disclosure
As was seen in relation to protection for those who raise concerns about
race or sex discrimination, a major difficulty in providing protection for the
employee lies in showing that dismissal was causally linked to a disclosure.
Employers have succeeded in showing that dismissal was not linked to the
raising of a concern, but rather was caused by a breach in company rules
involved in raising the concern42, or because the manner in which the
concern was raised was disruptive43 . If the causal link between dismissal
and disclosure can be broken so easily, the potential for employees to be
protected will be seriously impaired.
Instead, courts need to take a more generous approach to the issue of
causation, following the example of the protection in the USA. In relation
to the wrongful discharge tort, the Mount Healthy test is used. The
disclosure needs only to be a substantial reason for the dismissal, not the
reason; and employers only have a defence if they can show that, even
without the disclosure the employee would have been dismissed. This
allows the employer a defence if a separate fair reason for dismissal exists,
42British Airways Engine Overhaul Ltd v Francis [1981] IRLR 9 EAT
43Re York Truck Equipment Lid, Industrial Relations Legal Information
Bulletin 20 February 1990, p 11.
Mount Healt&v Cliv School District Board of Education v Doyle 97
S. Ct 568, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The test is in two parts. First, was the
public interest disclosure a substantial reason for the decision to dismiss;
second, if so, could the employer show that the employee would not have
been dismissed but for the disclosure.
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thus preventing employees from making disclosures in order to gain
protection from otherwise justifiable dismissal. It also means that employees
cannot be dismissed because of the manner in which the concern was
raised; in such a case the employee can say that but for the disclosure there
would not have been a dismissal. However, it does allow dismissal where
the employee makes repeated false allegations against the employer. In
effect, the second stage of the test only works in the employer's favour
where an incident, separate from the public interest disclosure, was the
reason for the dismissal.
The test in the 1989 Whistleblower Protection Act is even more generous
to the employee45. This requires only that the employee show that the
whistleblowing was a contributing factor to the dismissal. This can be
shown by pointing to circumstantial evidence, such as that dismissal
followed swiftly after disclosure and that the employer knew of the
disclosure. The burden of proof then shifts to the employer who can only
avoid liability by showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
dismissal would have taken place in the absence of the whistleblowing
activity by the employee.
Both tests improve the position of the employee seeking protection from
reprisal for making a public interest disclosure, whilst affording the
employer protection against the employee who discloses information in
order to gain protection against legitimate disciplinary action. The 1989
WPA test is to be preferred as it creates an easier test for the employee to
meet46.
45See Whistleblower Protection in the U.S.A., above.
See for example, Nagarajan v Agnew [1994] IRLR 61 EAT and
O 'Neil! v Governors of St Thomas More Upper School [1996] IRLR 372
discussed in Chapter Five above.
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As has been noted above, the courts are already taking a more generous
approach to questions of causation in sex discrimination cases, however, the
scope for an amendment to the legal test to solve the problems
whistleblowers face in proving causation should not be exaggerated. The
experience in the USA indicates that even after the test had been changed
in the employee's favour, proving causation remained a major hurdle for
employees.
3.1.4 Internal disclosure as a precondition of protection
In considering the protection in the USA it was noted that some states
protect only external reporting, some only internal reporting and some
protect both modes of disclosure. The argument for restricting protection to
external disclosure is that internal reporting allows employers to cover up
wrongdoing. Such a model is based on the view that protection is given
because it is in the public interest that disclosure be made; hence the
disclosure ought to be public (or at least to some outside body). Another
justification for this model is that dismissal for internal whistleblowing is
regarded as a private matter for the company and outside the remit of court
intervention.
The shortcomings of such an approach are obvious. Whilst the public
interest may be better served by public disclosure, this is not a reason to
limit protection to employees raising concerns publicly. Dismissal for
disclosing public interest matters internally remains unjust and should not
be condoned. Although using an internal procedure allows the employer to
keep any wrongdoing concealed, it also allows good employers to take
action to remedy any wrongdoing and address any concerns without having
to be involved in damaging publicity. For these reasons, although external
disclosure may in some circumstances be preferable, this is no reason to
confine protection to external reporters.
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Equally, the employer's interest in protecting against vindictive or
misguided disclosures is not strong enough to outweigh the public interest
in external disclosure where appropriate. Instead, any automatically unfair
dismissal protection must cover both internal and external reporting whilst
providing some safeguards for the employer. The most obvious way to do
this is to require that, if external disclosure is to be protected, employees
first attempt to raise concerns internally. If a concern is not dealt with, then
the employee can raise the matter externally and still come within the
protection provided.
However, there will be circumstances where the public interest is such that
information needs to be disclosed externally in the first instance. At this
point it is necessaiy to distinguish between external reporting to appropriate
regulatory bodies and wider disclosure, for example via the media.
3.1.4.1 Disclosure to a regulatory body
Where illegal or improper conduct at work is involved, there should be no
restriction on the freedom of the employee to refer the matter to an
appropriate investigative body. For example, where an employee suspects
tax improprieties, she should be able to refer the matter to the Inland
Revenue without fear of reprisal. It is then up to the Inland Revenue to
investigate the claim. If it is upheld then action can be taken; if not, then
the matter can be dropped. There seems to be no reason to prevent the
employee from raising such concerns directly with the regulatory body.
The only risk to the employer is from vindictive or misguided employees
making false allegations. However, as long as the matter is treated in
confidence by the Inland Revenue whilst it is being investigated, the
employer, even if falsely accused, should suffer no great loss, apart from
the loss of the time involved in any investigation. The public interest in
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preventing criminal behaviour may justify the risk of this loss to the
employer. It is unlikely to occur repeatedly to the same employer, unless a
vindictive employee is involved. In such a case, the regulatoty body should
be trusted to be able to distinguish between vexatious reporting and genuine
concerns, and to minimise any loss to the employer. On the other hand,
there is no reason why an employee who repeatedly refers matters to an
external body, out of malice, should continue to be employed, and such an
employee may find that any resulting dismissal was fair, as the dismissal
would not be for raising the concern in the first place but for raising it
repeatedly without good cause, after it has been investigated and dismissed
by a regulatory body.
If an employee is not vindictive, but just misguided, there may be different
problems. If a concern is raised once with a regulatory body, this should not
give rise to dismissal or discipline, even if the concern is not valid. If,
however, different false concerns are raised repeatedly, this may of itself
give a fair reason to dismiss. More problematic is where the employee
refuses to accept the judgement of the regulator and continues to voice the
concern, perhaps via the media. Here the employee may claim protection
because she will first have attempted to raise the concern through more
appropriate channels. If the concern is found to be in the public interest,
then disclosure to the media is appropriate, if the matter has not already
been dealt with satisfactorily. If the concern is not in the public interest,
then the employee will not be protected. Any requirement that an employees
belief in the conduct must be reasonable will not be fulfilled where the
concern has been dropped by an appropriate regulatory body after
investigation.
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3.1.4.2 Disclosure to the media
In Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans47 (where information disclosed cast
doubt on the reliability of breathalyser machines), the courts confirmed that
there are occasions where disclosure direct to the media is appropriate. For
example, where concerns are urgent, particularly on matters of health and
safety, disclosure via the press offers the quickest way to reach the widest
number of people. Where the public interest is served, the employee should
not suffer reprisal for raising the matter directly with the media.
Alternatively, employees may justifiably choose to disclose to the media
where there is no relevant regulatoiy body, and internal disclosure would
give the employer a chance to cover up any wrongdoing. In such cases, the
fact that disclosure was not first made internally should not prevent the
disclosure from being protected.
Where disclosure via an internal mechanism or to a regulatory body has not
resulted in the resolution of the matter, or where the employee has reason
to believe that reporting via these channels would be futile, disclosures
directly to the media should be protected. Clearly in these cases the
employee will be running a risk. Taking the example of disclosure to
regulatory bodies, if the courts agree with the employee's view that the
regulatory body had not adequately dealt with the matter, then protection
will be granted; if the court confirms the regulatory body's decision not to
proceed with the matter then the employee may find it hard to show that
her personal belief that any allegation was correct was held on reasonable
grounds. Although this may cause hardship to an employee acting in good
faith, to provide protection on the basis only of the employee's view that
media disclosure was appropriate would be to make employers too
[l984] 2 All ER 41
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vulnerable to breaches of confidence on a wide scale by misguided
employees.
Restricting protection for media disclosure to cases where matters are first
raised internally except in the circumstances mentioned above, should not
cause the watchdog whistleblower too much difficulty. Concerns can be
raised internally, or via an appropriate external body, and where neither of
these resolve the matter, with the press.
However, protesters face greater difficulties. Although it cannot be in the
public interest for employees to be vulnerable to reprisals for participating
in debate on matters of public importance, the types of concern raised in
protest are less likely to be of the urgent nature traditionally seen as
requiring disclosure on a wide scale. On the other hand, the concerns of the
protester cannot, by their nature, be raised internally, nor will there be any
appropriate regulatory body. According to the approach considered above,
disclosure straight to the media is therefore appropriate, as long as it serves
the public interest. If, in determining whether the public interest is served
by any particular speech, courts consider the public interest in its widest
context, as advocated above, this difficulty should be largely overcome.
3.13 The position of the employee within the organisation
'Where employees seek legal protection of their rights to freedom of speech
at work, it may be that the position of the individual within the organisation
is relevant. In the USA, employees whose jobs have a confidential or
policy-making nature are excluded from the protection of the Whistleblower
Protection Act 1989. It is arguable that senior employees take on a level of
confidentiality and loyalty above that of the ordinary worker, and that
dismissal for disclosure by such employees is more easily justified.
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It is difficult to see why this should be the case in relation to watchdog
whistleblowers. If an organisation is involved in illegal or unsafe practices,
this information should be in the public domain. Indeed, in some cases,
those in senior positions have access to the information that reveals the
most serious wrongdoing. There is no reason to require senior employees
to protect such organisational secrets by depriving them of protection.
The position may be different for protest whistleblowers. The difficulty here
is that where senior employees speak publicly about a matter of more
general concern, they may be thought to speak on behalf of the
organisation, and this may cause difficulty, depending on the content of the
speech. For example, the European Commission on Human Rights has held
that dismissal for political activity on behalf of party hostile to presence of
foreign workers in the Netherlands was not an infringement of the right to
freedom of speech, because the employee involved was the director of an
immigration centre, and the speech was clearly incompatible with his
job48.
Where senior employees are involved it may be that some forms of protest
are not compatible with continued employment, for example if a marketing
manager denigrates the quality of her employer's products. However,
although the option needs to be open for a court to say that dismissal was
fair because of position of the employee makes the expression of particular
views incompatible with continued employment, care would need to be
taken not to conclude too often that this is the case. For example, senior
medical staff carrying out predominantly medical work should be allowed
to voice opinions on the state of the NHS, as such views do not interfere
with the continuation of their medical duties, even if the seniority of the
staff member causes added embarrassment to the employing trust. Pitt
48 Van Der HeUden v the Netherlands 11002/84 (1985) decision of 8
March
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suggests that speech should only be restricted where the employee acts as
a spokesperson for the organisation, or where, because of her position, her
speech will be regarded as that of the organisation 49 . Otherwise, speech
should not be restricted because of the position of the employee within the
organisation. It is submitted that this is the correct approach.
3.1.6 Remedies
The current remedies for employees who are unfairly dismissed are clearly
inadequate. Compensation levels are subject to a maximum that has failed
to keep up with rising pay levels. Even if the maximum compensation is
awarded, true compensation for the employee's losses is unlikely, especially
as the employee dismissed for making a disclosure may find it hard to find
new employment. The other remedies, reengagement and reinstatement are
rarely awarded, where they are, the cost to the employer will not be very
high. All in all, the remedies that can be granted to the employee mean that
it is fairly easy for the employer to pay off an employee, by giving him the
maximum compensation. The case is then never heard, and the employee,
who may still be without a job, has no further redress. The remedies thus
fail adequately to compensate, nor do they pose a serious disincentive to
employers.
For any employee protection to be effective the remedies must be
strengthened. One option is to remove the upper ceiling on compensation,
as has been done for sex and race discrimination cases, so that actual losses
can be compensated. Alternatively, additional remedies could be allowed,
as they are where dismissal is for trade union activity and dismissal for
activities as a health and safety representative. Punitive compensation could
49see Pitt, Rights and Employee Rights - the Case of Free Speech, in
Understanding Human Rights, Geary and Tomkins eds. (1996) Mansell,
London, p. 393
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be awarded against employers found to have dismissed for a public interest
disclosure, and refusing to reemploy, as it can be for dismissals for trade
union activity50. Further protection would be provided by allowing
employees who are dismissed for public interest disclosure to claim interim
relief; a tribunal, having found that the employee is likely to succeed in her
claim could then order reinstatement pending a full hearing, or that the
contract (and therefore pay) continues during such a period51.
The extension of remedies beyond those available for straight unfair
dismissal claims could improve the position of employees dismissed for
making public interest disclosures. Allowing tribunals to compensate losses
fully will at least benefit the dismissed employee, and may also act as a
deterrent to employers.
It might be argued that these improvements to remedies are needed for all
dismissal cases, raising the question of whether there is anything about
public interest disclosure dismissals that warrants special treatment. One
answer to this is that unfair dismissal protection would be greatly enhanced
by an improvement in remedies to reflect the real costs to employees of
unfair dismissal and to encourage the use of reinstatement and
reengagement as remedies. However, given that wholesale reform of
remedies is unlikely, a special case for public interest disclosure dismissals
can be made. Where dismissal of individuals is unfair either because there
is no fair reason or because the dismissal was carried out with an unfair
procedure, an injustice is done to the individual employee, which should be
compensated. 'Where a person is dismissed for making a disclosure that is
in the public interest, not only is an injustice done to the individual, but the
public interest is harmed, particularly as others may be deterred from
bringing similarly important information to public attention. Such conduct,
50ss 156 -158 TULR(C)A 1992
51 ss 161 - 166 TULR(C)A 1992
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involving public as well as private interests, therefore deserves particular
protection52.
3.1.7 Eligibility
Unfair dismissal protection is usually only provided once the employee has
worked for the employer for two years. Where dismissals are for reasons
that are automatically unfair, employees are usually protected regardless of
the length of employment53 . This should apply to employees dismissed for
raising public interest concerns. Apart from the fact that these dismissals
deserve special protection for the reasons outlined above, this is particularly
necessary as it is often the case that those who are new to an organisation
see it more clearly, and may be in better position to notice matters that
ought in the public interest to be disclosed, than those who have worked for
an employer for a number of years who may be imbued with the culture of
a workplace and may no longer notice issues of concern. Requiring
employees to work for two years before providing protection may also
encourage employers to dismiss any employees who do not seem happy to
toe the line, before their two years have been served, again prejudicing the
public interest as well as the private interests of the individual employee.
Given that the public interest is served by protected disclosures, other limits
on eligibility should also be removed such as the lower and upper age
limits. However, the final limit, that protection is limited to employees
52The same argument can be applied to the special protection for trade
union activities, which dates from a time when what was seen as at stake
was not just the individual right to organise, but the collective rights of
many.
53E.G. for pregnancy related reasons, for trade union activity, for
activities as health and safety representative, for exercising a statutory right.
However, to be protected against a dismissal connected to a transfer of an
undertaking (unless for an economic, technical or organisational reason
entailing changes in the workforce) employees must have worked for two
years.
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cannot be lifted without fundamentally altering the nature of unfair
dismissal protection.
3.2 The Limitations of Unfair Dismissal Protection
The limitation of protection to employees remains a serious obstacle to full
protection for whistleblowers. There may well be occasions where casual
workers, temporary workers, agency workers, or other self employed
workers wish to raise concerns without having their contracts terminated.
Even though they are not employees, the termination of a contract for
services can have an adverse effect on a worker, which, as well as being
unjust may well act as a deterrent to raising a concern. As with new
employees, external contractors who work inside a workplace may well see
matters with fresh insight, and may see that it is in the public interest that
matters be raised either internally or externally. Leaving such workers
unprotected may therefore harm their individual interests and the public
interest.
Just as the remedies and eligibility rules can be altered and improved for
dismissals that are against the public interest, it might be possible to extend
protection to workers who are not employees. However to do so would be
to introduce wholesale change to the nature of unfair dismissal protection.
It is submitted that at this stage it would be simpler to change the basis of
protection to enable the limitations to be met, rather than continue
piecemeal alterations to unfair dismissal protection that change it out of all
recognition.
This argument is fuelled by consideration of the fact that unfair dismissal
protection only protects against dismissal. Full protection for public interest
disclosure requires that action short of dismissal, such as demotion, failure
to promote, unfair disciplinary action, and failure to employ, if they can be
shown to be linked to public interest disclosure, should also be unlawful.
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For these reasons, it may well be that automatically unfair dismissal
legislation is not the best vehicle for providing protection for public interest
disclosure. Instead, wider protection would be provided by using the model
of anti-discrimination protection rather than that of unfair dismissal.
4 Creation of a right not to be discriminated against for exercising the
right to freedom of speech
Protection against discrimination on grounds or race or sex in the
employment sphere is fairly comprehensive. It includes protection against
dismissal, disciplinaiy action, omission or refusal to employ, and access to
training and other benefits. In addition, the protection extends beyond the
traditional employment sphere, and includes protection for contract
workersTM, and members of partnerships 55, as well as providing protection
against discrimination in the provision of services.
Using a discrimination model to formulate protection for whistleblowers
would have the advantage that any worker could be covered, not just
employees; in addition, any adverse action short of dismissal could also be
covered. Thus, the failure to employ a person because of past disclosures,
or the fear of future ones, would be unlawful, as would a failure to
promote, or the subjection of the worker to harassment because of a
disclosure. Instead of being forced to resign and claim constructive (and
unfair) dismissal in such circumstances, the worker would be able to claim
54s 9 SDA 1975 and s 7 RRA 1976
"s 11 SDA 1975 and s 10 RRA 1976
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that she was being discriminated on the grounds of having exercised her
right to freedom of speech.
The extension of protection to workers who are not employees has
increased significance given current trends towards a flexible workforce,
relying on contract workers, out-sourcing, home working and other forms
of non-standard working relationships. In order for these and other workers
to be adequately protected, protection should not be limited to employees.
Apart from the fact that a discrimination model enables protection to be
widened without altering the unfair dismissal protection out of all
recognition, it also ties in with an increasing recognition that a new
category of public or civil rights dismissals need protection, and that these
should be based on the anti-discrimination model 56. The argument here is
that unfair dismissal legislation has too narrow a remit. While recognising
the importance of job security for individual workers and ensuring that any
denial of that security is for one of a number of selected fair reasons and
carried out using fair procedures, it is nevertheless predicated on
maintaining managerial prerogative, particularly as evidenced by the "range
of reasonable responses" test. Although some dismissals have been
designated automatically unfair, this has been done for variety of different
public policy reasons57, some at behest of Europe 58, and with no real
56Collins, Justice in Dismissal, (1992) Clarendon Press, Oxford; Collins,
The meaning of job securizv, (1991) 20 lU 227; Deakin, The Utility of
'Rights Talk': Employees' Personal Rights, in Understanding Human
Rights, Geary and Tomkins eds. (1996) Mansell, London; Pitt, Rig/its and
Employee Rights - the Case of Free Speech, in Understanding Human
Rights, Geary and Tomkins eds. (1996) Mansell, London.
57Such as the protection of pregnant workers s 99 ERA 1996
(previously s 60 EP(C)A 1978), and the protection of trade union workers
s 152 T!JLR(C)A.
58For example s 100 (ERA (previously s 57A) (Health and safety
representatives) and Regulation 8 TUPE 1981
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overarching rationale. If it is felt necessary to provide protection against
dismissal where human rights are in issue, it would be better to start afresh
on a consistent and rational basis that discrimination for exercising human
rights is unlawful, rather than by ad hoc amendments to the list of
automatically unfair reasons for dismissal.
Given the competing interests at stake in any case of disclosure of sensitive
information, any protection based on an anti-discrimination model would
clearly need to include an employer defence where the discrimination was
justified. For example, discrimination against an employee for a straight
breach of confidence would be justified. In fact, all the restrictions on the
right not to be dismissed, discussed above, such as the need to disclose
internally first in most cases, would need to be incorporated into any
employer defence of justification. Thus, discriminatory action against an
employee who makes a false allegation to the press, without reasonable
grounds for making it, would be justified.
In this way, any right not to be discriminated against on the basis of having
exercised the right to freedom of speech at work would be subject to the
same safeguards for the employer as those examined above in relation to
the proposed automatic unfair reason for dismissal. The benefit is that
protection would be broader, applying to any detrimental action taken
against any type of worker. Framing protection as anti-discrimination
legislation may also help the whistleblower as the model used would bring
the protection into a tradition that views unlawful discrimination prima facie
as a breach of a fundamental right, and thus interprets any justifications as
restrictively as possible 59. Such an approach should aid the protester in
particular, as it would mean the protection would be interpreted on the
59North Yorkshire CC v Ratc4ffe [1995] IRLR 439 provides a good
illustration of the willingness of courts to look at wider social issues when
deciding cases relating to equal treatment and equal pay.
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assumption that the protester can speak, with justification only being
established where some type of harm has been done to the employer.
5 An essential core of protection
Despite the arguments in favour of a rights based model, reform is likely
to take the form of the creation of an automatically unfair reason for
dismissal. The parliamentary debates on the 1996 Public Interest Disclosure
Bill60 demonstrate the level of opposition that any proposed protection
would command61 . An attempt to introduce full and comprehensive
protection, for both watchdog and protest whistleblowers, is likely to be
unsuccessful and would run the risk of jeopardising even the most basic
protection in the process. It is thus worth identifying a core of protection
that is most urgently needed, in the hope that its introduction would be less
controversial. It may then pave the way for the introduction of more
comprehensive protection at a later date.
In justifying the need for protection for freedom of speech, above, the
discussion has often focused on the arguments in favour of protest
whistleblowing in particular. However, this should not be taken to imply
that protest whistleblowing is more important, but rather that the case is less
self evident than the case in favour of allowing watchdog whistleblowing.
Where employees engage in protest they come into conflict with well
established principles of employee trust and loyalty, which are still closely
adhered to, despite the arguments set out above demonstrating the public
interest in protest on certain issues. The fear that protection will undermine
such loyalty may mean that any move to introduce protection for protesters
will lose support.
60See H.C. Debs., 1st March 1996, cols. 1108 - 1175.
61Although the Labour Party has said that it will introduce
whistleblower protection if elected. It would probably form part of an act
to secure freedom of information.
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In contrast, the case in favour of protecting the watchdog whistleblower is
very strong, backed as it is by the examples provided by the disasters at
Zeebrugge, Clapham Junction, and on the Piper Alpha oil platform. Core
protection is clearly needed to protect those who raise concerns about
immediate health and safety risks, and risks of serious financial malpractice;
the argument that employers engaged in such hazardous activities are
worthy of loyalty is hard to sustain.
In terms of the level of protection required, it has been suggested that it
should ideally extend to any discrimination as a result of raising a public
interest concern. However, any proposed legislation would stand a greater
chance of success if the protection were limited to dismissal. Other forms
of reprisal are objectionable, but leave employees with less stark choices
than when faced with dismissal. After all, if an employee has action short
of dismissal taken against her, she remains employed, if not on the terms
or in circumstances that she would choose. If reprisal stops short of outright
dismissal, but leaves the employee with no option but to resign, the law
already provides that the employee can claim to have been constructively
dismissed, and the core protection would therefore cover such
circumstances62.
62Given the need for a more pragmatic approach if legislation is to be
introduced, it is not surprising that the Public Interest Disclosure Bill 1996
was limited to protecting watchdog whistleblowers against dismissal. The
Bill contained a list of matters that could be disclosed, limited to offences
or breaches of legal obligations, improper or unauthorised use of public
funds, miscarriages of justice and dangers to health and safety or to the
environment. Prior to amendment after committee stage, the original draft
of the Bill contained a non-exhaustive list which also contained abuse of
authority and maladministration.
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6 Limitations of legal reform
Finally, whichever model of protection is used, whether core or
comprehensive, the limited potential for the law to protect the individual
whistleblower must be recognised.
The problem of proving a causal connection between the whistleblowing
and any retaliatory action will remain regardless of where the burden of
proof lies in any protection introduced. In the USA, where the burden of
proof is weighted strongly in favour of the employee, the main hurdle for
employees is still proving the connection between the employer's acts and
the employees' disclosures 63 . The tactics that employers may use to avoid
the protection whilst retaliating against the employee are well documented
and include moving employees to "bad" jobs, intensifying the employees
workload, isolating the employee, suggesting that the employee has
psychiatric problems, and asking the employee to solve the problem while
not providing the resources to allow this to be done".
Given that it will be impossible to create a system that is risk-free for the
employee without leaving an employer too vulnerable to unwarranted
allegations, a level of risk that such action will be taken is inevitable. The
public interest will only be served where employees are public spirited
enough to speak out, despite this residual level of risk. V/hat is necessary
to encourage employees to take such risks in the public interest is the belief
on the part of the employee that action will be taken to put right the wrong
reported. In the US, it has been found that employees often do not report
63 V,1istleblower Protection: Determining Whether Reprisal Occurred
Remains Dfflcult, October 1992, U.S. General Accounting Office.
"Devin and Aplin, Whistleblower Protection - The Gap Between the
Law and Reality [ 1988] Howard Law Journal, 223; Evans and Lewis, Anti-
Union Discrimination: Practice Law and Policy (1987) 16 lU 88; Lennane,
"Whistleblowing": a health issue (1993) 307 BMJ 667
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concerns, despite the protection available, because they believe that
concerns are not taken up, and in practice nothing changes after a report has
been made65 . Where employees feel that concerns will be heard and acted
upon then there is an incentive to speak up, despite the risks. Conversely,
taking any risk to one's job if the wrong being reported will not be put
right remains an empty gesture.
In order to tap into the resource represented by the employee, then, not only
is legal protection needed but also a change in workplace culture.
Employees' concerns need to be taken seriously and their capacity for
making valuable contributions to the running of business and the protection
of the public interest needs to be recognised. Only then will any protection
provided by the law be able to work to its full potential to serve the public
interest.
65 Whistleblower Protection: Survey of Federal Employees on
Misconduct and Protection from Reprisal. July 1992, U.S. General
Accounting Office.
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